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1. Introduction
Is rational social interaction possible? This may seem a sur-
prising question, given the Apollonian flavor of the con-
temporary behavioral and social sciences. Rational choice
theory (RCT) is the cornerstone of neoclassical economics
(Arrow et al. 1996; Elster 1986; Sugden 1991b). In political
science, RCT began to mushroom after the publication of
Social Choice and Individual Values (Arrow 1963) and
transformed the discipline within a few decades (Friedman
1996; Green & Shapiro 1994; Ordeshook 1986). In sociol-
ogy, Weber’s (1922/1968) analyses of law and economics as
models of rationality prepared the ground for the germina-
tion of RCT ideas half a century later (Abell 1991; Coleman
& Fararo 1992; Hollis 1987; Moser 1990). Theories of be-
havioral ecology (Dawkins 1989; Krebs & Davies 1987),
and particularly, the evolution of social behavior (Maynard
Smith 1984), were revolutionized by the introduction of
RCT-based game theory in the early 1970s (Maynard Smith
& Price 1973); and even jurisprudence has been influenced
by RCT (Raz 2000).
1.1. Rationality in psychology
In psychology, the picture is admittedly more complex.
Since the publication of Freud’s earliest metapsychological
writings, and in particular his adumbration of the distinc-
tion between two principles of mental functioning, the 
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Were such things here as we do speak about?
Or have we eaten on the insane root
That takes the reason prisoner?
—Macbeth (I.iii.84)
reality principle and the pleasure principle (Freud 1911) –
only the first of which he believed to be functionally ratio-
nal – psychologists have paid particular attention to irra-
tional aspects of thought and behavior. But psychologists
have generally assumed, usually tacitly, that rationality is
normal, whereas irrationality is, in some sense, abnormal or
pathological.1
1.2. Bounded rationality
This article is not concerned merely with the accuracy of
RCT in predicting human behavior. The concept of
bounded rationality (Simon 1957) has been widely ac-
cepted and corroborated by experimental evidence. Our
bounded rationality obliges us to use rough-and-ready rules
of thumb (heuristics) that can lead to predictable errors and
judgmental biases, many of which have been investigated
empirically (Bell et al. 1988; Kahneman et al. 1982), but
that allow us to solve problems quickly and efficiently
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein 1996; Gigerenzer et al. 1999). For
example, a simple rule of win-stay, lose-change can lead to
the evolution of mutually beneficial cooperation in a group
of players who are ignorant not only of the payoff structure
of the game but even of the fact that they are involved with
other players in a strategic interaction (Coleman et al.
1990).
1.3. Evolutionary game theory
Game-theoretic equilibrium points can thus be arrived at
by entirely non-rational evolutionary processes. The basic
concepts of game theory can be mapped to the elements of
the theory of natural selection as follows. Players corre-
spond to individual organisms, strategies to organisms’
genotypes, and payoffs to the changes in their Darwinian
fitness – the numbers of offspring resembling themselves
that they transmit to future generations. In evolutionary
game theory interpreted biologically, the players do not
choose their strategies (genotypes) rationally or even delib-
erately, but different profiles of strategies lead to different
payoffs, and natural selection mimics deliberate choice.
Maynard Smith and Price (1973) introduced the concept of
the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) to handle such
games. It is a strategy with the property that if most mem-
bers of a population adopt it, then no mutant strategy can
invade the population by natural selection, and it is there-
fore the strategy that we should expect to see commonly in
nature. An ESS is invariably a Nash equilibrium (see sect.
5.1 below), and therefore a type of game-theoretic solution;
but not every Nash equilibrium is an ESS.
Evolutionary game theory deals with social as well as bi-
ological evolution. It has been studied intensively since the
1970s, and the theory is well understood (Hofbauer & Sig-
mund 1998; Samuelson 1997). Even purely analytic studies
can solve problems and provide useful insights. A simple ex-
ample with psychological relevance is an evolutionary
model of Antisocial Personality Disorder, based on a multi-
player Chicken game, that provided an explanation for the
low but stable prevalence of this disorder in widely diverse
societies (Colman & Wilson 1997; see also Colman 1995b).
Evolutionary games have also been studied empirically
(Maynard Smith 1984), and above all, computationally,
sometimes by running strategies against one another and
transmitting copies of these strategies to future generations
according to their accumulating payoffs (Axelrod 1984;
1997, Chs. 1, 2; Nowak et al. 1995; Nowak & Sigmund
1993). Evolutionary game theory deals with non-rational
strategic interaction driven by mindless adaptive processes
resembling trial and error, and it is therefore not directly
relevant to this article. Populations of insects, plants, and
even computer programs can evolve to game-theoretic
equilibrium points, and cooperation can evolve without ra-
tional decision making. This article, however, focuses on
whether full rationality can be applied to social interaction.
1.4. Outline of the argument
When a decision involves two or more interactive decision
makers, each having only partial control over the outcomes,
an individual may have no basis for rational choice without
strong assumptions about how the other(s) will act. This
complicates the picture and leads to problems, in some
cases even to the breakdown of the standard concept of ra-
tionality.2 This article brings together a heterogeneous and
disparate collection of arguments and evidence suggesting
that rationality, conventionally defined, is not characteristic
of human social interaction in general.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 outlines the nature of rationality and its formaliza-
tion. Section 3 focuses more specifically on game theory,
and section 4 on game theory’s underlying assumptions.
Section 5 argues that selection of focal points and of payoff-
dominant equilibria is inexplicable according to game-the-
oretic rationality, and that a key solution concept for coop-
erative games is not always applicable. Section 6 is devoted
to social dilemmas, in which rationality is self-defeating and
human decision makers are paradoxically more successful
than ideally rational agents. Section 7 deals with backward
induction in sequential games where the standard concept
of rationality appears incoherent. Section 8 introduces psy-
chological game theory and outlines some nonstandard
contributions designed to overcome these problems. Fi-
nally, section 9 draws the threads together and summarizes
the conclusions.
2. Nature of rationality
What is rationality? Broadly speaking, it involves thinking
and behaving reasonably or logically, and it comes in several
guises (Manktelow & Over 1993). Rational beliefs are those
that are internally consistent,3 and rational arguments are
those that obey the rules of logic. Rational preferences and
decisions require more detailed explanation.
2.1. Rational preferences
Suppose a universe of alternatives includes a subset A of al-
ternatives that are available in a particular decision context.
Decision theorists generally assume that an agent’s rational
preferences obey the following conditions.
1. Completeness: For every pair of alternatives ai and aj
in A, the agent either prefers ai to aj, or prefers aj to ai, or
is indifferent between ai and aj.
2. Transitivity: Given alternatives ai, aj, and ak in A, an
agent who considers ai to be at least as preferable as aj, and
aj at least as preferable as ak, considers ai to be at least as
preferable as ak.
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3. Context-free ordering: If an agent considers ai to be
at least as preferable as aj in A, then that agent considers ai
to be at least as preferable as aj in an enlarged set A9 con-
taining all the elements in A plus additional elements from
the universe of alternatives.
These three conditions are collectively called the weak
ordering principle (McClennen 1990, Ch. 2). We had to be-
gin with a subset A to give meaning to the third condition,
which would otherwise be implied by the first.4 Given pref-
erences that satisfy this tripartite principle, a rational deci-
sion maker always chooses a maximally preferable alterna-
tive (which may not be unique, hence “a” rather than “the”).
The formalization of this in expected utility theory will be
discussed in sections 2.3 to 2.6 below. Experimental evi-
dence suggests that human decision makers frequently vi-
olate the second and third conditions (Doyle et al. 1999;
Huber et al. 1982; Slovic & Lichtenstein 1983; Tversky
1969), although they tend to modify their intransitive pref-
erences, at least, when their violations are pointed out to
them.
2.2. Rational decisions
Rational decisions or choices are those in which agents act
according to their preferences, relative to their knowledge
and beliefs at the time of acting. This is instrumental ratio-
nality (or means-end rationality), and it can be traced back
to the Scottish Enlightenment writings of David Hume
(1739–1740/1978) and Adam Smith (1776/1910). Hume
gave the most frequently quoted account of it in his Trea-
tise of Human Nature (2.III.iii):
Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and
can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey
them. . . . A passion can never, in any sense, be call’d unrea-
sonable, but when founded on a false supposition, or when it
chuses means insufficient for the design’d end. (Hume 1739–
40/1978, pp. 415–16)
Hume conceived of reason as a faculty affording the
means for achieving goals that are not themselves afforded
by reason. Russell (1954) summed this up lucidly: “‘Rea-
son’ has a perfectly clear and precise meaning. It signifies
the choice of the right means to an end that you wish to
achieve. It has nothing whatever to do with the choice of
ends” (p. 8).
2.3. Expected utility theory
Formally, decisions that maximize expected utility (EU) are
rational decisions. The theory of EU was first presented in
axiomatic form by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947)
in an appendix to the second edition of Theory of Games
and Economic Behavior. It is based on the weak ordering
principle (see sect. 2.1 above), extended to gambles or lot-
teries among outcomes. It is assumed that a player can ex-
press a preference or indifference not only between any
pair of outcomes, but also between an outcome and a gam-
ble involving a pair of outcomes, or between a pair of gam-
bles, and that the weak ordering principle applies to these
preferences also.
This necessitates a further assumption, called the inde-
pendence principle (McClennen 1990, Ch. 3). If g1, g2, and
g3 are any three gambles, and 0 , p # 1, then g1 is pre-
ferred to g2 if and only if a gamble involving g1 with prob-
ability p and g3 with probability 1 – p is preferred to a gam-
ble involving g2 with probability p and g3 with probability
1 – p. From this independence principle, together with the
weak ordering principle, it is possible to define a function
u(g) that assigns a numerical expected utility to every out-
come and gamble, in such a way that the expected utility
of a gamble is equal to the sum of the utilities of its com-
ponents, weighted by their probabilities. It can then be
proved that agents who maximize u(g) are acting accord-
ing to their preferences and are thus manifesting instru-
mental rationality. Von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
are measured on an interval scale, with an arbitrary zero
point and unit of measurement, like temperature mea-
sured on a Fahrenheit or Celsius scale, and are therefore
unique up to a strictly increasing linear (affine) transfor-
mation. This means that two utility scales u and u9 repre-
sent the same preferences if a and b are arbitrary con-
stants, a . 0, and u9 5 au 1 b. It follows that maximizing
u9 is equivalent to maximizing u. Harless and Camerer
(1994) and Starmer (2000) have comprehensively re-
viewed EU theory and several alternative “non-expected
utility” theories and related empirical findings (see also
Camerer 1995; Fishburn 1988; Frisch & Clemen 1994;
Hey & Orme 1994; Lea et al. 1987; Machina 1987; 1991;
Sosa & Galloway 2000; Taylor 1996).
2.4. Subjective expected utility theory
In Bayesian game theory (initiated by Harsanyi 1967–
1968), expected utilities are based on subjective probabili-
ties rather than objective relative frequencies, and what is
maximized is subjective expected utility (SEU). In SEU the-
ory, utilities obey the axioms formulated by Savage (1954)5
or one of the alternative axiom systems that have been pro-
posed. Savage built on the axioms of von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1947), who introduced the independence
principle, and Ramsey (1931), who showed how to define
subjective probabilities in terms of preferences among
gambles. Rational decisions are those that maximize EU,
whether objective or subjective.
2.5. Utility maximization
Utility maximization has a straightforward interpretation in
individual decision making. The choice of alternative ai is
rational if the possible alternatives are a1, . . . , am, and
there are foreseeable outcomes c1, . . . , cm, such that a1
leads reliably to c1, . . . , and am leads reliably to cm, and no
outcome has a higher utility for the decision maker than ci.
A choice is thus rational if no alternative yields a preferable
outcome.
2.6. Expected utility maximization
According to the theory of revealed preference, popular
with economists, a person who is observed to choose alter-
native ai, and to reject aj, is said to have revealed a prefer-
ence of ai over aj and a higher utility for ai than aj – and
choice behavior therefore maximizes expected utility tau-
tologically.6 If chance plays a part, and the choice of ai leads
not to a definite outcome ci but to a foreseeable probabil-
ity distribution over the set of outcomes, then a decision
maker who chooses an alternative that maximizes the
weighted average expected utility (EU) is acting rationally.
But if the decision is interactive and the outcome is deter-
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mined by two or more decision makers, then the interpre-
tation of instrumental rationality is unclear because, except
in special cases, an individual cannot maximize EU in any
obvious way. In interactive decisions, EU maximization is
undefined without further assumptions.
3. Game theory
The necessary assumptions are provided by game theory,
the framework within which interactive decisions are mod-
eled. This is a mathematical theory applicable to any social
interaction involving two or more decision makers (play-
ers), each with two or more ways of acting (strategies), 
so that the outcome depends on the strategy choices of all
the players, each player having well-defined preferences
among the possible outcomes, enabling corresponding von
Neumann-Morgenstern utilities (payoffs) to be assigned.
The definition is inclusive, embracing as it does a wide
range of social interactions.
3.1. Abstraction and idealization
A game is a mathematical abstraction functioning as an ide-
alization of a social interaction. An actual interaction is in-
variably too complex and ephemeral to be comprehended
clearly; thus it is replaced by a deliberately simplified ab-
straction in which the rules and basic elements (players,
strategies, payoffs) are explicitly defined, and from which
other properties can be inferred by logical reasoning alone.
These inferences apply to the idealized game, not directly
to the social interaction that it purports to model, and they
are valid, provided that the reasoning is sound, whether or
not the game models the original interaction accurately. But
if it does not, usually because of faulty judgments about
which features to ignore, then its relevance and usefulness
are limited. To be both relevant and useful, a game must in-
corporate the important properties of the interaction and
must also generate inferences that are not obvious without
its help.
3.2. Normative theory
The primary objective of game theory is to determine what
strategies rational players should choose in order to maxi-
mize their payoffs. The theory is therefore primarily nor-
mative rather than positive or descriptive. The founding
game theorists stated this explicitly (von Neumann 1928,
p. 1; von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, pp. 31–33). So
did Luce and Raiffa (1957), when they introduced game
theory to social scientists:
We feel that it is crucial that the social scientist recognize that
game theory is not descriptive, but rather (conditionally) nor-
mative. It states neither how people do behave nor how they
should behave in an absolute sense, but how they should be-
have if they wish to achieve certain ends. (p. 63, emphasis in
original)
3.3. Positive theory
If game theory were exclusively normative, then it would
have limited relevance to the (empirical) behavioral and so-
cial sciences, because a normative theory cannot be tested
empirically, and evolutionary game theory (see sect. 1.3
above) would be pointless. Arguably, game theory becomes
a positive theory by the addition of a bridging hypothesis of
weak rationality, according to which people try to do the
best for themselves in any given circumstances. To err is hu-
man, and deviations from perfect rationality are inevitable,
because of computational limitations or bounded rational-
ity (see sect. 1.2 above), incomplete specification of prob-
lems (Berkeley & Humphreys 1982; Dawes 2000), or sys-
tematic irrationality (Stanovich & West 2000).7 But none of
this is inconsistent with the hypothesis that people try to act
rationally. The addition of this hypothesis provides game
theory with a secondary objective, to make testable predic-
tions, and this justifies the thriving enterprise of experi-
mental gaming.
The literature of experimental gaming (reviewed by Col-
man 1995a; Kagel & Roth 1995, Chs. 1–4; Pruitt & Kim-
mel 1977) testifies to the fruitfulness of empirical research
within a broadly game-theoretic framework. Some impor-
tant phenomena, such as the clash between individual and
collective rationality (see sect. 6 below), cannot even be for-
mulated clearly without the conceptual framework of game
theory.
4. Standard assumptions
To give meaning to rational choice in games, it is necessary
to introduce assumptions, not only about the players’ ratio-
nality, but also about their knowledge. The following as-
sumptions are fairly standard8 and are often called common
knowledge and rationality (CKR):
CKR1. The specification of the game, including the
players’ strategy sets and payoff functions, is common
knowledge in the game, together with everything that can
be deduced logically from it and from CKR2.
CKR2. The players are rational in the sense of expected
utility (EU) theory (see sects. 2.3 to 2.6 above), hence they
always choose strategies that maximize their individual ex-
pected utilities, relative to their knowledge and beliefs at
the time of acting. (By CKR1 this too is common knowledge
in the game.)
The concept of common knowledge was introduced by
Lewis (1969, pp. 52–68) and formalized by Aumann
(1976). A proposition is common knowledge among a set of
players if every player knows it to be true, knows that every
other player knows it to be true, knows that every other
player knows that every other player knows it to be true, and
so on. Lewis originally wrote “ad infinitum” rather than
“and so on” and commented that “this is a chain of implica-
tions, not the steps in anyone’s actual reasoning” (p. 53). In
fact, nothing is gained by carrying the knowledge beyond
the nth degree when there are n players (Binmore 1992,
pp. 467–72), and in some games players can reason to so-
lutions with fewer degrees (Bicchieri 1993, Ch. 4). Even
three or four degrees may seem impossibly demanding, but
according to one interpretation, full common knowledge is
an everyday phenomenon arising, for example, whenever a
public announcement is made so that everyone knows it,
knows that others know it, and so on (Milgrom 1981).9
Common knowledge is crucially different from every player
merely knowing a proposition to be true. The celebrated
muddy children problem (Fagin et al. 1995, pp. 3–7) ex-
poses this distinction dramatically (for a formal but simple
proof, see Colman 1998, pp. 361–62).
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4.1. Implications of the theory
The orthodox belief about the standard assumptions has
been summed up by Binmore (1994a):
Game theorists of the strict school believe that their prescrip-
tions for rational play in games can be deduced, in principle,
from one-person rationality considerations without the need to
invent collective rationality criteria – provided that sufficient
information is assumed to be common knowledge. (p. 142)
That is a fair statement of the belief that this article calls
into question. The paragraphs that follow provide diverse
reasons for doubting its validity. The implications of strict
rationality for games is an important and intrinsically inter-
esting problem. Aumann (2000) has argued that “full ratio-
nality is not such a bad assumption; it is a sort of idealiza-
tion, like the ideas of perfect gas or frictionless motion; . . .
no less valid than any other scientific idealization” (p. 139).
In a survey of the foundations of decision theory, Bacharach
and Hurley (1991) wrote: “Von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944) . . . set out to derive a theory of rational play in
games from one of rational individual decision-making.
Their successors have not deviated from the faith that this
can be done” (pp. 3–4). But there are reasons to suspect
that this faith may be misplaced.
5. Focal points and payoff dominance
Let us examine the implications of the CKR assumptions in
the most trivial convention game that we may call Heads or
Tails. Two people independently choose heads or tails,
knowing that if they both choose heads or both tails, then
each will receive a payoff of five units of utility, otherwise
their payoffs will be zero. This is a pure coordination game,
because the players’ payoffs are identical in every outcome,
and the players are motivated solely to coordinate their
strategies. Figure 1 shows the payoff matrix.
Player I chooses between the rows, Player II between the
columns, and the numbers in each cell represent the pay-
offs, the first conventionally being Player I’s and the second
Player II’s, though in this game they are always equal. In the
games discussed in this article, no harm comes from think-
ing of the payoffs as US dollars, pounds sterling, euros, or
other monetary units. In general, this amounts to assuming
that the players are risk-neutral within the range of payoffs
in the game, so that utility is a strictly increasing linear func-
tion of monetary value, though that is immaterial in this
trivial game.
5.1. Nash equilibrium
The players hope to coordinate on either (Heads, Heads)
or (Tails, Tails). These are Nash equilibria or equilibrium
points. In a two-person game, an equilibrium point is a pair
of strategies that are best replies to each other, a best reply
being a strategy that maximizes a player’s payoff, given the
strategy chosen by the other player.
If a game has a uniquely rational solution, then it must 
be an equilibrium point. Von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944, pp. 146–48) presented a celebrated Indirect Argu-
ment to prove this important result; Luce and Raiffa (1957,
pp. 63–65) gave the most frequently cited version of it; and
Bacharach (1987, pp. 39–42) proved it from formal axioms.
Informally, the players are rational utility-maximizers (by
CKR2). Any rational deduction about the game must (by
CKR1) be common knowledge – Bacharach named this the
transparency of reason. It implies that, if it is uniquely ra-
tional for Player I to choose Strategy X and Player II Strat-
egy Y, then X and Y must be best replies to each other, be-
cause each player anticipates the other’s strategy and
necessarily chooses a best reply to it. Because X and Y are
best replies to each other, they constitute an equilibrium
point by definition. Therefore, if a game has a uniquely ra-
tional solution, then it must be an equilibrium point.
Whether or not rational players can reason from the stan-
dard assumptions to an equilibrium solution is another mat-
ter altogether. When the logic of this problem was exam-
ined carefully, it became clear that the CKR assumptions
are sometimes more than what is required and sometimes
insufficient to allow players to reason to an equilibrium so-
lution (Antonelli & Bicchieri 1994; Bicchieri 1993; Bic-
chieri & Antonelli 1995; Samet 1996).
5.2. Indeterminacy, refinements, and the core
Nash (1950a; 1951) formalized the equilibrium concept
and proved that every finite game has at least one equilib-
rium point, provided that mixed strategies (probability dis-
tributions over the pure strategy sets) are taken into con-
sideration. This does not always help a player to choose a
strategy, as the game of Heads or Tails shows. In that game,
(Heads, Heads) and (Tails, Tails) are equilibrium points,
and there is also a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each
player chooses randomly with a probability of 1/2 assigned
to each pure strategy (by tossing a coin, for example). But
what should a rational player do? Any model of evolution-
ary game theory (see sect. 1.3 above) with a stochastic or
noise component would converge on one or other of the
pure-strategy equilibrium points, but rational choice re-
mains indeterminate. This exposes a fundamental weak-
ness of classical game theory, namely, its systematic inde-
terminacy.10
Various refinements of Nash equilibrium have been pro-
posed to deal with the indeterminacy problem. The most
influential is the subgame-perfect equilibrium, proposed by
Selten (1965; 1975), but it and other refinements are
merely palliative. The Holy Grail is a theory that invariably
selects a single equilibrium point, but its status as a solution
would rest on a dubious assumption of rational determi-
nacy in games (see sect. 6.6 below).
Numerous solution concepts have been suggested for co-
operative games – games in which players are free to ne-
gotiate coalitions based on binding and enforceable agree-
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                  II
   Heads    Tails
Heads       5, 5     0, 0
I
   Tails       0, 0     5, 5
Figure 1. Heads or Tails
ments governing the division of a payoff. Nash (1950b) pi-
oneered an approach involving the reformulation of coop-
erative games as non-cooperative ones and the search for
equilibrium solutions in the reformulated games, but this
Nash program ran up against the indeterminacy problem.
The most fundamental and influential solution concept for
cooperative games is the core (Gillies 1953). An outcome x
of a cooperative game is said to dominate another outcome
y if there is a potential coalition that has both the motive
and the power to enforce x. The core of a cooperative game
is the set of undominated outcomes. The core satisfies in-
dividual, coalition, and collective rationality, inasmuch as it
includes only divisions of the payoff such that the players
receive at least as much as they could guarantee for them-
selves by acting independently, every proper subset of the
players receives at least as much as it could guarantee for it-
self by acting together, and the totality of players receives
at least as much as it could guarantee for itself by acting col-
lectively as a grand coalition, so that nothing is wasted. But
there are many games in which no division satisfies all these
requirements and the core is therefore empty. For exam-
ple, if three people try to divide a sum of money among
themselves by majority vote, then any proposed division can
be outvoted by a two-person coalition with the will and the
power to enforce a solution that is better for both of its
members.11 Rational social interaction, at least as defined
by the core, is simply infeasible in these circumstances.
Other solution concepts for cooperative games suffer from
similar pathologies.
In the non-cooperative game of Heads or Tails, rational
players are forced to choose arbitrarily, with a probability of
successful coordination of 1/2 and an expected payoff of
2.5. Can they do better than that?
5.3. Focal points
Of course they can. Going beyond the mathematical prop-
erties of the game and delving into its psychology, if both
players perceive heads to be more salient than tails, in other
words if they both recognize (Heads, Heads) as a focal
point, and if both believe this to be common knowledge,
then both will unhesitatingly choose heads, and they will co-
ordinate successfully. This was first pointed out by Schelling
(1960, Ch. 3), who reported the results of informal experi-
ments in which 86 percent of participants chose heads. This
implies a probability of coordination of .86 3 .86 or ap-
proximately 3/4, and hence an expected payoff of approxi-
mately 3.7 – a big improvement.
According to Schelling (1960), what enables players to
focus on heads is the “conventional priority, similar to the
convention that dictates A, B, C, though not nearly so
strong” (p. 64) of heads over tails. Mehta et al. (1994a;
1994b) replicated his finding in England, where 87 percent
of players chose heads. Both studies also included several
more difficult pure coordination games, some with infinite
strategy sets, in which players frequently coordinated on fo-
cal points without difficulty. For example, suppose that you
have to meet a stranger at a specified place on a specified
day but neither of you has been told the time of the meet-
ing. What time would you choose to optimize your chances
of coordinating? Most people focus unhesitatingly on 12
noon (Schelling 1960, p. 55).
5.4. Hume’s example
The idea of a focal point can be traced back to a discussion
by Hume (1739–40/1978, 3.II.iii) of a pure coordination
game played by a German, a Frenchman, and a Spaniard,
who come across three bottles of wine, namely Rhenish,
Burgundy, and port, and “fall a quarrelling about the divi-
sion of them” (pp. 509–10n). There are 27 ways of assign-
ing three bottles to three people, or six permutations if each
person gets exactly one bottle. Hume pointed out that the
obvious focal point among these alternatives is to “give
every one the product of his own country” (p. 510n).12
The focal point of Heads or Tails emerges from its rep-
resentation within the common language shared by the
players (Crawford & Haller 1990). Considered in the ab-
stract, this game, or the problem of the unspecified meet-
ing time, or Hume’s problem of the three wines, has no fo-
cal point. To remove the common language, including the
culturally determined labeling of strategies, is to filter out
the focal points, reducing the prospects of coordination to
chance levels.
5.5. Gilbert’s argument
The salient focal points are obvious in Heads or Tails, the
unspecified meeting time, and Hume’s problem of the
three wines. Nevertheless, it turns out that their selection
cannot be justified rationally. Gilbert (1989b) showed that
“if human beings are – happily – guided by salience, it ap-
pears that this is not a consequence of their rationality”
(p. 61) and that “mere salience is not enough to provide ra-
tional agents with a reason for action (though it would ob-
viously be nice, from the point of view of rational agency, if
it did)” (p. 69, emphasis in original).
Gilbert’s proof is easy to follow, though hard to swallow.
The focal point of Heads or Tails is obviously (Heads,
Heads), and to clarify the argument, let us assume that the
players have previously agreed on this, so it is common
knowledge. Under the CKR2 rationality assumption, Player
I will choose heads, given any reason for believing that
Player II will choose heads, to ensure a payoff of 5 rather
than 0. But in the absence of any reason to expect Player II
to choose heads, Player I has no reason to choose it or not
to choose it. The fact that (Heads, Heads) is a focal point is
not a valid reason for Player I to choose heads, because
heads is best only if Player II chooses it also. Because the
salience of (Heads, Heads) does not give Player I a reason
to choose heads, it cannot give Player I a reason to expect
Player II to choose heads. Both players are in exactly the
same quandary, lacking any reason for choosing heads in the
absence of a reason to expect the co-player to choose it. The
argument goes round in circles without providing the play-
ers with any rational justification for playing their parts in
the focal-point equilibrium, in spite of its salience and in-
tuitive appeal.
This is an excellent example of the fundamental thesis of
this article, that the concept of utility maximization cannot
be applied straightforwardly to interactive decisions.
5.6. Payoff dominance
Gilbert’s (1989b) argument applies even to games with
structurally inbuilt payoff-dominant (or Pareto-dominant)
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equilibrium points. These games have focal points that do
not depend on any common language, pace Crawford and
Haller (1990). Payoff dominance is illustrated most simply
in the Hi-Lo Matching game (Fig. 2). If both players choose
H, each gains six units; if both choose L, each gains three
units; otherwise neither gains anything. The two obvious
equilibria are HH, with payoffs of (6, 6) and LL, with pay-
offs of (3, 3). (There is also a mixed-strategy equilibrium in
which each player chooses 1/3 H and 2/3 L, with expected
payoffs of 2 units each.) Rational players prefer HH to LL,
because HH payoff-dominates LL. An equilibrium point
payoff-dominates another if it yields a higher payoff to both
players. It is obviously a structural focal point.
The payoff-dominance principle is the assumption that,
if one equilibrium point payoff-dominates all others in a
game, then rational players will play their parts in it.13
Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) general theory of equilibrium
selection is based on it, together with a secondary risk-dom-
inance principle,14 and most game theorists accept its intu-
itive force (e.g., Bacharach 1993; Crawford & Haller 1990;
Farrell 1987; 1988; Gauthier 1975; Janssen 2001b; Lewis
1969; Sugden 1995; 2000). Empirical tests of the payoff-
dominance principle have yielded mixed results (e.g.,
Cooper et al. 1990; van Huyck et al. 1990). But, astonish-
ingly, a straightforward extension of Gilbert’s (1989b) argu-
ment reveals that a player has a reason to choose H if and
only if there is a reason to expect the co-player to choose H,
and there is no such reason, because both players face the
identical quandary. The fact that HH is the optimum equi-
librium (indeed, the optimum outcome) for both players is
not ipso facto a reason for Player I to expect Player II to
choose H, because H is not a utility-maximizing choice for
Player II in the absence of any reason to expect Player I to
choose it, and vice versa (Casajus 2001; Colman 1997;
Gilbert 1990; Hollis & Sugden 1993; Sugden 1991b). This
is a startling failure of game theory. When one first appre-
ciates the force of the argument, one feels like pinching
oneself.
A common initial reaction is to try to justify the choice of
H in Figure 2 on the grounds that “The best I can get from
choosing H is better than the best I can get from choosing
L, and the worst is no worse, therefore I should choose H.”
To see the fallacy in this naive maximax reasoning, consider
the slightly modified game shown in Figure 3. In this ver-
sion, Strategy L gives Player II a higher payoff whatever
Player I chooses, therefore a rational Player II will certainly
choose it. By the transparency of reason, Player I will an-
ticipate this and will therefore also choose L, hence the ra-
tional solution is unambiguously LL. But the maximax ar-
gument (“The best I can get from choosing H is better than
the best I can get from choosing L, and the worst is no
worse, therefore I should choose H”) would still lead Player
I to choose H, and that is manifestly absurd.
A more sophisticated fallacy is the attempt to justify
choosing H in the Hi-Lo Matching game (Fig. 2) by assign-
ing subjective probabilities to the co-player’s strategies. The
specific probabilities are immaterial, so let us suppose
Player I assumes (perhaps by the Principle of Insufficient
Reason) that Player II’s strategies are equally probable. If
this assumption were valid, then Player I would indeed have
a reason (SEU maximization) to choose H, but a simple re-
ductio proof exposes the error. By the transparency of rea-
son, Player I’s intention to choose H would be common
knowledge and would induce Player II to choose the best
reply, namely H, with certainty, contradicting Player I’s ini-
tial assumption.
5.7. Coordination without rationality
Under the CKR knowledge and rationality assumptions, co-
ordination by focal point selection ought to be impossible,
yet it occurs quite frequently in everyday social interaction.
Even in games with blindingly obvious payoff-dominant fo-
cal points, players have no rational justification for choos-
ing the corresponding strategies. Orthodox game-theoretic
rationality is powerless to explain these phenomena.
6. Social dilemmas
Social dilemmas are games in which individual and collec-
tive interests conflict. The simplest is the familiar two-per-
son Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG). The general N-
player Prisoner’s Dilemma (NPD), of which the PDG is a
special case, was discovered simultaneously and indepen-
dently by Dawes (1973), Hamburger (1973), and Schelling
(1973). Social dilemmas have generated a vast amount of
theoretical and empirical research (reviewed by Colman
1995a, Chs. 6, 7, 9; Dawes 1980; 1988, Ch. 9; Foddy et al.
1999; Ledyard 1995; Nozick 1993, pp. 50–59; Rapoport
1989, Chs. 12, 14; Schroeder 1995; van Lange et al. 1992;
and van Vugt 1998; among others).
6.1. Self-defeating strategies
The peculiarity of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is that, of
the two strategies available to each player, one is uniquely
rational, yet each player fares better if both choose the
other. To borrow a felicitous epithet from Parfit (1979;
1984, Ch. 1), rationality is self-defeating in the PDG, and in
social dilemmas in general.
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                  II
       H       L
  H       6, 6     0, 0
I
  L       0, 0     3, 3
Figure 2. Hi-Lo Matching game
                  II
       H       L
  H       6, 6     0, 7
I
  L       0, 0     3, 3
Figure 3. Modified Hi-Lo Matching game
6.2. Prisoner’s Dilemma formalization
The PDG (Fig. 4) was discovered in 1950 by Flood and
Dresher (Poundstone 1993, p. 8; Raifa 1992, p. 173). What
defines it as a PDG are the relative rather than the absolute
values of the payoffs, hence the numbers 4, 3, 2, and 1 are
used for simplicity, though they are assumed to be utilities.
6.3. Lifelike interpretation
The name Prisoner’s Dilemma comes from an interpreta-
tion involving two prisoners, introduced by Tucker in a sem-
inar in the Psychology Department of Stanford University
in 1950, the most familiar published version being Luce and
Raiffa’s (1957, pp. 94–97). The story is too well known to
repeat, and the following alternative interpretation, based
on an idea of Hofstadter’s (1983), will help to fix the idea of
a game as an abstract structure applicable to a potentially
unlimited set of interactions.
Player I is keen to buy a packet of illegal drugs from
Player II, and Player II is keen to sell it. They have agreed
a price that suits them both, but because of the nature of
the trade, it must take place without face-to-face contact.
Player I promises to leave an envelope full of money in a
dead-letter drop, such as a litter bin in a park. Player II
promises to leave an envelope full of drugs in another, dis-
tant, dead-letter drop at the same time. Each player faces a
choice between cooperating (leaving the promised enve-
lope) or defecting (neglecting to leave it). If both players co-
operate and choose C, then the payoffs are good for both
(3, 3). If both defect and choose D, the payoffs are worse
for each (2, 2). And if one player cooperates while the other
defects, then the outcome is worst for the cooperator and
best for the defector, hence the payoffs are (1, 4) or (4, 1),
depending on who cooperates and who defects.
6.4. Ubiquity of social dilemmas
Many everyday two-person interactions have the strategic
structure of the PDG. Rapoport (1962) discovered it in
Puccini’s opera Tosca. Lumsden (1973) showed empirically
that the Cyprus conflict shared the preference structure of
an indefinitely repeated PDG. The PDG is a standard
model of bilateral arms races and duopoly competition.
Many other two-person interactions involving cooperation
and competition, trust and suspicion, threats, promises, and
commitments are PDGs.
6.5. Strategic dominance
How should a rational player act in the PDG? There are two
main arguments in favor of defecting (choosing D). They
apply to the standard one-shot PDG. For indefinitely iter-
ated PDGs, a folk theorem establishes a vast number of
equilibrium points, including many leading to joint cooper-
ation (see Binmore 1992, pp. 373–76, for a clear proof),
and evolutionary experiments have reported high levels of
cooperation (Axelrod 1984; 1997, Chs. 1, 2; Kraines &
Kraines 1995; Nowak et al. 1995; Nowak & Sigmund 1993).
The finitely iterated PDG presents a different problem al-
together, to be discussed in section 7.1 below.
The most powerful reason for defecting in the one-shot
PDG is strategic dominance. The D strategies are strongly
dominant for both players inasmuch as each player receives
a higher payoff by choosing D than C against either coun-
terstrategy of the co-player. Player I receives a higher pay-
off by choosing D than C whether Player II chooses C or D,
hence D is a strongly dominant strategy for Player I and, by
symmetry, the same applies to Player II. It is in the interest
of each player to defect whatever the other player might do.
It is generally agreed that a rational agent will never
choose a dominated strategy. Dixit and Nalebuff (1991,
p. 86) identified the avoidance of dominated strategies as
one of the four basic rules of successful strategic thinking,
and it has been proved that the only strategies in two-per-
son games that can be rationalized – justified in terms of
consistent beliefs about the co-player’s beliefs – are those
that survive a process of successively deleting strongly dom-
inated strategies (Bernheim 1984; Pearce 1984).
Strategic dominance is a simplified version of the sure-
thing principle,15 first propounded by Savage (1951) and
incorporated into his decision theory as an axiom, with the
comment: “I know of no other extralogical principle gov-
erning decisions that finds such ready acceptance” (Savage
1954, p. 21). The strategic dominance principle, in its
strong form, can be deduced from elementary axioms of
game theory (Bacharach 1987), although the (weak) sure-
thing principle cannot (McClennen 1983).
In individual decision making, the sure-thing principle
seems intuitively compelling, except in certain pathological
though interesting cases based on Simpson’s paradox
(Shafir 1993) or Newcomb’s problem (Campbell & Sowden
1985), or in situations in which players’ actions are not in-
dependent (Jeffrey 1983, pp. 8–10). But when the strate-
gic dominance principle is applied to the PDG, the conclu-
sion seems paradoxical, because if both players choose
dominated C strategies, then each receives a higher payoff
than if both choose dominant D strategies. The DD out-
come resulting from the choice of dominant strategies is
Pareto-inefficient in the sense that another outcome (CC)
would be preferred by both players.
6.6. Argument from Nash equilibrium
The second major argument for defection focuses on the
fact that DD is the PDG’s only equilibrium point. It is ob-
vious in Figure 4 that D is a best reply to D and that there
is no other equilibrium point. From the Indirect Argument
(see sect. 5.1 above), if the PDG has a uniquely rational so-
lution, then, because it must be an equilibrium point, it
must therefore be this equilibrium point.
It is often considered axiomatic that every game has a
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                  II
       C       D
  C       3, 3     1, 4
I
  D       4, 1     2, 2
Figure 4. Prisoner’s Dilemma game
uniquely rational solution that could, in principle, be de-
duced from basic assumptions (Harsanyi 1962; 1966; Har-
sanyi & Selten 1988; Weirich 1998). When it is expressed
formally, this existence postulate is called the principle of
rational determinacy. Nash (1950a; 1950b; 1951) assumed
it tacitly at first, then in a later article (Nash 1953) intro-
duced it explicitly as the first of seven axioms: “For each
game . . . there is a unique solution” (p. 136). Although it is
widely accepted, Bacharach (1987) pointed out that it re-
mains unproven, and this blocks the inference that a game’s
unique equilibrium point must necessarily be a uniquely ra-
tional solution, because the game may have no uniquely ra-
tional solution. Sugden (1991a) presented several reasons
for skepticism about the principle of rational determinacy.
However, in the PDG, we know from the dominance argu-
ment that joint defection must be uniquely rational, and it
is therefore paradoxical that irrational players who cooper-
ate end up better off.
6.7. Experimental evidence
Joint defection is uniquely rational in the PDG. Binmore
(1994a) devoted a long chapter (Ch. 3) to refuting fallacies
purporting to justify cooperation. But as a prediction about
human behavior, this fails miserably in the light of experi-
mental evidence (reviewed by Colman 1995a, Ch. 7; Good
1991; Grzelak 1988; Rapoport 1989, Ch. 12; among others).
In the largest published PDG experiment (Rapoport &
Chammah 1965), almost 50 percent of strategy choices
were cooperative, and even in experiments using one-shot
PDGs, many players cooperate, to their mutual advantage.
Game theory fails as a positive theory in the PDG, because
human decision makers do not follow its rational prescrip-
tions.
6.8. Three-player Prisoner’s Dilemma
The simplest multi-player Prisoner’s Dilemma, using pay-
offs of 4, 3, 2, and 1 for convenience once again, is the three-
player NPD shown in Table 1. The first row of Table 1
shows that the payoff to each C-chooser is 3 if all three play-
ers choose C, and in that case the payoff to each (non-exis-
tent) D-chooser is undefined, hence the dash in the last col-
umn. In the second row, if two players choose C and the
remaining player chooses D, then the payoff is 2 to each C-
chooser and 4 to the D-chooser, and so on.
6.9. Defining properties
The defining properties of the NPD are as follows:
1. Each player chooses between two options that may be
labeled C (cooperate) and D (defect).
2. The D option is strongly dominant for each player:
each obtains a higher payoff by choosing D than C no mat-
ter how many of the others choose C.
3. The dominant D strategies intersect in an equilib-
rium point that is Pareto-inefficient: the dominant D
strategies are best replies to one another, but the outcome
is better for every player if all choose their dominated C
strategies.
The NPD in Table 1 has all three properties, and so does
the two-person PDG in Figure 4, which can now be seen as
a special case. The NPD is ubiquitous, especially in situa-
tions involving conservation of scarce resources and contri-
butions to collective goods. Examples of defection include
negotiating a wage settlement above the inflation rate, ne-
glecting to conserve water during a drought or fuel during
a fuel shortage, over-fishing, increasing armaments in a
multilateral arms race, and bolting for an exit during an es-
cape panic. In each case, individual rationality mandates
defection regardless of the choices of the others, but each
individual is better off if everyone cooperates.
6.10. More experimental evidence
Normative arguments for defection in the PDG – strategic
dominance and unique Nash equilibrium – apply equally to
the NPD. But experimental investigations since the mid-
1970s, using both NPDs and strategically equivalent com-
mons dilemmas (also called resource dilemmas) and public
goods dilemmas (also called free-rider problems), have in-
variably found rampant cooperation. The proportion of co-
operative choices tends to decrease as group size increases
but remains substantial even in large groups. The experi-
mental evidence has been reviewed by Colman (1995a, Ch.
9), Dawes (1980; 1988, Ch. 9), Foddy et al. (1999), Ledyard
(1995), Rapoport (1989, Ch. 14), Schroeder (1995), and van
Lange et al. (1992), among others. Ledyard’s main conclu-
sion was: “Hard-nosed game theory cannot explain the
data. . . . If these experiments are viewed solely as tests of
game theory, that theory has failed” (p. 172, emphasis in
original).
6.11. Puzzling conclusions
Game-theoretic rationality requires rational players to de-
fect in one-shot social dilemmas. This conclusion is puz-
zling in the light of experimental evidence showing wide-
spread cooperation in two-player and multi-player social
dilemmas. The evidence has failed to corroborate positive
game theory. Even from a normative point of view, ratio-
nality is self-defeating in social dilemmas. Players who co-
operate by choosing dominated C strategies end up with
higher individual payoffs than players who follow game-
theoretic rationality. Because utility maximization is the
essence of game-theoretic rationality, this seems counter-
intuitive and even paradoxical.
Social dilemmas are not the only games that generate ro-
bust experimental data starkly at odds with game theory.
The more recently discovered Ultimatum game is begin-
ning to upstage the PDG in the freak show of human irra-
tionality. Orthodox rationality is manifestly ill-advised in the
Ultimatum game. Space constraints forbid a detailed dis-
cussion of it here (see Thaler 1992, Ch. 3, for an excellent
review).
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Table 1. Three-player Prisoner’s Dilemma
Number Number Payoff to each Payoff to each
choosing C choosing D C-chooser D-chooser
3 0 3 —
2 1 2 4
1 2 1 3
0 3 — 2
7. Backward induction
Backward induction is a form of reasoning resembling
mathematical induction, an established method of proving
theorems. It was introduced into game theory by Zermelo
(1912), who proved the first major theorem of game theory
to the effect that every strictly competitive game like chess,
in which the players have perfect information of earlier
moves, has either a guaranteed winning strategy for one of
the players or guaranteed drawing strategies for both.
7.1. Finitely iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
In a famous passage, Luce and Raiffa (1957, pp. 97–102)
applied backward induction to the finitely iterated PDG –
that is, the PDG repeated a finite number of times (n) by a
pair of players. They proved that rational players who con-
sider each other rational will defect on every move, pro-
vided that both know n in advance. The proof is easy. Sup-
pose that the game is to be iterated twice (n 5 2). Rational
players know that defection is the rational strategy in a one-
shot PDG (see sects. 6.5 and 6.6 above). There could be a
reason for cooperating on the first round if it might influ-
ence the outcome of the second. But in the second round,
there are no moves to follow and thus no future effects to
consider; consequently, the second round is effectively a
one-shot PDG, and its rational outcome is joint defection.
Because the outcome of the second round is thus prede-
termined, and the first round cannot influence it, the first
round is also effectively a one-shot PDG. Therefore, both
players will defect on the first round as well as the second.
This argument generalizes straightforwardly to any finite n,
showing that rational players will defect on every round.
This conclusion is counterintuitive, because both players
would receive higher payoffs if both behaved more cooper-
atively. Luce and Raiffa (1957) had difficulty accepting
their own proof: “If we were to play this game we would not
take the [D] strategy at every move!” (p. 100, emphasis in
original). They offered no persuasive reason for disowning
their proof, although subsequent experimental evidence
corroborated their intuition by showing that intelligent
players tend to cooperate (e.g., Andreoni & Miller 1993;
Cooper et al. 1996; Selten & Stoecker 1986). What is typi-
cally observed in finitely iterated experimental PDGs with
human players is a substantial proportion of cooperative
choices, often exceeding 30 percent, and a sizeable minor-
ity even in the last round. Furthermore, high levels of co-
operation are observed in evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma
games (e.g., Axelrod 1984; 1997, Chs. 1, 2; Nowak et al.
1995).
7.2. Chain-store game
Backward induction rose to prominence with Selten’s
(1978) introduction of the multi-player Chain-store game
(subsequently discussed by Bicchieri 1989; 1993, pp. 192–
94; Friedman 1991, pp. 190–93; Kreps & Wilson 1982a;
Milgrom & Roberts 1982; Ordeshook 1986, pp. 451–62;
Rosenthal 1981; and others). In outline, without quantify-
ing payoffs, the game is as follows. A chain-store has
branches in 20 cities, in each of which there is a local com-
petitor hoping to sell the same goods. These potential chal-
lengers decide one by one whether to enter the market in
their home cities. Whenever one of them enters the mar-
ket, the chain-store responds either with aggressive preda-
tory pricing, causing both stores to lose money, or coopera-
tively, sharing the profits 50–50 with the challenger.
Intuitively, the chain-store seems to have a reason to re-
spond aggressively to early challengers in order to deter
later ones. But Selten’s (1978) backward induction argu-
ment shows that deterrence is futile. The argument begins
at the final stage, when the twentieth challenger decides
whether to enter the market. This challenger will enter, and
the chain-store will respond cooperatively, because there is
no future challenger to deter and therefore no rational rea-
son for the chain-store to sacrifice profit by responding ag-
gressively. Because the outcome of the final round is thus
predetermined, the nineteenth challenger will enter the
market on the penultimate round, and the chain-store will
respond cooperatively, because both players know that the
final challenger cannot be deterred and that the chain-store
therefore has no reason to act aggressively on the current
round. This argument unfolds backwards to the first move.
Every challenger will enter the market when its turn comes,
and the chain-store will always respond cooperatively.
Like Luce and Raiffa (1957) before him, Selten (1978)
found his backward induction proof unpalatable. He ad-
mitted that, if he were to play the game in the role of the
chain-store, he would play aggressively to deter subsequent
competitors:
I would be very surprised if it failed to work. From my discus-
sions with friends and colleagues, I get the impression that most
people share this inclination. In fact, up to now I met nobody
who said that he would behave according to [backward] induc-
tion theory. My experience suggests that mathematically
trained persons recognize the logical validity of the induction
argument, but they refuse to accept it as a guide to practical be-
havior. (Selten 1978, pp. 132–33)
If deterrence is indeed futile in finitely iterated interac-
tions, then the implications are momentous. Economic
competition often involves finite sequences of challenges to
the dominance of a market leader, and deterrence lies at the
heart of military defense strategy and penology. If deter-
rence is potentially futile, then much commercial, military,
and judicial strategy is irrational. On the other hand, the fu-
tility of deterrence in finite sequences of interactions could
help to explain why animals often settle disputes by con-
ventional displays rather than escalated fighting (Lazarus
1995; Maynard Smith 1976).
7.3. Centipede game
The paradoxical implications of backward induction emerge
most vividly in the two-person Centipede game, introduced
(among obiter dicta on the Chain-store game) by Rosenthal
(1981) and subsequently named by Binmore (1987) after
the appearance of its extensive-form graph. It has attracted
much discussion (e.g., Aumann 1995; 1996; 1998; Basu
1990; Bicchieri 1993, pp. 91–98; Binmore 1994b; Bonanno
1991; Colman 1998; Hollis & Sugden 1993; Kreps 1990;
Pettit & Sugden 1989; Sugden 1991b; 1992). A simple ver-
sion – actually a tetrapod, but long enough to illustrate the
basic idea – is shown in Figure 5.
The graph shows a sequence of moves, starting at the left.
Players I and II alternate in choosing, at each decision node,
whether to defect by moving down or to cooperate by mov-
ing across. If a player defects down, then the game stops at
that point and the payoffs are shown in parentheses (in the
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order I, II). Thus, if Player I defects down on the first move,
then the game stops and both payoffs are zero. Whenever
a player continues across, that player loses 1 unit and the
other gains 10. Thus, if Player I continues across at the first
decision node, losing 1 unit and adding 10 to Player II’s pay-
off, and if Player II promptly defects down, then the game
stops and the payoffs are 21 to Player I and 10 to Player II,
and so on. If both players continue across at every decision
node, then the game ends automatically after the fourth de-
cision, with a payoff of 18 to each player.
7.4. Argument for defection
Players can earn large payoffs by cooperating, but backward
induction shows, astonishingly, that Player I should defect
down and stop the game on the first move, with zero pay-
offs to both players. Suppose the game has reached the fi-
nal decision node. Player II can defect down and receive 19
or continue across and receive 18. A rational Player II will
obviously defect down. Consequently, at the third decision
node, a rational Player I who can anticipate Player II’s rea-
soning will defect down to receive 9, rather than continue
across and receive only 8 when Player II defects down on
the following move. Extending this line of reasoning back-
wards, Player I will defect down at the first decision node,
even in a Centipede with 100 feet and fabulous payoffs dan-
gling from its head and shoulders, in spite of the fact that
both players could enjoy these riches by playing more co-
operatively.
This is an almost intolerably counterintuitive conclusion.
In experimental Centipede games, most players behave far
more cooperatively, the great majority continuing across at
the first decision node, and a substantial minority even at
the last (El-Gamal et al. 1993; Fey et al. 1996; Güth et al.
1997; McKelvey & Palfrey 1992). This cannot be explained
by orthodox game-theoretic rationality with backward in-
duction. Cooperative players, who earn significant mone-
tary payoffs in experimental Centipede games, could legit-
imately ask rational utility maximizers, who come away with
nothing: “If you’re so rational, how come you ain’t rich?”
This seems a good question, given that rational decision
making is, by definition, utility maximization.
7.5. Are the assumptions incoherent?
Player I, if rational, will defect down on the first move. Ac-
cording to the CKR2 rationality assumption, this means
that, for Player I, the expected utility of defecting down
must exceed the expected utility of continuing across. It fol-
lows that we must have proved that Player I expects Player
II to respond to a cooperative opening move by defecting
down immediately. If Player I assigned even a small proba-
bility – anything greater than 1/10 – to Player II’s respond-
ing cooperatively, then to maximize expected utility, Player
I would open with a cooperative move.
But is Player I’s expectation rational? Perhaps not, for the
following reason. If Player I were to open with a coopera-
tive move, and if the backward induction argument is
sound, then the CKR2 rationality assumption would have
been violated. Player II would face something in conflict
with that basic assumption, namely, an irrational co-player.
It would then be impossible for Player II to respond ratio-
nally, because the theory would no longer apply. But if
Player II’s response is therefore unpredictable, how could
Player I evaluate the expected utility of cooperating on the
opening move? For Player I, the expected utility of this
move seems indeterminate.
This leads to an impasse in which neither player can act
rationally. Orthodox game-theoretic rationality seems to
have broken down, and this raises a suspicion that the CKR
assumptions may be incoherent. Cubitt and Sugden (1994;
1995) reached a similar conclusion from formal analyses in
which they defined a concept of rationally justified play and
examined its implications under the CKR assumptions, for-
mulated as axioms, adding a further axiom according to
which players never assign a zero probability to any of their
co-players’ rationally justifiable strategies being played. It
should then have been possible to prove any strategy either
rationally justifiable or unjustifiable, but it turned out that
there are strategies that fall into neither category, even in a
simple nonsequential game that they exhibited as a coun-
terexample. Working along similar lines, Samuelson (1992)
and Squires (1998) have cast further doubt on the coher-
ence of the fundamental assumptions of game theory.
8. Psychological game theory
The arguments and evidence discussed above seem to im-
ply that orthodox game theory cannot explain strategic in-
teraction in widely disparate games. To deal with similar
problems, Camerer (1997) proposed the label behavioral
game theory for an approach that replaces descriptively in-
accurate aspects of game theory with plausible explanations
providing better predictions of empirical (especially exper-
imental) observations. One of Camerer’s examples of be-
havioral game theory is Rabin’s (1993) fairness equilibrium,
based on payoff transformations. According to this ap-
proach, a player’s payoff increases by a fixed proportion a
of a co-player’s payoff if the co-player acts kindly or help-
fully and decreases by a of the co-player’s payoff if the co-
player acts meanly or unhelpfully. In the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma game (Fig. 4), for example, if a 5 1/2, so that each
player’s payoff increases by a half that of the co-player when
the co-player cooperates, and decreases by half that of the
co-player when the co-player defects, then joint coopera-
tion (CC) emerges as a new equilibrium point, called a fair-
ness equilibrium, with transformed payoffs of 4¹⁄₂ to each
player. According to Camerer, this may help to explain co-
operation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Psychological game theory, as described in the following
subsections, overlaps behavioral game theory but focuses
specifically on nonstandard reasoning processes rather than
other revisions of orthodox game theory such as payoff
transformations. Psychological game theory seeks to mod-
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Figure 5. Centipede game
ify the orthodox theory by introducing formal principles of
reasoning that may help to explain empirical observations
and widely shared intuitions that are left unexplained by the
orthodox theory. An important forerunner is the work of
Geanakoplos et al. (1989) on psychological games in which
payoffs depend not only on players’ actions, but also on
their expectations. The forms of psychological game theory
that will be discussed are team reasoning, Stackelberg rea-
soning, and epistemic and non-monotonic reasoning. Like
behavioral game theory, psychological game theory is pri-
marily descriptive or positive rather than normative, and it
amounts to nothing more than a collection of tentative and
ad hoc suggestions for solving the heterogeneous problems
that have been highlighted in earlier sections.
8.1. Team reasoning
First, how do human players choose focal points in pure co-
ordination games? In particular, what accounts for the in-
tuitive appeal of payoff-dominant equilibria, such as HH in
the Hi-Lo Matching game (Fig. 2), and how do human de-
cision makers manage to coordinate their strategies on pay-
off-dominant equilibria? Two suggestions have been put
forward to answer these questions, both involving depar-
tures from the CKR assumptions. The first is team reason-
ing, formulated by Gilbert for a variety of problems (1987;
1989a; 1989b; 1990; 2000); developed into a decision the-
ory by Sugden (1993; 1995; 2000); and formalized in a sto-
chastic form by Bacharach (1999). A team-reasoning player
maximizes the objective function of the set of players by
identifying a profile of strategies that maximizes their joint
or collective payoff, and then, if the maximizing profile is
unique, playing the individual strategy that forms a compo-
nent of it.
Gilbert (1989a) showed how “a conclusion about what
an individual should do can follow directly, without the in-
terposition of any assumptions about what that individual
wants or seeks. Indeed, no single individual’s aims need be
referred to” (p. 708, emphasis in original). This implies the
existence of collective preferences, in addition to standard
individual preferences. Sugden (2000) illustrated this con-
cept with his family’s preferences for spending a summer
holiday: “When it comes to walks, we prefer walks of six
miles or so. . . . But ‘our’ preferences are not exactly those
of any one of us. My ideal walk would be somewhat longer
than six miles” (p. 175). Gilbert (2000) examined the 
implications of collective preferences for rational choice
theory.
Team reasoning is simple and intuitively compelling but
profoundly subversive of orthodox decision theory and
game theory, both of which rest on a bedrock of method-
ological individualism. It departs from the CKR2 rational-
ity assumption, inasmuch as a team-reasoning player does
not maximize individual EU but pursues collective interests
instead. It is nevertheless easy to call to mind anecdotal ev-
idence of joint enterprises in which people appear to be
motivated by collective rather than individual interests. In
team sports, military situations, joint business ventures, and
even family outings, people sometimes choose to do what
is best for “us,” even when this collective interest does not
coincide with their individual preferences. There is some
experimental evidence that collective preferences can in-
deed arise in quite ordinary circumstances (Park & Colman
2001). Research based in social dilemmas has shown that
mutually beneficial cooperation and “we-thinking” are en-
hanced by merely raising players’ sense of group identity
(Brewer & Kramer 1986; Dawes et al. 1988; 1990).
Team-reasoning players choose HH in the Hi-Lo Match-
ing game (Fig. 2) and the modified version (Fig. 3), because
the team’s collective payoff, defined by the sum of the play-
ers’ individual payoffs, is highest there. Thus, team reason-
ing offers a plausible explanation for the intuitive appeal of
the payoff-dominance principle. It may even help to explain
cooperation in social dilemmas, because a glance at Figure
4 and Table 1 confirms that, in those games, the collective
payoff of the pair or set of players is maximized by joint co-
operation, though it is arguably a weakness of team reason-
ing that it sometimes predicts such out-of-equilibrium out-
comes.
The focus on cooperative rather than individual goals
tends to foster a debilitating misconception among some
social psychologists that team reasoning is merely a social
value orientation, alongside individualism, altruism, com-
petitiveness, and equality seeking, in the payoff-transfor-
mational theories of McClintock and Liebrand (1988), van
Lange (1999), and van Lange and De Dreu (2001). In fact,
it is impossible to accommodate team reasoning in these ap-
proaches, because they all rely implicitly on methodologi-
cal individualism. Van Lange’s (1999) integrative theory in-
cludes a model that resembles team reasoning superficially
and may therefore be expected to predict coordination in
the Hi-Lo Matching game. Van Lange defined cooperation
as an individual motivation to maximize the outcome trans-
formation function OT 5 W1 (own payoff) 1 W2 (co-
player’s payoff). The payoff matrix is transformed accord-
ing to this function, and each player then proceeds with
standard individualistic reasoning, using the transformed
OT payoffs. This leads to cooperation in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, as van Lange pointed out, but it fails in the
Hi-Lo Matching game and is not equivalent to team rea-
soning.
Application of van Lange’s (1999) transformation to the
Hi-Lo Matching game (Fig. 2) involves replacing each pay-
off with the sum of individual payoffs in the corresponding
cell, and it produces the Bloated Hi-Lo Matching game
shown in Figure 6. But this is strategically identical to the
original game, and the coordination problem is back with a
vengeance. The idea of forming linear combinations of own
and other’s payoffs was proposed, in a more general form
than van Lange’s, over a century ago by Edgeworth (1881/
1967, pp. 101–102). Although it seems plausible and may
help to explain some social phenomena (Camerer 1997,
pp. 169–70), it cannot explain the payoff-dominance phe-
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                  II
       H       L
  H     12, 12     0, 0
I
  L       0, 0     6, 6
Figure 6. Bloated Hi-Lo Matching game
nomenon or incorporate team reasoning. Team reasoning is
inherently non-individualistic and cannot be derived from
transformational models of social value orientation.
8.2. Stackelberg reasoning
A second suggestion for solving the payoff-dominance puz-
zle is Stackelberg reasoning, proposed by Colman and
Bacharach (1997). Stackelberg reasoning is a generalization
of the “minorant” and “majorant” models used by von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (1944, pp. 100–101) to rationalize
their solution of strictly competitive games. The basic idea
is that players choose strategies that maximize their indi-
vidual payoffs on the assumption that any choice will in-
variably be met by the co-player’s best reply, as if the play-
ers could anticipate each other’s choices. This enables
players to select payoff-dominant equilibria. For example,
in the Hi-Lo Matching game (Fig. 2), a Stackelberg-rea-
soning player may deliberate as follows:
Suppose my co-player could read my mind, or at least antici-
pate my strategy choice. If I chose H, my co-player would best-
reply H, and I’d receive my optimal payoff of 6. If I chose L,
then my co-player would best-reply L, and I’d receive 3. In this
version of the game, I’d maximize my payoff by choosing H. My
co-player knows all this, because we share a common faculty of
reason, so in the actual game, I should choose H and expect my
co-player to do likewise.
Formally, in any two-person game, Player i assumes that
Player j can anticipate i’s choice. This implies that for every
strategy si in i’s strategy set, Player j responds with a best re-
ply f(si). Player i expects this to happen and, if f(si) is unique,
chooses a payoff-maximizing best reply to it. Thus, Player i,
seeking to maximize the payoff function Hi, chooses a strat-
egy for which maxi Hi [si, f(si)] is attained. This is called Play-
er i’s Stackelberg strategy.
In any game G, if the players’ Stackelberg strategies are
in Nash equilibrium, then G is Stackelberg soluble, and the
corresponding equilibrium point is called a Stackelberg so-
lution. Stackelberg reasoning acts as a strategy generator,
and Nash equilibrium as a strategy filter.16 Stackelberg rea-
soning mandates the choice of Stackelberg strategies only
in games that are Stackelberg soluble. Colman and
Bacharach (1997) proved that all common-interest games
are soluble in this sense, and that in every game with
Pareto-rankable equilibria, a Stackelberg solution is a pay-
off-dominant equilibrium. The Hi-Lo Matching game is
the simplest example of this.
Stackelberg reasoning turns out to imply a form of evi-
dential decision theory (Eells 1985; Horgan 1981; Jeffrey
1983; Nozick 1969; 1993, Ch. 2) that departs from both
standard decision theory and causal decision theory. It in-
volves maximizing conditional EU – conditioned on the
strategy chosen – rather than causal EU, as in causal deci-
sion theory, or standard EU as in plain vanilla decision the-
ory. Nozick’s (1993, Ch. 2) careful discussion of Newcomb’s
problem suggests that evidential reasoning is characteristic
of human thought in certain circumstances, and there is ex-
perimental evidence that it occurs (Anand 1990; Quattrone
& Tversky 1984).
8.3. Evidence of Stackelberg reasoning
More specifically, Colman and Stirk (1998) reported exper-
imental evidence of Stackelberg reasoning. Their 100 deci-
sion makers played all 12 ordinally nonequivalent, sym-
metric, 2 3 2 games, nine of which (including Prisoner’s
Dilemma and Stag Hunt) were Stackelberg soluble and
three (including Battle of the Sexes and Chicken) were not.
Players chose an overwhelming preponderance (78 to 98
percent) of Stackelberg strategies in the Stackelberg-solu-
ble games but showed no significant biases and very small
effect sizes in the non-Stackelberg-soluble games. A proto-
col analysis revealed that joint payoff maximization was a
significantly more frequent reason for choice in the Stack-
elberg-soluble than the non-Stackelberg-soluble games.
These results were replicated in a later study with 3 3 3
games (Colman et al. 2001). Taken together, these findings
suggest that human decision makers may be influenced by
Stackelberg reasoning, at least in simple games.
Both team reasoning and Stackelberg reasoning may
help to explain the payoff-dominance phenomenon. In ad-
dition, Stackelberg reasoning can be shown to predict focal-
point selection in pure coordination games in general (Col-
man 1997). Team reasoning may even offer a partial
explanation for cooperation in social dilemmas. Any alter-
native explanations of these phenomena would have to in-
voke other nonstandard psychological game-theoretic
processes that have yet to be discovered.
8.4. Epistemic and non-monotonic reasoning
The backward induction problem (sect. 7) requires an en-
tirely different type of solution. In the Centipede game,
backward induction, in conjunction with the CKR assump-
tions, seems to lead to an impasse in which neither player
can act rationally. Epistemic reasoning – reasoning about
knowledge and belief – in backward induction has been re-
examined by Antonelli and Bicchieri (1994), Bicchieri
(1993, Chs. 3, 4), Bonanno (1991), and Samet (1996),
among others. Backward induction makes sense only if the
players have no doubts about each other’s rationality. To
clear the logjam, perhaps common knowledge needs to be
replaced by something like common beliefs (Monderer &
Samet 1989) or entrenched common beliefs (Sugden 1992).
Perhaps common knowledge of rationality, in particular,
needs to be weakened to common belief. A proposition is a
matter of common belief if each player believes it to be
true, believes that the other player(s) believe(s) it to be true,
and so on, and if each player continues to believe it only as
long as it generates no inconsistency. Sugden showed that
replacing common knowledge of rationality with en-
trenched common belief allows a player to evaluate the EU
of cooperating, thus clearing the impasse, but the cure may
be worse than the disease, as we shall see.
The appropriate formal apparatus for this type of analy-
sis is non-monotonic reasoning, in which premises may be
treated as default assumptions, subject to belief revision in
the light of subsequent information. The replacement of
common knowledge of rationality with common belief in
rationality, as a default assumption, does not prevent the
backward induction argument from going through (Colman
1998). The players remain instrumentally rational, and
their default assumptions about their co-players’ rationality
need not be revised. Hence, in the Centipede game, Player
I still defects down on the first move. The crucial difference
is that it is no longer impossible for Player I to perform the
necessary reasoning with subjunctive conditionals (If I were
to make a cooperative opening move, then . . .) to judge how
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Player II would respond to a deviation from the backward
induction path.
Player I may calculate that a cooperative opening move
would force Player II to abandon the default assumption
that Player I is rational, attributing this to Player I’s “trem-
bling hand” (Selten 1975) or to some more serious cogni-
tive limitation. Player II would choose a utility-maximizing
reply in the light of these changed circumstances, defecting
down at the second decision node if Player I was expected
to respond by defecting down at the third. But Player II
may reasonably expect Player I, who has already cooperated
once, to do it again, given the chance. In that case, Player
II would respond cooperatively, and if Player I anticipated
this reasoning, that would provide a rational justification for
choosing a cooperative opening move. A sequence of recip-
rocally cooperative moves could ensue, to the mutual ben-
efit of the players.
This directly contradicts the conclusion of the backward
induction argument. In place of an impasse, we now have a
contradiction, suggesting either that the backward induc-
tion argument is flawed or that the revised assumptions are
incoherent. Furthermore, it is debatable whether a rational
Player I could make a cooperative move, as distinct from
merely contemplating its implications, without violating the
CKR2 rationality assumption. It is important to remember
that the rationality assumption itself has not been weak-
ened. What has made the difference is a weakening of the
common knowledge of rationality assumption. This was
necessary to clear the impasse and enable the players to
evaluate the relevant expected utilities.
This discussion has no doubt muddied the waters, but it
seems to have confirmed that, in some circumstances at
least, strategic interaction is not rational in the official
game-theoretic sense of the word.
9. Conclusions
Rationality has a clear interpretation in individual decision
making, but it does not transfer comfortably to interactive
decisions, because interactive decision makers cannot max-
imize expected utility without strong assumptions about
how the other participant(s) will behave. In game theory,
common knowledge and rationality assumptions have there-
fore been introduced, but under these assumptions, ratio-
nality does not appear to be characteristic of social interac-
tion in general.
9.1. Failures of game-theoretic rationality
In pure coordination games, game-theoretic rationality
cannot guide players to focal points, nor show why focal
points are often intuitively obvious choices, nor explain how
human players choose them in practice. Even in a game
with an idiot-proof payoff-dominant equilibrium, game-
theoretic rationality stubbornly fails to mandate its selec-
tion. Cooperative games, in which players can form coali-
tions sanctioned by binding and enforceable agreements,
often have empty cores (see sect. 5.2 above), and rational
social interaction is therefore impossible in such games, at
least according to the leading solution concept of the core.
In social dilemmas, game-theoretic rationality is self-defeat-
ing, and experimental players frequently violate it.
In certain sequential games, game theory yields power-
fully counterintuitive prescriptions, but under closer exam-
ination the theory appears to generate contradictions, ren-
dering it impotent as a guide to rational choice. Human ex-
perimental players tend to deviate from the backward
induction path, behaving more cooperatively and earning
higher payoffs as a consequence. These problems and para-
doxes can be solved only by introducing forms of psycho-
logical game theory incorporating nonstandard types of rea-
soning.
9.2. Final evaluation
Game theory’s contribution to the study of interactive deci-
sion making is incalculable, and it is indubitably one of the
most powerful and successful theories in the behavioral and
social sciences. But the project initiated by von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944) to characterize rationality as indi-
vidual expected utility maximization has created profound
problems for game theory, in both its normative and its pos-
itive interpretations. Although game theory has vastly in-
creased our understanding of interactive decision making,
and no alternative theory even comes close to challenging
its power, the conception of rationality on which it rests ap-
pears to be internally deficient and incapable of explaining
social interaction. Psychological game theory, some exam-
ples of which were outlined above, may help to provide a
way forward.
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NOTES
1. According to a debatable behavioral interpretation of RCT
(Herrnstein 1990), its central assumption is that organisms maxi-
mize reinforcement, and this “comes close to serving as the fun-
damental principle of the behavioral sciences” (p. 356). But, as
Herrnstein pointed out, experimental evidence suggests that
RCT, thus interpreted, predicts human and animal behavior only
imperfectly.
2. Green and Shapiro (1994) did not touch on this most crucial
problem in their wide-ranging critical review of the rational choice
literature. Neither did any of the participants in the ensuing “ra-
tional choice controversy” in the journal Critical Review, later re-
published as a book (Friedman 1996).
3. This implies that rational beliefs have to respect the
(known) evidence. For example, a person who has irrefutable ev-
idence that it is raining and therefore knows (believes that the
probability is 1) that it is raining, but also believes that it is fine,
fails to respect the evidence and necessarily holds internally in-
consistent beliefs.
4. I am grateful to Ken Binmore for pointing this out to me.
5. Kreps (1988) has provided an excellent summary of Savage’s
theory, although Savage’s (1954) own account is brief and lucid.
6. To a psychologist, revealed preference theory explains too
little, because there are other sources of information about pref-
erences apart from choices, and too much, because there are other
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factors apart from preferences that determine choices – see the
devastating “rational fools” article by Sen (1978).
7. The possibility of systematic irrationality, or of demonstrat-
ing it empirically, has been questioned, notably by Broome (1991),
Cohen (1981), and Stein (1996).
8. See, for example, Bicchieri (1993, Chs. 2, 3); Colman (1997;
1998); Cubitt and Sugden (1994; 1995); Hollis and Sugden (1993);
McClennen (1992); Sugden (1991b; 1992). The common knowl-
edge assumptions are sometimes relaxed in recent research (e.g.,
Aumann & Brandenburger 1995).
9. In other circumstances, experimental evidence suggests that
human reasoners do not even come close to full common knowl-
edge (Stahl & Wilson 1995).
10. The theory is determinate for every strictly competitive (fi-
nite, two-person, zero-sum) game, because if such a game has
multiple equilibria, then they are necessarily equivalent and in-
terchangeable, but this does not hold for other games.
11. See Colman (1995a, pp. 169–75) for a simple example of
an empty core in Harold Pinter’s play, The Caretaker.
12. Even Hume nods. Port comes from Portugal, of course.
13. Janssen’s (2001b) principle of individual team member ra-
tionality is slightly weaker (it does not require equilibrium): “If
there is a unique strategy combination that is Pareto-optimal, then
individual players should do their part of the strategy combina-
tion” (p. 120). Gauthier’s (1975) principle of coordination is
slightly stronger (it requires both equilibrium and optimality): “In
a situation with one and only one outcome which is both optimal
and a best equilibrium . . . it is rational for each person to perform
that action which has the best equilibrium as one of its possible
outcomes” (p. 201).
14. If e and f are any two equilibrium points in a game, then e
risk-dominates f if and only if the minimum possible payoff re-
sulting from the choice of the strategy corresponding to e is strictly
greater for every player than the minimum possible payoff result-
ing from the choice of the strategy corresponding to f. According
to Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) risk-dominance principle, if one
equilibrium point risk-dominates all others, then players should
choose its component strategies. It is used when subgame perfec-
tion and payoff dominance fail to yield a determinate solution.
15. According to the sure-thing principle, if an alternative ai is
judged to be as good as another aj in all possible contingencies that
might arise, and better than aj in at least one, then a rational de-
cision maker will prefer ai to aj. Savage’s (1954) illustration refers
to a person deciding whether or not to buy a certain property
shortly before a presidential election, the outcome of which could
radically affect the property market. “Seeing that he would buy in
either event, he decides that he should buy, even though he does
not know which event will obtain” (p. 21).
16. I am grateful to Werner Güth for this insight.
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Abstract: Rejecting evolutionary principles is a mistake, because evolu-
tionary processes produced the irrational human minds for which Colman
argues. An evolved cultural ability to acquire information socially and in-
fer other’s mental states (mind-reading) evokes Stackelberg reasoning.
Much of game theory, however, assumes away information transfer and ex-
cludes the very solution that natural selection likely created to solve the
problem of cooperation.
Colman rejects the relevancy of evolutionary game theory to his
argument that rationality is not a general characteristic of human
social interaction. Although the evolutionary process of natural se-
lection is indeed mindless, as Colman notes, it is useful to consider
that mindless evolutionary processes produced human minds.
Human minds, and the behaviors that they produce, remain the
focus of our interests. If people are less than rational in social in-
teractions, as Colman suggests, it is because we evolved that way.
The fact that rationality leads to inferior outcomes in social dilem-
mas, compared to alternative forms of reasoning, lends support to
the idea that selection might have favored something other than
strict rationality in our evolutionary past. Many of the ad hoc prin-
ciples of psychological game theory introduced at the end of the
target article might be deductively generated from the principles
of evolutionary theory.
An evolutionary approach encourages the use of the compara-
tive method. The ability of humans to cooperate to achieve com-
mon goals is nearly unique among animals and is perhaps matched
in scope only by the social insects (Hill 2002). While insects ac-
complish their collectivity through rigid genetic rules, there is
much to suggest that we are able to achieve our level of ultraso-
ciality via cultural mechanisms (Richerson & Boyd 2001). Exactly
how humans accomplish this is one of the key questions of the so-
cial sciences.
Researchers interested in the evolution of cultural abilities –
culture is defined as the social transmission of information –
should be particularly intrigued by the issues related to coordina-
tion that Colman raises. Among other advantages, cultural mech-
anisms provide people the ability to infer each other’s mental
states, to preferentially assort with others who have similar (or
complementary) intentions or capabilities, and to reap the advan-
tages of coordinated activities (Alvard, in press; Boyd & Richer-
son 1996; Tomasello 1999). Focal point selection is facilitated by
cultural mechanisms that create shared notions among individu-
als. Colman hints at this himself when he says, “To remove . . . the
culturally determined labeling of strategies, is to filter out the fo-
cal points” (target article, sect. 5.4, last para.). Having shared no-
tions greatly enhances the ability to solve simple yet common and
important coordination games.
The forms of psychological games Colman describes as alter-
natives to the classic game forms depend on psychological expec-
tations. Stackelberg reasoning, for example, involves anticipating
the other player’s choices. Such reasoning requires a sophisticated
theory of mind where others are viewed as intentional agents. It
also suggests the related concept of mind-reading (Baron-Cohen
1995; Cheney & Seyfarth 1990). Not nearly as mysterious as it
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sounds, though perhaps a uniquely human capability, mind-read-
ing is the ability to reason about the otherwise unobservable men-
tal states of others and make predictions about their behaviors
based partly on the awareness that others are intentional agents
with general goals similar to one’s own. Colman uses the phrasing
of mind-reading in his description of how a Stackelberg-reasoning
player might deliberate.
It seems that cultural mechanisms solve cooperative problems
so transparently, however, that many do not recognize them as so-
lutions at all. Broadly speaking, communicating via spoken lan-
guage can be construed as mind-reading. I can utter a sound and
others can predict my intent based on that sound, unless they do
not share my otherwise arbitrary association between sound and
meaning. Part of the problem of classic analytic game theory re-
volves around the standard assumption that players do not speak
to one another. This assumption is put into practice in experi-
mental game research where subjects usually do not communicate
during experiments. It seems that pre-game communication
among subjects is such a simple solution to many games that re-
searchers routinely disallow it in order for the “truly” interesting
solutions to emerge (van Huyck et al. 1990). Although “cheap talk”
solutions may seem trivial to game theoreticians, because all ex-
tant humans can easily communicate this way, from a comparative
evolutionary perspective, such a solution is far from trivial. Al-
though simple communication among players is often sufficient to
generate complexly coordinated behaviors, speaking is anything
but simple. Such a research design excludes the very solution that
natural selection likely created to solve the problem. Experimen-
tal social games in which subjects are not allowed to speak to one
another are a bit like sports competitions where subjects must
compete with their legs shackled together.
Verbalizing intent may be feasible in small groups, but how do
humans communicate expectations between members of large co-
operative groups like those that characterize most human societies
– ethnic groups, for example – in which many interactions are
seemingly anonymous? How do fellows know that they share be-
liefs concerning behavior critical for coordination? How can indi-
viduals predict what others think and will do in such large groups?
There are a number of options. One could attempt to learn, on
one’s own, the beliefs of all the potential cooperative partners.
This could prove difficult, time-consuming, and error-prone
(Boyd & Richerson 1995). In addition to speaking, however, hu-
mans use symbols and markers of group identity to transmit in-
formation that helps them make predictions about the otherwise
unobservable mental states of others. McElreath et al. (2003) ar-
gue that group markers, such as speech or dress, function to allow
individuals to advertise their behavioral intent so that individuals
who share social norms can identify one another and assort for col-
lective action. Although cheaters are a problem if interaction is
structured like a prisoner’s dilemma, McElreath et al.’s critical
point is that group markers are useful if people engage in social
interactions structured as coordination games. Colman notes the
advantages of making predictions about the behavior of others
based on information acquired culturally.
The great potential payoffs from successfully navigating real-
life coordination games may have been part of the selective pres-
sure favoring the evolution of language and culture. Coordination
problems abound, and their solutions are facilitated when players
have the ability to quickly acquire expectations about fellow play-
ers’ behavior. Whether such adaptations are rational or not, ig-
noring the evolutionary mechanisms that produced these cogni-
tive abilities is a mistake.
Humans should be individualistic and utility-
maximizing, but not necessarily “rational”
Pat Barclay and Martin Daly
Department of Psychology, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, L8S 4K1
Canada. barclapj@mcmaster.ca daly@mcmaster.ca
http://www.science.mcmaster.ca/Psychology/md.html
Abstract: One reason why humans don’t behave according to standard
game theoretical rationality is because it’s not realistic to assume that
everyone else is behaving rationally. An individual is expected to have psy-
chological mechanisms that function to maximize his/her long-term pay-
offs in a world of potentially “irrational” individuals. Psychological decision
theory has to be individualistic because individuals make decisions, not
groups.
Game theoretical rationality in the service of personal profit max-
imization is not an adequate model of human decision-making in
social bargaining situations. This proposition is a large part of Col-
man’s thesis, and we have no quarrel with it. Does anyone? The
point is proven whenever experimental subjects reject offers in
Ultimatum Games, share the pot in Dictator Games, or cooperate
in one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemmas (e.g., Frank et al. 1993; Roth
1995). The idea that this simple game theoretical account is de-
scriptive rather than normative is surely dead in experimental eco-
nomics and psychology. Evolutionary models are an important ex-
ception, because they purport to describe what strategies will be
selected for. However, in these models, the concept of “rational-
ity” is superfluous, because the selection of superior strategies oc-
curs by a mindless, competitive process (Gintis 2000).
One way in which rational choice theory (RCT) is problematic
is the default expectation that all other players will behave “ratio-
nally.” Individuals can be expected to occasionally make decisions
that are not in accordance with predictions of RCT because of in-
complete information, errors, concern for the welfare of others
(such as friends or relatives), or manipulation by others. Also, in-
dividuals may be expected to act irrationally if that irrationality is
more adaptive than rationality. For example, Nowak et al. (2000)
show that the “irrational” behavior of demanding fair offers in the
Ultimatum Game is evolutionarily stable if each individual has
knowledge about what kind of offers each other individual will ac-
cept. Similarly, aggressive behavior or punishment, while not “ra-
tional” in the game theoretic sense, can evolve if the costs of be-
ing punished are high (Boyd & Richerson 1992), because the
punished individual learns (potentially via operant conditioning)
to desist from the behavior that brought on the punishment.
Given that others are sometimes not strictly rational, an instru-
mentally rational individual should reevaluate his/her situation
and act accordingly (Colman hints at this in sect. 8.4). We argue
that rationality should not even be the default assumption because
individuals are repeatedly faced with evidence (from real life) that
others are not always rational, and this affects the strategy that a
profit-maximizing individual should take. For example, when
playing an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma against what appears to be
a conditional cooperator (such as a Tit-for-Tat player), a rational
and selfish player should cooperate for a while. Even if the ratio-
nal actor is cheated in later rounds, he/she has still done better
than if he/she had never cooperated. Thus, a rational player
should attempt to determine the likely responses of others, rather
than assume that (despite past experience to the contrary) they
will be “rational.” Henrich et al. (2001) argue that when people
play experimental games, they compare the games to analogous
situations with which they have experience. If different people
have had different experiences because of different backgrounds,
then they will have different beliefs about how others will behave.
Thus, in iterated games, each player may be acting rationally with
respect to his/her past experience. Recent experiences have large
effects on how people play experimental games (Eckel & Wilson
1998a), possibly because players use their experience in the games
to update their beliefs of what others will do.
This does not explain behavior in one-shot games, but we would
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not expect the human psyche to have evolved to deal with one-
shot games. Under normal circumstances (and especially before
the dawn of the global village), one can rarely (if ever) be ab-
solutely certain that one will never interact with the same person
again. Even if two individuals never interact again, others may ob-
serve the interaction (Alexander 1987). For this reason, humans
may have internal rewards for acting cooperatively in repeated in-
teractions, which evolved (or were learned) because those rewards
caused people to cooperate and reap the benefits of mutual co-
operation. These internal rewards (or nonstandard preferences
such as a positive valuation of fairness, equity, or the well-being of
individual exchange partners) would also cause them to act coop-
eratively in the novel case of one-shot interactions as well.
The target article’s more contentious claim is that game theo-
retical rationality cannot be salvaged as a model of human deci-
sion-making in social situations by incorporating nonstandard
preferences into the decision makers’ utility functions. In section
8.1, Colman illustrates the problem of finding compromise solu-
tions where individual preferences differ with Sugden’s example
of a family going for a walk, and asserts that tinkering with utility
functions cannot explain their solubility. He insists that the “team
reasoning” by which compromises are negotiated is an “inherently
non-individualistic” process. However, we looked in vain for evi-
dence or argument in support of these conclusions. It is, after all,
individuals who ultimately make the choices in experimental
games, so if “a team reasoning player” really seeks to maximize
“joint or collective payoff,” as Colman claims (sect. 8.1), then con-
tra his own conclusion (sect. 9.1), this is evidence of nonstandard
preferences, not of “nonstandard types of reasoning.” Moreover,
such a process of team reasoning cannot have general applicabil-
ity to social dilemmas with divisible payoffs, because it is incon-
sistent with the evidence that experimental subjects will pay to
punish other players (Fehr & Gächter 2000; Roth 1995). We do
not understand the notion of a “psychological” theory that is “non-
individualistic”; the individual organism is psychology’s focal level
of analysis.
We agree with Colman in saying that game theoretic rationality
does not accurately describe human social behavior. However, he
has not argued convincingly why expanding calculations of Ex-
pected Utility to include nonstandard preferences and rational re-
sponses to irrational behavior cannot salvage models of Expected
Utility, so we would argue that such expanded models still may be
effective at explaining human behavior. Evolutionary models can
help generate hypotheses about what those nonstandard prefer-
ences are, and how we might expect people to respond to appar-
ently irrational behavior.
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Neural game theory and the search for
rational agents in the brain
Gregory S. Berns
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Abstract: The advent of functional brain imaging has revolutionized the
ability to understand the biological mechanisms underlying decision-mak-
ing. Although it has been amply demonstrated that assumptions of ratio-
nality often break down in experimental games, there has not been an
overarching theory of why this happens. I describe recent advances in
functional brain imaging and suggest a framework for considering the
function of the human reward system as a discrete agent.
The assumption of rationality has been under attack from several
fronts for a number of years. Colman succinctly surveys the evi-
dence against rationality in such ubiquitous decision games rang-
ing from the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) to Centipede and comes to
the conclusion that standard game theory fails to explain much of
human behavior, especially within the confines of social interac-
tions. This is a startling conclusion, and not merely because the
tools of game theory have become so enmeshed as an approach to
decision-making and risk management. The startling implication
is that almost every commonplace decision that humans make is
socially constrained. Whether it is an explicit social interaction like
the PD or an implicit social construct that underlies the decision
to stay a few more hours at work versus spending time with fam-
ily, social connectedness cannot be factored out of almost any
meaningful human decision. If the assumption of rationality gov-
erns the application of game theoretic tools to understanding hu-
man decision-making, then its very failure in social domains brings
into question its practical utility. Can the tools of game theory be
applied within ad hoc frameworks like behavioral game theory, or
psychological game theory? The reunification of psychological
principles within economics is a necessary first step (Camerer
1999). However, like cognitive psychology before it, psychological
principles also often fail to explain human behavior. Neuroscience
offers yet another perspective on human behavior, and the appli-
cation within economic frameworks has come to be called neural
economics (Montague & Berns 2002; Wilson 1998).
One of the earliest applications of functional brain imaging, in
this case functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), to the
evaluation of the neural basis of game theory was performed by
McCabe and colleagues (McCabe et al. 2001). In a variant of Cen-
tipede, pairs of subjects played three types of games (trust, pun-
ish, and mutual advantage). As Colman points out, most players
behave cooperatively in these types of games – an observation un-
explainable by standard rational game theory. McCabe’s results
implicated a specific region of the medial prefrontal cortex that
subserved this type of cooperative behavior. Perhaps because of
the small sample size (N 5 6), statistically significant results were
not found for the noncooperators (i.e., “rational” players), and
nothing could be said about the possible existence of rational
agents in the brain.
In a recent study, our group used fMRI to examine the neural
responses of one player in an all-female PD interaction (Rilling et
al. 2002). The large sample size (N 5 36) yielded reasonable
power to detect a number of significant activations related to the
different outcomes. At the simplest level, striatal activation was
most strongly associated with mutual cooperation outcomes.
When subjects played a computer, the striatal activation was
greatly reduced, suggesting that the striatal activity was specifi-
cally modulated by the presence or absence of social context. This
region of the striatum is of particular interest because it is the
same region most closely associated with hedonic reward pro-
cesses (Schultz et al. 1997). Activation of the ventral striatum, es-
pecially the nucleus accumbens, has been observed repeatedly in
various forms of appetitive Pavlovian conditioning and drug ad-
ministration – activity that is widely believed to be modulated by
dopamine release (Robbins & Everitt 1992). The striatal activa-
tion observed with mutual cooperation most likely reflected the
overall utility of that outcome in the context of the PD. The same
region of striatum was also observed to be active during the deci-
sion-making phase of the experiment, but only when the subject
chose to cooperate following her partner’s cooperation in the pre-
vious round. This latter finding suggests that the striatum was not
only encoding the actual utility of the outcome, but the expected
utility during the decision-making phase. We do not yet know the
exact relationship between reward-system activity and expected
utility (modified or not), but the mesolimbic reward system ap-
pears to be a promising candidate for a “rational agent” within the
brain.
Based on the results of the PD experiment, our group realized
that it would be desirable to monitor brain activity in both players
simultaneously. The rationale is that by monitoring the activity in
the reward pathways of both players in a two-player game, one
should have a direct assay of the player’s expected utility functions
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without resorting to revealed preference. Under rational assump-
tions, these functions should be about the same. In a proof of prin-
ciple experiment, based loosely on the game of matching pennies,
we described the methodology necessary to conduct such simul-
taneous imaging experiments, which we have termed, “Hyper-
scanning” (Montague et al. 2002). In this first experiment, we did
not undertake an assessment of utility functions, but it is worth
pointing out that the methodology is generalizable to N-person in-
teractions.
There is good reason to be hopeful that neuroscientific meth-
ods, especially functional brain imaging, will help resolve the ap-
parent paradoxes between rational game theory and both behav-
ioral and psychological variants. By looking inside the brain, it
becomes possible to identify specific neuronal clusters that may
be operating near different equilibria. Recent work suggests that
neurons in the lateral intraparietal area encode expected utilities
during probabilistic reward paradigms in monkeys (Glimcher
2002; Gold & Shadlen 2001). In humans, correlates of utility, as
predicted by prospect theory, have been found in discrete ele-
ments of the reward pathway (Breiter et al. 2001). Taken together,
these early neuroscientific enquiries suggest that game theoretic
principles are very much viable predictors of neuronal behavior.
The interaction of different pools of neurons in the brain may re-
sult in phenotypic behavior that appears to be irrational, but it is
possible that the rational agents are the neurons, not the person.
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Evolution, the emotions, and rationality in
social interaction
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Abstract: Although Colman’s criticisms of orthodox game theory are con-
vincing, his assessment of progress toward construction of an alternative
is unnecessarily restrictive and pessimistic. He omits an important multi-
disciplinary literature grounded in human evolutionary biology, in partic-
ular the existence and function of social emotions experienced when fac-
ing some strategic choices. I end with an alternative suggestion for
modifying orthodox game theory.
Colman has brought together an impressive collection of argu-
ments to demonstrate both serious weaknesses and failures of or-
thodox game-theoretic rationality. But to address these problems
he offers only some “tentative and ad hoc suggestions” (sect. 8,
para. 2) from psychological game theory. Although I strongly en-
dorse his criticisms of orthodox game theory and agree that the
new reasoning principles he describes have a part to play, I think
his discussion of “where next” neglects some important ideas from
a recent and exciting multidisciplinary literature.
Because of the newness of this research and its multidiscipli-
nary origins, we must piece together some apparently disparate
strands of thought in order to glimpse the beginnings of an alter-
native to orthodox game-theoretic rationality. One reason why
Colman’s “destruction” work is much more comprehensive and
convincing than his subsequent “construction” is his early dis-
tinction between the nonrational “mindless” (sect. 1.3, para. 3)
strategic interaction of evolutionary game theory, and the rational
strategic interaction of human agents. He argues the former is not
of interest for his views on rationality, but I will argue that this di-
chotomy severely restricts the variety of new ideas that he can con-
sider.
To understand human decision-making in social interactions,
we should keep in mind that both humans and their decision-mak-
ing apparatus are themselves products of natural selection. There
is a growing consensus behind the “social animal” hypothesis (e.g.,
Barton & Dunbar 1997; Cartwright 2000), which maintains that
the selection pressures among humans were primarily an in-
traspecies phenomenon. In successive generations, reproductive
success went to those with the best grasp of the complexities of
the “social chess” that was a constant theme of tribal life. In this
view, underlying the anomalous cooperation observed in both ex-
perimental and real world social dilemmas is an innate predispo-
sition, not for unconditional cooperation, but for some form of
reciprocity. Indeed, there is a now a significant literature in ex-
perimental and theoretical economics on reciprocity models (see
Sethi & Somanathan 2003 for a recent survey).
Trivers (1985) argued that reciprocal altruism in humans
evolved by molding our emotional responses to the cost/benefit
calculus of social exchange; among these emotions are both coop-
erative and punitive sentiments. In a recent study, Price et al.
(2002) demonstrate that “punitive sentiments in collective action
contexts have evolved to reverse the fitness advantages that accrue
to free riders over producers.” Indeed, punitive sentiments must
go hand in hand with a preparedness to risk cooperation if coop-
eration is to survive the process of natural selection.
There is also a growing recognition that contrary to the standard
model of rational choice, “gut feelings experienced at the moment
of making a decision, which are often quite independent of the
consequences of the decision, can play a critical role in the choice
one eventually makes” (Loewenstein et al. 2001). For example,
they refer to the work of the neuroscientist Damasio (1994), who
shows how our ability to choose rationally is intertwined with our
ability to experience emotional reactions to the choices we face.
Damasio calls these reactions “somatic markers” and argues: “Na-
ture appears to have built the apparatus of rationality (the cere-
bral cortex) not just on top of the apparatus of biological regula-
tion (the limbic system), but also from it and with it” (p. 128). A
more human rationality may also allow for heterogeneity of
choices, in recognition of the differing intensities with which the
social (and other) emotions are experienced by different people in
the deliberation process.
Although neither Damasio nor Loewenstein and colleagues di-
rectly address the social emotions, we can easily extend their ar-
guments to the context of strategic interaction, where the emo-
tions that need incorporating for a descriptive theory are the
cooperative and punitive sentiments behind reciprocity. We might
even go further and argue for their incorporation into normative
models, as well. This is because our emotional responses to
choices that place our individual and collective interests in oppo-
sition embody adaptive knowledge that helped win many games
of “social chess.” These somatic responses may help us to extract
the long run benefits of cooperation.
There is also now direct evidence that a somatic response spe-
cific to human strategic interactions exists. Recent work by Rilling
et al. (2002), using fMRI scans on subjects playing prisoner’s
dilemma games, found that an individual’s brain activation pat-
terns when the playing partner was identified as a human differ
from when the partner was identified as a computer. They con-
clude “that (the relevant activation patterns) may relate specifi-
cally to cooperative social interactions with human partners.” It
seems that human players rely more on a common knowledge of
humanity in strategic interaction than a common knowledge of ra-
tionality as conventionally understood.
The finding of Rilling and colleagues also highlights the impor-
tance of the description or “framing” of the game for our choices.
Loewenstein and colleagues also noted, for choice under risk, that
these factors become important when we incorporate emotions
experienced when choosing, in contrast to the purely cognitive
evaluations of the standard model that are supposedly context in-
dependent. This implies we can no longer expect game theoretic
models to satisfy description invariance if a change in the de-
scription (e.g., that the other player is a person or a program) is
implemented.
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Colman discusses “Stackelberg reasoning” and “team thinking,”
and he mentions (sect. 8.1, para. 3) that the collective preferences
of team reasoning can be triggered by the acceptance of a group
identity in certain contexts. But he doesn’t explain where these al-
ternative reasoning methods come from, how they survive, or how,
if cooperation in social dilemmas is sensitive to the cost/benefit
ratio, we might “trade-off” the different reasoning methods in
some meta-reasoning process. Hamilton’s (1964) “kin-selection,”
Trivers’ (1971) “reciprocal altruism,” and Alexander’s (1987) “in-
direct reciprocity” models might at least offer a way to think about
answering these questions.
If we wish to incorporate the social emotions triggered by a
strategic choice into our models, how might we proceed? Hollis
and Sugden (1993) explained (p. 28) why our attitudes toward
consequences cannot be simply “bundled in” with the existing util-
ities of a game. A more plausible path then may be to alter the
weighting we attach to the consequences, along the lines of the
“rank dependent” transformation of the cumulative probability
distribution, which has worked so well among the alternatives to
expected utility theory (see Starmer 2000). In this way, some plau-
sible improvements to orthodox game theory might be developed,
as has already happened to expected utility theory in choice under
risk.
Behavioral game theory: Plausible formal
models that predict accurately
Colin F. Camerer
Division of Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA
91125. camerer@hss.caltech.edu http://hss.caltech.edu/~camerer
Abstract: Many weaknesses of game theory are cured by new models that
embody simple cognitive principles, while maintaining the formalism and
generality that makes game theory useful. Social preference models can
generate team reasoning by combining reciprocation and correlated equi-
librium. Models of limited iterated thinking explain data better than equi-
librium models do; and they self-repair problems of implausibility and
multiplicity of equilibria.
Andrew Colman’s wonderful, timely, and provocative article col-
lects several long-standing complaints about game theory. Part of
the problem is that game theory has used lots of applied math and
little empirical observation. Theorists think that deriving per-
fectly precise analytical predictions about what people will do
(under differing assumptions about rationality) from pure rea-
soning is the greatest challenge. Perhaps it is; but why is this the
main activity? The important uses of game theory are prescrip-
tive (e.g., giving people good advice) and descriptive (predicting
what is likely to happen), because good advice (and good design
of institutions) requires a good model of how people are likely to
play. It is often said that studying analytical game theory helps a
player understand what might happen, vaguely, even if it does not
yield direct advice. This is like saying that studying physics helps
you win at pool because the balls move according to physical laws.
A little physics probably doesn’t hurt, but also helps very little
compared to watching other pool players, practicing, getting
coaching, studying what makes other players crumble under
pressure, and so on.
While Colman emphasizes the shortcomings of standard theory,
the real challenge is in creating new theory that is psychological
(his term) or “behavioral” (my earlier term from 1990; they are
synonymous). Models that are cognitively plausible, explain data
(mostly experimental), and are as general as analytical models,
have developed very rapidly in just the last few years. Colman
mentions some. Others are described in my book (Camerer 2003).
An important step is to remember that games are defined over
utilities, but in the world (and even the lab) we can usually only
measure pecuniary payoffs – status, territory, number of offspring,
money, and so forth. The fact that people cooperate in the pris-
oner’s dilemma (PD) is not a refutation of game theory per se; it
is a refutation of the joint hypothesis of optimization (obeying
dominance) and the auxiliary hypothesis that they care only about
the payoffs we observe them to earn (their own money). The self-
interest hypothesis is what’s at fault.
Several new approaches to modeling this sort of “social prefer-
ences” improve on similar work by social psychologists (men-
tioned in sect. 8.1), because the new models are designed to work
across games and endogenize when players help or hurt others.
For example, in Rabin’s fairness theory, player A treats another
player’s move as giving herself (A) a good or bad payoff, and forms
a judgment of whether the other player is being nice or mean.
Players are assumed to reciprocate niceness and also meanness.
Rabin’s model is a way to formalize conditional cooperation –
people cooperate if they expect others to do so. This provides a
way to anchor the idea of “team reasoning” in methodological in-
dividualism. In experiments on group identity and cooperation, a
treatment (like subjecting subjects to a common fate or dividing
them into two rooms) or categorization (whether they like cats or
dogs better) is used to divide subjects into groups. In the Rabin
approach, PD and public goods games are coordination games in
which players are trying to coordinate on their level of mutual
niceness or meanness.
Experimental identity manipulations can be seen as correlating
devices that tell subjects which equilibrium will be played, that is,
whether they can expect cooperation from the other players or not
(which is self-enforcing if they like to reciprocate). This explana-
tion is not merely relabeling the phenomenon, because it makes a
sharp prediction: A correlated equilibrium requires a publicly ob-
servable variable that players commonly know. If identity is a cor-
relating device, then when it is not commonly known, cooperation
will fall apart. For example, suppose members of the A team (“in-
formed A’s”) are informed that they will play other A’s, but the in-
formed As’ partners will not know whether they are playing A’s or
B’s. Some theories of pure empathy or group identification pre-
dict that who the other players think they are playing won’t mat-
ter to the informed A’s because they just like to help their team-
mates. The correlated equilibrium interpretation predicts that
cooperation will shrink if informed A’s know that their partners
don’t know who they are playing, because A’s only cooperate with
other A’s if they can expect cooperation by their partners. So there
is not necessarily a conflict between an individualist approach and
team reasoning: “Teamness” can arise purely through the con-
junction of reciprocal individual preferences and observable cor-
relating variables, which create shared beliefs about what team
members are likely to do. What those variables are is an interest-
ing empirical matter.
Another type of model weakens the mutual consistency of play-
ers’ choices and beliefs. This might seem like a step backward but
it is not – in fact, it solves several problems that mutual consis-
tency (equilibrium) creates. In the cognitive hierarchy (CH)
model of Camerer et al. (2002), a Poisson distribution of discrete
levels of thinking is derived from a reduced-form constraint on
working memory. Players who use 0 levels will randomize. Players
at level K . 0 believe others are using 0 to K to 1 levels. They know
the normalized distribution of lower-level thinkers, and what
those others do, and best respond according to their beliefs. The
model has one parameter, t, the average number of levels of think-
ing (it averages around 1.5 in about a hundred games). In the CH
model, every strategy is played with positive probability, so there
are no incredible threats and odd beliefs after surprising moves.
Once t is fixed (say 1.5), the model produces an exact statistical
distribution of strategy frequencies – so it is more precise in games
with multiple equilibria, and is generally more empirically accu-
rate than equilibrium models. The model can explain focal points
in matching games if level-0 subjects choose what springs up. The
model also has “economic value”: If subjects had used it to fore-
cast what others were likely to do, and best responded to the
model’s advice, they would have earned substantially more (about
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a third of the economic value of perfect advice). Nash equilibrium,
in contrast, sometimes has negative economic value.
Beliefs, intentions, and evolution: Old versus
new psychological game theory
Jeffrey P. Carpenter and Peter Hans Matthews




Abstract: We compare Colman’s proposed “psychological game theory”
with the existing literature on psychological games (Geanakoplos et al.
1989), in which beliefs and intentions assume a prominent role. We also
discuss experimental evidence on intentions, with a particular emphasis on
reciprocal behavior, as well as recent efforts to show that such behavior is
consistent with social evolution.
Andrew Colman’s target article is a call to build a new, psycholog-
ical, game theory based on “nonstandard assumptions.” Our im-
mediate purpose is to remind readers that the earlier work of
Geanakoplos et al. (1989), henceforth abbreviated as GPS, which
the target article cites but does not discuss in detail, established
the foundations for a theory of “psychological games” that achieves
at least some of the same ends. Our brief review of GPS and some
of its descendants – in particular, the work of Rabin (1993) and
Falk and Fischbacher (2000) – will also allow us to elaborate on
the connections between psychological games, experimental eco-
nomics, and social evolution.
The basic premise of GPS is that payoffs are sometimes a func-
tion of both actions and beliefs about these actions, where the lat-
ter assumes the form of a subjective probability measure over the
product of strategy spaces. If these beliefs are “coherent” – that
is, the information embodied in second-order beliefs are consis-
tent with the first-order beliefs, and so on – and this coherence is
common knowledge, then the influence of second (and higher) or-
der beliefs can be reduced to a set of common first-order beliefs.
That is, in a two-player psychological game, for example, the util-
ities of A and B are functions of the strategies of each and the be-
liefs of each about these strategies. A psychological Nash equilib-
rium (PNE) is then a strategy profile in which, given their beliefs,
neither A nor B would prefer to deviate, and these first-order be-
liefs are correct. If these augmented utilities are continuous, then
all normal form psychological games must have at least one PNE.
The introduction of beliefs provides a natural framework for
modeling the role of intentions in strategic contests, and this could
well prove to be the most important application of GPS. It is ob-
vious that intentions matter to decision-makers – consider the le-
gal difference between manslaughter and murder – and that game
theorists would do well to heed the advice of Colman and others
who advocate a more behavioral approach.
For a time, it was not clear whether or not the GPS framework
was tractable. Rabin (1993), which Colman cites as an example of
behavioral, rather than psychological, game theory, was perhaps
the first to illustrate how a normal form psychological game could
be derived from a “material game” with the addition of parsimo-
nious “kindness beliefs.” In the standard two-person prisoner’s
dilemma (PD), for example, he showed that the “all cooperate”
and “all defect” outcomes could both be rationalized as PNEs.
As Rabin (1993) himself notes, this transformation of the PD is
not equivalent to the substitution of altruistic agents for self-
interested ones: the “all defect” outcome, in which each prisoner
believes that the other(s) will defect, could not otherwise be an
equilibrium. This is an important caveat to the recommendation
that we endow economic actors with “nonstandard reasoning
processes,” and prompts the question: What observed behavior
will the “new psychological game theory” explain that an old(er)
GPS-inspired one cannot? Or, in narrower terms, what are the
shortcomings of game theoretic models that incorporate the role
of intentions, and therefore such emotions as surprise or resent-
fulness?
The answers are not obvious, not least because there are so few
examples of the transformation of material games into plausible
psychological ones, and almost all of these share Rabin’s (1993)
emphasis on kindness and reciprocal behavior. It does seem to us,
however, that to the extent that Colman’s “nonstandard reasoning”
can be formalized in terms of intentions and beliefs, there are
fewer differences between the old and new psychological game
theories than at first it seems.
There is considerable experimental evidence that intentions
matter. Consider, for example, Falk et al. (2000), in which a first
mover can either give money to, or take money away from, a sec-
ond mover, and any money given is tripled before it reaches the
second mover, who must then decide whether to give money back,
or take money from, the first mover. Their analysis suggests that
there is a strong relationship between what the first and second
movers do: in particular, the more the first mover gives (takes), the
more the second mover takes (gives) back.
Falk et al. (2000) find that first mover giving (taking) is inter-
preted as a friendly (unfriendly) act, and that these intentions mat-
ter. Without the influence of beliefs or intentions on utilities, there
would be a single Nash equilibrium in which the first mover takes
as much as possible because she “knows” that the second has no
material incentive to retaliate. Although this behavior can also be
supported as a PNE, so can that in which the first mover gives and
expects a return and the second mover understands this intention
and reciprocates. When the experiment is changed so that the first
mover’s choice is determined randomly, and there are no inten-
tions for the second mover to impute, the correlation between first
and second mover actions collapses. We see this as evidence that
beliefs – in particular, intentions – matter, but also that once these
beliefs have been incorporated, a modified “rational choice frame-
work” is still useful.
Building on both GPS and Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (1998) and Falk and Fischbacher (2000) derive vari-
ations of Rabin’s (1993) “fairness equilibrium” for extensive form
games, with results that are consistent with experimental evi-
dence. The simplest of these is the ultimatum game, in which a
first mover offers some share of a pie to a second mover who must
then accept or reject the proposal. With kindness functions simi-
lar to Rabin’s (1993), Falk and Fischbacher (2000) show that the
ultimatum game has a unique PNE that varies with the “reci-
procity parameters” of proposer and responder. Furthermore, this
equilibrium is consistent with the observations that the modal of-
fer is half the surplus, that offers near the mode are seldom re-
jected, that there are few of the low offers that are consistent with
the subgame perfect equilibrium, and that most of these low of-
fers are rejected.
This result does not tell us, though, whether this outcome is
consistent with the development of reciprocal intentions or norms
over time, or, in other words, whether social evolution favors those
with “good intentions.” To be more concrete, suppose that the
proposers and responders in the ultimatum game are drawn from
two distinct populations and matched at random each period, and
that these populations are heterogeneous with respect to inten-
tion. Could these intentions survive “selection” based on differ-
ences in material outcomes? Or do these intentions impose sub-
stantial costs on those who have them?
There are still no definitive answers to these questions, but the
results in Binmore et al. (1995), henceforth abbreviated as BGS,
hint that prosocial intentions will sometimes survive. BGS con-
sider a “miniature ultimatum game” with a limited strategy space
and show there are two stable equilibria within this framework.
The first corresponds to the subgame perfect equilibrium – pro-
posers are selfish, and responders accept these selfish offers – but
in the second, proposers are fair and a substantial share of re-
sponders would turn down an unfair offer. Furthermore, these dy-
Commentary/Colman: Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction
158 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2003) 26:2
namics can be rationalized as a form of social or cultural learning:
BGS emphasize the role of aspirations, but evolution toward fair
outcomes is also consistent with imitation (Björnerstedt & Weibull
1996). It is tempting, then, to interpret the second BGS outcome
as a Falk and Fischbacher (2000) “fairness equilibrium.”
All of this said, we share most of Colman’s concerns with stan-
dard game theoretic arguments, and suspect that psychological
game theorists, both old and new, will have much to contribute to
the literature.
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To have and to eat cake: The biscriptive role
of game-theoretic explanations of human
choice behavior
William D. Casebeera and James E. Parcob
aDepartment of Philosophy, United States Air Force Academy, Colorado




Abstract: Game-theoretic explanations of behavior need supplementa-
tion to be descriptive; behavior has multiple causes, only some governed
by traditional rationality. An evolutionarily informed theory of action coun-
tenances overlapping causal domains: neurobiological, psychological, and
rational. Colman’s discussion is insufficient because he neither evaluates
learning models nor qualifies under what conditions his propositions hold.
Still, inability to incorporate emotions in axiomatic models highlights the
need for a comprehensive theory of functional rationality.
The power and beauty of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s The-
ory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944) and Luce and
Raiffa’s Games and Decisions (1957) lie in their mathematical co-
herence and axiomatic treatment of human behavior. Once ratio-
nal agents could be described mathematically, game theory pro-
vided a far-reaching normative model of behavior requiring an
assumption of common knowledge of rationality. This assumption
(in addition to the often unstated requirement that a player fully
understand the game situation) is subsumed under the phrase “the
theory assumes rational players” (Luce & Raiffa 1957). But we
know that, descriptively speaking, this is not always the case. The
literature has clearly shown that not only are these (mathemati-
cally required) assumptions often too strong to be met in practice,
but also that the “rational actor theory” (hereafter RAT) is under-
specified in that it cannot effectively accommodate emotions. But
does this constitute a failure of RAT? We think not.
Nevertheless, we agree with Colman’s larger point that we need
a “psychological game theory,” or rather, a neurobiologically in-
formed theory of decision-making. This is not because of the spec-
tacular failure of game theoretic assumptions in any particular ex-
periment, but rather stems from an ecumenical and fully
naturalizable worldview about the causes of, and norms govern-
ing, human behavior. Choice-driven behavior is a function of mul-
tiple, highly distributed brain subsystems that include affect and
emotion. For example, in the domain of moral judgment, good
moral cognition is driven by a variety of brain structures, only
some involved in ratiocination as traditionally construed (Case-
beer & Churchland 2003). Even the most ardent RAT enthusiast
recognizes that if your explanandum is all human behavior, your
explanans will be more comprehensive than adverting to RAT
alone.
Thus, we question the usefulness of Colman’s ad hoc refine-
ments for prescriptions of behavior in interactive decision-mak-
ing, primarily because he has neither (1) qualified his theory as to
when and under what conditions it applies, nor (2) provided an ac-
count for learning in games (beyond simple Stackelberg reason-
ing). For example, Colman uses the two-player centipede game as
a primary domain in which he justifies his theory. However, recent
evidence experimentally investigating three-player centipede
games (Parco et al. 2002) directly contradicts it. Parco et al. ex-
tended the McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) study to three players us-
ing small incentives (10 cents for stopping the game at the first
node, and $25.60 for continuing the game all the way to the end)
and obtained similar results, soundly rejecting the normative equi-
librium solution derived by backward induction. However, when
the payoffs of the game were increased by a factor of 50 (and each
player thus had the opportunity to earn $7,680), the results were
markedly different. Although initial behavior of both the low-pay
and high-pay conditions mirrored that of the McKelvey and Pal-
frey study, over the course of play for 60 trials, behavior in the
high-pay treatment converged toward the Nash equilibrium and
could be well accounted for using an adaptive reinforcement-
based learning model. Furthermore, as noted by McKelvey and
Palfrey (1992) and later by Fey et al. (1996), in all of the centipede
experiments that were conducted up until then, there were learn-
ing effects in the direction of equilibrium play. Colman’s oversight
of the extant learning in games literature and his brief account for
the dynamics of play through Stackelberg reasoning is insufficient.
Learning in games manifests itself in a variety of processes quite
different from simple Stackelberg reasoning (see Camerer & Ho
1999; Erev & Roth, 1998). For example, Rapoport et al. (2002)
document almost “magical” convergence to the mixed-strategy
equilibrium over 70 trials without common knowledge or be-
tween-trial feedback provided to subjects. Neither traditional
game theory nor Colman’s model can account for such data.
Generally speaking, Colman does little to improve prescriptions
for human behavior both within and outside of the subset of games
he has described; his paper is really a call for more theory than a
theory proper. RAT’s difficulty in dealing with emotions serves as
proof-of-concept that we need a more comprehensive theory. Hu-
mans are evolved creatures with multiple causes of behavior, and
the brain structures that subserve “rational” thought are, on an
evolutionary timescale, relatively recent arrivals compared to the
midbrain and limbic systems, which are the neural mechanisms of
affect and emotion. Ultimately, our goal should be to formulate an
explanation of human behavior that leverages RAT in the multiple
domains where it is successful, but that also enlightens (in a prin-
cipled way) as to when and why RAT fails. This more compre-
hensive explanation will be a neurobiological cum psychological
cum rational theory of human behavior.
The problems game-theoretic treatments have in dealing with
the role of emotions in decision-making serve to underscore our
point. There are at least two strategies “friends of RAT” can pur-
sue: (1) attempt to include emotions in the subjective utility
function (meaning you must have a mathematically rigorous the-
ory of the emotions; this is problematic), or (2) abandon RAT’s
claim to be discussing proximate human psychology and, instead,
talk about how emotions fit in system-wide considerations about
long-term strategic utility (Frank 1988). The latter approach has
been most successful, although it leaves RAT in the position of
being a distal explanatory mechanism. The proximate causes of
behavior in this story will be locally arational or possibly irra-
tional (hence the concerns with emotions). How would “new
wave RAT” deal with this? One contender for a meta-theory of
rationality that can accommodate the explanatory successes of
RAT, yet can also cope with their failure in certain domains, is a
functional conception of rationality. The norms that govern ac-
tion are reasonable, and reason-giving for creatures that wish to
be rational, insofar as such norms allow us to function appropri-
ately given our evolutionary history and our current environment
of action (Casebeer 2003).
We acknowledge that RAT will require supplementation if it is
to fully realize its biscriptive explanatory role of predicting human
action and providing us with a normative yardstick for it. Utility
theory must incorporate neurobiological and psychological deter-
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minants, as well as the rational, if game theory is to become as de-
scriptively appealing as it is normatively.
Experience and decisions
Edmund Fantino and Stephanie Stolarz-Fantino
Department of Psychology, University of California–San Diego, La Jolla, CA
92093-0109. efantino@ucsd.edu sfantino@psy.ucsd.edu
Abstract: Game-theoretic rationality is not generally observed in human
behavior. One important reason is that subjects do not perceive the tasks
in the same way as the experimenters do. Moreover, the rich history of co-
operation that participants bring into the laboratory affects the decisions
they make.
Colman reviews many instances of game playing in which human
players behave much more cooperatively and receive larger pay-
offs than permitted by conceptions of strict rationality. Specifi-
cally, he points out that although “Game-theoretic rationality re-
quires rational players to defect in one-shot social dilemmas”
(sect. 6.11), experimental evidence shows widespread coopera-
tion. We agree that strict rationality does not accurately portray or
predict human behavior in interactive decision-making situations.
Particularly problematic are predictions made on the basis of
backward induction. The Chain-store and Centipede games are
good examples. In each case, backward induction makes it appear
that the likely last move is inevitable, rather than one of a number
of possible outcomes, as it must appear to the participant. In any
case, it is unlikely that participants would reason backwards from
the conclusion, even if such reasoning made sense. For example,
Stolarz-Fantino et al. (2003) found that students were more likely
to demonstrate the conjunction effect (in which the conjunction
of two statements is judged more likely than at least one of the
component statements) when the conjunction was judged before
the components, than when it was judged after them. Further, if
people easily reasoned backward from likely end-states, they
should be more adept at demonstrating self-control (preferring a
larger, delayed reward to a smaller, more immediate reward) than
in fact they are (see discussion in Logue 1988).
Colman proposes “Psychological game theory” as a general ap-
proach that can be argued to account for these deviations. We
agree that this is a promising approach, although it is a fairly broad
and nonspecific approach as presented in the target article. We
would add a component to Psychological game theory that appears
to be relevant to the types of problems discussed: the pre-experi-
mental behavioral history of the game participants. We are study-
ing various types of irrational and nonoptimal behavior in the lab-
oratory (e.g., Case et al. 1999; Fantino 1998a; 1998b; Fantino &
Stolarz-Fantino 2002a; Goodie & Fantino 1995; 1996; 1999; Sto-
larz-Fantino et al. 1996; 2003) and are finding a pronounced ef-
fect of past history on decision-making (a conclusion also sup-
ported by Goltz’ research on the sunk-cost effect, e.g., Goltz 1993;
1999). One example will suffice.
A case of illogical decision-making is base-rate neglect, first de-
veloped by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) and discussed often in
this journal (e.g., Koehler 1996). Base-rate neglect refers to a ro-
bust phenomenon in which people ignore or undervalue back-
ground information in favor of case-specific information. Al-
though many studies have reported such neglect, most have used
a single “paper-and-pencil” question with no special care taken to
insure attentive and motivated subjects. Goodie and Fantino won-
dered if base-rate neglect would occur in a behavioral task in
which subjects were motivated and in which they were exposed to
repeated trials. We employed a matching-to-sample procedure
(MTS), which allowed us to mimic the base-rate problem quite
precisely (Goodie & Fantino 1995; 1996; 1999; Stolarz-Fantino &
Fantino 1990). The sample in the MTS task was either a blue or
green light. After sample termination, two comparison stimuli ap-
peared: these were always a blue and a green light. Subjects were
instructed to choose either. We could present subjects with re-
peated trials rapidly (from 150 to 400 trials in less than a one-hour
session, depending on the experiment) and could readily manip-
ulate the probability of reinforcement for selecting either color af-
ter a blue sample and after a green sample. Consider the follow-
ing condition (from Goodie & Fantino 1995): Following either a
blue sample or a green sample, selection of the blue comparison
stimulus is rewarded on 67% of trials, and selection of the green
comparison stimulus is rewarded on 33% of trials; thus, in this sit-
uation the sample has no informative or predictive function. If
participants responded optimally, they should have come to always
select blue, regardless of the color of the sample; instead they fo-
cused on sample accuracy. Thus, after a green sample, instead of
always choosing blue (for reward on 67% of trials) they chose the
(matching) green comparison stimulus on 56% of trials (for a 48%
rate of reward). This continued for several hundred trials. In con-
trast, Hartl and Fantino (1996) found that pigeons performed op-
timally, ignoring the sample stimulus when it served no predictive
function. They did not neglect base-rate information.
What accounts for pigeons’ and people’s differing responses to
this simple task? We have speculated that people have acquired
strategies for dealing with matching problems that are misapplied
in our MTS problem (e.g., Stolarz-Fantino & Fantino 1995). For
example, from early childhood, we learn to match like shapes and
colors at home, in school, and at play (e.g., in picture books and in
playing with blocks and puzzles). Perhaps, this learned tendency
to match accounts for base-rate neglect in our MTS procedure. If
so, Goodie and Fantino (1996) reasoned that base-rate neglect
would be eliminated by using sample and comparison stimuli un-
related to one another (line orientation and color). In this case,
base-rate neglect was indeed eliminated. To further assess the
learning hypothesis, Goodie and Fantino (1996) next introduced
an MTS task in which the sample and comparison stimuli were
physically different but related by an extensive history. The sam-
ples were the words “blue” and “green”; the comparison stimuli
were the colors blue and green. A robust base-rate neglect was re-
instated. Ongoing research in our laboratory is showing that pi-
geons with sufficient matching experience (where matching is re-
quired for reward) can be induced to commit base-rate neglect.
These and other studies have led us to conclude that base-rate ne-
glect results from preexisting learned associations.
How might learned associations account for nonoptimal deci-
sions in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG)? Rationality theory
argues that the selfish response is optimal. But we have been
taught since childhood to be unselfish and cooperative. For many
of us, these behaviors have been rewarded with praise throughout
our lives (see the discussion of altruism in Fantino & Stolarz-Fan-
tino 2002b; Rachlin 2002). Moreover, actual deeds of unselfish
and cooperative behavior are often reciprocated. Why then should
these behaviors not “intrude” on the decisions subjects make in
the laboratory? Viewed from this perspective, there is nothing sur-
prising about the kinds of behavior displayed in PDG. Indeed,
such behavior is variable (many subjects cooperate, many defect),
as one would expect from the variable behavioral histories of the
participants.
A critique of team and Stackelberg reasoning
Herbert Gintis
Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts,
Northampton, MA 01060; External Faculty, Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM.
hgintis@comcast.net http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis
Abstract: Colman’s critique of classical game theory is correct, but it is
well known. Colman’s proposed mechanisms are not plausible. Insuffi-
cient reason does what “team reasoning” is supposed to handle, and it ap-
plies to a broader set of coordination games. There is little evidence rul-
ing out more traditional alternatives to Stackelberg reasoning, and the
latter is implausible when applied to coordination games in general.
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Colman’s critique of classical game theory is correct, but it is well
known. He misses one critique that I consider to be among the
most telling. If two “rational” players play a game with a unique,
strictly mixed strategy equilibrium, neither player has an incentive
to play using this equilibrium strategy, because in a true one-shot
game, there is absolutely no reason to randomize. It is easy to ex-
plain why one would prefer that one’s opponent not know which
action we will take, and it is possible to work this up into a full-
fledged justification of randomizing. But in a true one-shot, your
opponent knows nothing about you, so even if you choose a pure
strategy, you do no worse than by randomizing. The evolutionary
game-theoretic justification is that in a large population of agents
meeting randomly and playing the game in each period, in equi-
librium a fraction of the population will play each of the pure
strategies in proportion to that strategy’s weight in the mixed-strat-
egy Nash equilibrium.
Indeed, most of the problems with classical game theory can be
handled by evolutionary/behavioral game theory, and do not need
models of “nonstandard reasoning” (Gintis 2000). For instance, in
a pure coordination game with a positive payoff-dominant equi-
librium, and the payoffs to noncoordinated choices zero, evolu-
tionary game theory shows that each pair of coordinated choices
is a stable equilibrium, but if there are “trembles,” then the sys-
tem will spend most of its time in the neighborhood of the payoff-
dominant equilibrium (Young 1993).
As Colman notes, many of the empirical results appearing to
contradict classical game theory, in fact contradict the assumption
that agents are self-regarding. In fact, agents in many experimen-
tal situations care about fairness, and have a propensity to coop-
erate when others cooperate, and to punish noncooperators at
personal cost, even when there can be no long-run personal ma-
terial payoff to so doing. For an analysis and review of the post-
1995 studies supporting this assertion, see Gintis 2003.
Evolutionary game theory cannot repair all the problems of
classical game theory, because evolutionary game theory only ap-
plies when a large population engages in a particular strategic set-
ting for many periods, where agents are reassigned partners in
each period. We still need a theory of isolated encounters among
“rational” agents (i.e., agents who maximize an objective function
subject to constraints). Colman proposes two such mechanisms:
team reasoning and Stackelberg reasoning. I am not convinced
that either is a useful addition to the game-theoretic repertoire.
Concerning “team reasoning,” there is certainly much evidence
that pregame communication, face-to-face interaction, and fram-
ing effects that increase social solidarity among players do increase
prosocial behavior and raise average group payoffs, but this is usu-
ally attributed to players’ placing positive weight on the return 
to others, and increasing their confidence that others will also 
play prosocially. But these are nonstandard preference effects, not
nonstandard reasoning effects. Choosing the payoff-maximum
strategy in pure coordination games, where players receive some
constant nonpositive payoff when coordination fails, is most par-
simoniously explained as follows. If I know nothing about the
other players, then all of my strategies have an equal chance of
winning, so personal payoff maximization suggests choosing the
payoff maximum strategy. Nothing so exotic as “team reasoning”
is needed to obtain this result. Note that if a player does have in-
formation concerning how the other players might choose, an al-
ternative to the payoff-maximum strategy may be a best response.
Moreover, “team reasoning” completely fails if the pure coor-
dination game has nonconstant payoffs when coordination is not
achieved. Consider, for instance, the following two-person game.
Each person chooses a whole number between 1 and 10. If the
numbers agree, they each win that amount of dollars. If the num-
bers do not agree, they each lose the larger of the two choices. For
example, if one player chooses 10, and the other chooses 8, they
both lose ten dollars. This is a pure coordination game, and “team
reasoning” would lead to both players choosing 10. However, all
pure strategies are evolutionary equilibria, and computer simula-
tion shows that the higher numbers are less likely to emerge when
the simulation is randomly seeded at the start (I’ll send interested
readers the simulation program). Moreover, if an agent knows
nothing about his partner, it is easy to show, using the Principle of
Insufficient Reason, that 2 and 3 have the (equal and) highest pay-
offs. So if an agent believes that partners use the same reasoning,
he will be indifferent between 2 and 3. By the same reasoning, if
one’s partner chooses 2 and 3 with equal probability, then the pay-
off to 3 is higher than the payoff to 2. So 2 is the “rational” choice
of “ignorant” but “rational” agents.
Colman argues that there is strong evidence supporting Stack-
elberg reasoning, but he does not present this evidence. Some is
unpublished, but I did look at the main published article to which
he refers (Colman & Stirk 1998). This article shows that in 2 3 2
games, experimental subjects overwhelmingly choose Stackelberg
solutions when they exist. However, a glance at Figure 1 (p. 284)
of this article shows that, of the nine games with Stackelberg so-
lutions, six are also dominance-solvable, and in the other three,
any reasoning that would lead to choosing the payoff-maximum
strategy (including the argument from insufficient reason that I
presented above), gives the same result as Stackelberg reasoning.
So this evidence does not even weakly support the existence of
Stackelberg reasoning. I encourage Colman to do more serious
testing of this hypothesis.
I find the Stackelberg reasoning hypothesis implausible, be-
cause if players used this reasoning in pure coordination games, it
is not clear why they would not do so in other coordination games,
such as Battle of the Sexes (in this game, both agents prefer to use
the same strategy, but one player does better when both use strat-
egy 1, and the other does better when both use strategy 2). Stack-
elberg reasoning in this game would lead the players never to co-
ordinate, but always to choose their preferred strategies. I know
of no experimental results using such games, but I doubt that this
outcome would be even approximated.
How to play if you must
Hans Haller
Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,
Blacksburg, VA 24061. haller@vt.edu
Abstract: Beyond what Colman is suggesting, some residual indetermi-
nacy of Nash equilibrium may remain even after individual rationality is
amended. Although alternative solution concepts can expand the positive
scope (explanatory power) of game theory, they tend to reduce its accu-
racy of predictions (predictive power). Moreover, the appeal of alternative
solutions may be context-specific, as illustrated by the Stackelberg solu-
tion.
Analysis of a strategic or noncooperative game presumes that the
players are committed to participate. Normative analysis then
aims at an unambiguous recommendation of how to play the
game. If the analyst and the players adhere to the same principles
of rationality, then the players will follow the recommendation; in-
deed, the players can figure out how to play without outside help.
But can they? Like Colman, I shall refrain from elaborating on
bounded rationality.
Andrew Colman presents the argument of Gilbert, that com-
mon knowledge of individual rationality does not justify the use of
salient (exogenous, extrinsic) focal points to resolve indetermi-
nacy. Nor does it justify endogenous or intrinsic focal points based
on payoff dominance or asymmetry. This argument is in line with
the critique by Goyal and Janssen (1996) of Crawford and Haller’s
heuristic principle, to stay coordinated once coordination is ob-
tained. It applies as well to folk theorem scenarios, as in the infi-
nitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG): None of the
multiple equilibria is distinguished on the grounds of individual
rationality alone. The argument shows that principles other than
individual rationality have to be invoked for equilibrium selection
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à la Harsanyi and Selten (1988), and for rationalizing focal points
à la Kramarz (1996) or Janssen (2001b). Yet, even the addition of
several compelling principles need not result in a unique solution
for every game. For instance, in the Battle of the Sexes game, the
equilibrium in mixed strategies is ruled out by payoff dominance,
and there is no obvious way to select between the two equilibria
in pure strategies. It seems that there always remains some resid-
ual indeterminacy – unless it is stipulated by law how to play cer-
tain games. Thus, the ambitious goal of orthodox game theory,
broadly defined, to identify a unique solution for each game, has
been almost, but not completely, reached.
But do players play as they should? As the author of the target
article observes, it takes a further bridging hypothesis of weak ra-
tionality – that people try to act rationally – to turn the normative
theory into a positive one. Then, as a rule, the recommendations
of normative theory are treated as predictions. On a more funda-
mental level, the common knowledge and rationality (CKR) as-
sumptions may be tested. Although I agree that the literature on
experimental gaming testifies to the fruitfulness of empirical re-
search, I would add that empirical research in industrial organi-
zation tends to rely on natural rather than laboratory experiments.
This is worth noting, because economics, and in particular indus-
trial economics, has been the main area of applied game theory
and has immensely contributed to the development and prolifer-
ation of game-theoretical modeling.
Obviously, one would not necessarily observe the predicted out-
come, if the participants played a game that was different from the
one specified by the analyst or experimentalist. This would be the
case if the monetary payoffs, or hypothetical payoffs according to
the instructions, did not represent the subjects’ preferences. Such
instances are altruism or fairness considerations not accounted for
in the original payoff functions. In such a case, the “neoclassical
repair kit” can be applied, to use a popular, albeit somewhat
derogatory, term: After a payoff transformation or, more generally,
substitution of suitable utility functions for the original payoff
functions, the data no longer reject the model. Thus, although the
original model proved numerically mis-specified, the theory at
large has not been rejected.
Yet, there are plenty of instances where the specified payoffs do
represent player preferences, and orthodox and not-so-orthodox
game theory is rejected in laboratory experiments. The first re-
sponse to discrepancies between theory and evidence would be to
perform further experiments, to corroborate or reevaluate the
earlier evidence. After all, the immediate response to reports of
cold fusion was additional experimentation, not a rush to revise
theory. It appears that deliberate attempts at duplication are rare
and poorly rewarded in experimental gaming. Still, certain sys-
tematic violations of individual rationality are abundant, like play-
ing one’s strictly dominated strategy in a one-shot PDG and the
breakdown of backward induction in a variety of games.
In response to concerns rooted both in theory and evidence,
game theory has become fairly heterodox. The recent develop-
ments suggest an inherent tension between the goals of explain-
ing additional phenomena and of making more specific predic-
tions (Haller 2000). Less stringent requirements on solutions can
help explain hitherto unexplained phenomena. In the opposite di-
rection, the traditional, or if you want, orthodox literature on equi-
librium refinements and equilibrium selection has expended con-
siderable effort to narrow the set of eligible equilibrium outcomes,
to make more accurate predictions. Apart from the tradeoff men-
tioned, achieving a gain of explanatory power at the expense of
predictive power, novel solution concepts may be compelling in
some contexts and unconvincing under different but similar cir-
cumstances. One reason is that many experiments reveal a het-
erogeneous player population, with a substantial fraction evi-
dently violating individual rationality, and another non-negligible
fraction more or less conforming to orthodoxy. This raises inter-
esting questions; for example, whether the type of a player is time-
invariant or not.
Among the host of tentative and ad hoc suggestions falling un-
der the rubric of psychological game theory, Stackelberg reason-
ing can explain specific payoff dominance puzzles, but yields detri-
mental outcomes when applied to other classes of Stackelberg
solvable games. For instance, in a Cournot duopoly with zero costs
and linear demand, the Stackelberg solution yields the perfectly
competitive outcome, which is payoff-dominated by the Cournot-
Nash outcome. Hence, the Stackelberg solution illustrates that
the appeal of alternative solutions may be context-specific. Inci-
dentally, a Stackelberg solution is a special case of a conjectural
variation equilibrium. The latter concept can be traced back to
Bowley (1924). It introduces a quasidynamic element into a static
game. It has been utilized in models of imperfect competition and
strategic trade from time to time, and has seen a revival recently.
Despite its appeal, this modeling approach has been frequently
dismissed on the grounds that it makes ad hoc assumptions and
constitutes an unsatisfactory substitute for explicit dynamics.
Colman’s article is thought-provoking and touches on several of
the most pressing challenges for game theory, without pretending
to be comprehensive or definitive. It will be fascinating to see
which new theoretical concepts will emerge to address these chal-
lenges, and which ones will last.
What’s a face worth: Noneconomic factors in
game playing
Peter J. B. Hancocka and Lisa M. DeBruineb
aDepartment of Psychology, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA United
Kingdom; bDepartment of Psychology, McMaster University, Hamilton,
Ontario L8S 4K1, Canada. pjbh1@stir.ac.uk debruilm@mcmaster.ca
http://www.stir.ac.uk/psychology/staff/pjbh1
http://homepage.mac.com/debruine/
Abstract: Where behavior defies economic analysis, one explanation is
that individuals consider more than the immediate payoff. We present ev-
idence that noneconomic factors influence behavior. Attractiveness influ-
ences offers in the Ultimatum and Dictator Games. Facial resemblance, a
cue of relatedness, increases trusting in a two-node trust game. Only by
considering the range of possible influences will game-playing behavior be
explained.
Whenever a game is played between two people, there are many
potential motives for particular forms of behavior. One player may
wish to impress or defer to the other. One may feel vindictive to-
wards or sorry for the other player. Such motivations and others,
in various combinations, can add many layers of complexity to a
game-theoretic analysis of the payoffs. Where people behave in an
apparently irrational manner, it is possible that their perception of
the payoff does not equate to the economic one because of these
other factors. Players may also use cues to predict the behavior of
playing partners. For example, images of smiling partners are
trusted more than those who are not smiling (Scharlemann et al.
2001).
The Ultimatum Game is one where behavior defies a simple
payoff analysis (e.g., Thaler 1988). One player (the proposer) can
allocate some proportion of a sum of money to the second player
(the responder), who may accept or refuse the offer. If the offer is
refused, the money is returned and neither player gets anything.
Usually the game is played single-shot, where the players do not
know or even see each other. A payoff analysis suggests that any
offer should be accepted, but in typical western societies anything
less than about 35% is refused. This is usually explained as en-
forcement of “fair play” by the responder. In the related Dictator
Game, the second player has no choice. Now, the first player is
free to offer nothing, but in practice, usually does make some of-
fer. It appears that something inhibits purely selfish behavior. The
situation is more complicated when the players know something
of each other, as the other kinds of factors mentioned above may
affect decisions.
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Attractiveness is one of these factors. Apart from being desir-
able in its own right, the halo effect causes many assessments of
another, such as their intelligence and character, to be estimated
more highly. Thus, Solnick and Schweitzer (1999) found that more
was expected of attractive faces. Joergensen and Hancock (2001)
reported an Ultimatum Game where proposers saw a picture of
the responder. Offers were higher to faces rated as attractive,
echoing results from Solnick and Schweitzer (1999), but with a
stronger effect for attractive women. The correlation between
rated attractiveness and offer level was 0.83. However, the effect
of attractiveness was transient, it disappeared in a second round
of the game following information about who had refused low of-
fers. Hancock and Ross (2002) investigated the Dictator Game
with similar results: The correlation between offer levels within
the game and independently rated attractiveness was 0.91.
These experiments use anonymous faces, but what effect might
the perception that someone is related to you have? Hamilton’s
theory of kin selection (Hamilton 1964) suggests that people
should be favorably disposed toward relatives. Any gene promot-
ing altruistic behavior can influence its own success by benefiting
those most likely to share a copy of itself. Thus, a gene causing al-
truism will be favored if the benefit (b) to the recipient multiplied
by the relatedness1 (r) between the altruist and recipient is greater
than the cost (c) to the altruist.
Given this logic, cues of relatedness between individuals may
change the payoffs attributed to different behaviors. DeBruine
(2002) explored behavior in a two-person, two-node sequential
trust game (after Eckel & Wilson 1998b, and related to the Cen-
tipede game described by Colman). The first player can decide ei-
ther not to trust the second, in which case both get a sure payoff
of $3, or to trust the second player with the decision. The second
player can decide between selfish behavior, keeping $5 and giving
$2 to player one, or unselfish behavior, allocating $4 to each. Given
no information about the second player, the first player’s expected
payoff is $3 for either choice, so a rational player should be indif-
ferent. However, if the other player is a relative with relatedness
of 0.5,2 then the structure of the game is changed to a choice be-
tween a sure payoff of $4.50 ($3 to self plus 0.5 times $3 to the
other) and a risky payoff with an expected value of $5.25 ($3 to self
plus 0.5 times $4.50 to the other). In addition, assessment of the
second player’s trustworthiness may bias the expected payoff of
trusting.
DeBruine (2002) digitally morphed images of the other player
to manipulate one possible cue of relatedness, facial resemblance.
Players in this trust game chose the riskier option more often when
the image of the opponent had been morphed to resemble the first
player than when the image had been morphed to resemble an
unknown person. This is consistent with an increase in either the
expected payoff of trusting or the expected probability of trust-
worthy behavior. Analysis of the responses indicated that inde-
pendently rated attractiveness of the second player did not in-
fluence behavior in this situation, although current research by
DeBruine indicates that resemblance to self increases the attrac-
tiveness of faces (also see Penton-Voak et al. 1999).
In an unpublished study, DeBruine randomized the computer-
generated second players’ responses in the trust game. Players
were less likely to trust opponents in games immediately after they
had been cheated than in games after the opponent was unselfish.
This echoes findings by Eckel and Wilson (1998a) that the previ-
ous opponent’s response influences the current choice, even when
the current opponent is a different person. Within the sets of
games played after either a selfish or unselfish response, players
were still more likely to trust faces morphed to resemble them-
selves.
In any social situation, people evaluate others. We have shown
that even a static photograph of another player can cause signifi-
cant differences to behavior in simple games. A playing partner’s
attractiveness may introduce noneconomic motivations to the
game or change the player’s predictions of the partner’s behavior.
The perception that someone may be related to you introduces
further complications, because of the shift of possible inclusive fit-
ness payoffs. The inclusion of such factors will broaden the scope
of a psychological game theory.
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NOTES
1. Relatedness refers not to the total proportion of genes shared, but to
those shared by identical descent. In this case, r is the probability that the
recipient shares a gene for altruism with the altruist.
2. The conclusion holds for any r . 0 with this particular game payoff
structure.
Rational belief and social interaction
Daniel M. Hausman
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI
53706-1474. dhausman@wisc.edu
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Abstract: Game theory poses problems for modeling rational belief, but
it does not need a new theory of rationality. Experimental results that sug-
gest otherwise often reveal difficulties in testing game theory, rather than
mistakes or paradoxes. Even though the puzzles Colman discusses show
no inadequacy in the standard theory of rationality, they show that im-
proved models of belief are needed.
The theory of rational choice takes choice to be rational when it
tracks preferences. Preferences are rational when they are, in a
precise sense, consistent. When there is risk or uncertainty, pref-
erences and hence choices depend on beliefs; and neither prefer-
ence nor choice is rational unless belief is rational. Rational beliefs
must conform to the calculus of probabilities. When they do, and
preferences satisfy relevant consistency and technical axioms,
then preferences can be represented by expected utilities, and
choice is rational if and only if it maximizes expected utility.
Expected utility maximization is defined whenever rational be-
liefs and preferences are defined. The fact that an interaction is
strategic by itself causes no problem. If I am playing the pure co-
ordination game in Colman’s Figure 1 and believe that the other
player will play Tails, then I should choose Tails, too.
But suppose I have no beliefs about what strategies other play-
ers will choose other than those that I can deduce from (1) beliefs
about the other players’ preferences over the payoffs, (2) beliefs
about the other players’ beliefs concerning both the game and its
players, and (3) beliefs about the other players’ rationality. All of
these beliefs of mine have to be rational – that is, they have to be
consistent with the calculus of probabilities – but this constraint
permits many different sets of beliefs to count as rational. One way
of developing game theory that greatly narrows the set of rational
beliefs has been to assume that the players are all perfectly ratio-
nal, that they all share the same subjective prior probabilities, that
they have complete knowledge of the extensive form of the game,
and that all of this is common knowledge. Call this “the total ra-
tionality representation” (TRR). TRR is not required by the stan-
dard theory of rational belief, and the fact that it leads to surpris-
ing and sometimes arguably paradoxical results is no indictment
of the standard theory.
Colman also objects that game theory employing TRR may be
uninformative. In the Hi-Lo Matching game of Figure 2, the the-
ory fails to predict and recommend that players choose strategy H.
As Colman correctly points out, if TRR requires common prior
point probabilities, then no argument can be given for the ratio-
nality of playing H. But the remedy here is just a mild relaxation
of the idealizations. If one does not require that the players have
point priors, then Player I can believe that the probability that
Player II will play H is not less than one-half, and also believe that
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Player II believes the same of Player I. Player I can then reason
that Player II will definitely play H, update his or her subject prob-
ability accordingly, and play H. The problem lies with one ideal-
ized development of the standard view of rational belief, not with
the view itself.
Many of the purported paradoxes Colman discusses yield to
similar, though more complicated treatment. But some of the pur-
ported paradoxes are not paradoxes at all, and some of the appar-
ent experimental disconfirmations are dubious. Consider first the
standard single-shot prisoner’s dilemma (PDG). Mutual defection
is the uniquely rational outcome. Colman takes this to be para-
doxical and to show that rationality is self-defeating, on the
grounds that mutual cooperation is better for both players. In ad-
dition, he cites evidence showing that many experimental sub-
jects, in fact, cooperate.
Although rationality is indeed collectively self-defeating in a
PDG, there is no paradox or problem with the theory of rational-
ity, and the apparently disconfirming data Colman cites are ques-
tionable. Consider the following game form (Fig. 1), which rep-
resents a PDG if the two players care only about their own
monetary payoffs.
Mutual cooperators do better than mutual defectors. But the
benefit comes from the choice the other player makes, not from
one’s own choice. (Remember this is a simultaneous play one-shot
game in which I and II choose independently.) Unlike the finite
iterated prisoner’s dilemma or the centipede game, mutual coop-
erators cannot taunt mutual defectors, “If you’re so rational, how
come you ain’t rich?” because the defectors can reply, “Because I
wasn’t lucky enough to be playing against a fool.”
In addition, the apparently disconfirming experimental evi-
dence is dubious, because cooperating subjects facing a game
form like the one in Figure 1 might not be playing a PDG. To know
what game they are playing one needs to know their preferences.
For example, unless II prefers the outcome where II gets $4 and
I gets $1 to the actual outcome of $3 each, II was not playing a
PDG. For those who do not have these preferences, the interac-
tion depicted in Figure 1 is not a prisoner’s dilemma. Similar re-
marks apply to the tetrapod in Colman’s Figure 5. If the numbers
represented dollars, many people would prefer the outcome
where both get $18 and player I’s trust is rewarded, to the outcome
where II gets $19 and I gets $8. The numbers in Figure 5 are, of
course, supposed to represent utilities rather than dollars, but the
common view, that the recommendation to play down on the first
move is absurd, may reflect a common refusal to believe that these
numbers correctly represent the preferences.
A great deal remains to be done to figure out how to represent
rational beliefs. Wonderful controversy still rages. But one should
not thereby conclude, as Colman does, that “the conception of ra-
tionality on which it [game theory] rests appears to be internally
deficient” (target article, sect. 9.2). His essay does not address the
treatment of rational preference, and the problems Colman ex-
plores concerning rational belief show, at most, the limitations of
specific modeling choices, rather than a deficiency in basic con-
cepts.1
NOTE
1. I do not, in fact, think that the standard theory of rationality is un-
problematic (see e.g., my 1992 book, Chs. 2, 12, 13), but the difficulties I
see are independent of those that Colman alleges.
The limits of individualism are not the limits
of rationality
Susan Hurley
PAIS, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom.
susan.hurley@warwick.ac.uk www.warwick.ac.uk/staff/S.L.Hurley
Abstract: Individualism fixes the unit of rational agency at the individual,
creating problems exemplified in Hi-Lo and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
games. But instrumental evaluation of consequences does not require a
fixed individual unit. Units of agency can overlap, and the question of
which unit should operate arises. Assuming a fixed individual unit is hard
to justify: It is natural, and can be rational, to act as part of a group rather
than as an individual. More attention should be paid to how units of agency
are formed and selected: Are the local processes local or nonlocal? Do they
presuppose the ability to understand other minds?
I disagree with little that Colman says about the limitations of or-
thodox rational choice theory, but wonder why he doesn’t say more
to challenge individualism as their source, and why he omits ref-
erences to trailblazers such as Regan (1980) and Howard (1988).
In 1989, I argued that Hi-Lo and Prisoner’s Dilemma games
(PDs) exemplify the limits of individual rationality. In Hi-Lo, in-
dividuals have the same goals, yet individual rationality fails to
guarantee them the best available outcome. In PDs, individuals
have different goals, and individual rationality guarantees an out-
come worse for all than another available outcome. These prob-
lems stem not from nature of individuals’ goals, or the instrumen-
tal character of rationality, but from individualism about rationality,
which holds the unit of rational agency exogenously fixed at the in-
dividual (cf. Hurley 1989).
Activity by a given unit of agency has consequences, calculated
against a background of what occurs outside that unit, and can be
evaluated instrumentally. Such consequentialist evaluation does
not require the unit whose activity is evaluated to be fixed at the
individual. Larger units of agency can subsume smaller ones, and
consequentialist evaluation can apply to different units, with dif-
ferent results. We can think of individuals as composed of persons-
at-times (or in other ways, involving multiple personalities); simi-
larly, we can think of collective agents as composed of persons. In
both cases, lower-level rationality (or irrationality) may coexist
with, or even explain, higher-level irrationality (or rationality). For
example, we understand from social dilemmas and social choice
theory how a group can behave irrationally as a unit, although the
agents composing it are individually rational. Intrapersonal ana-
logues of social dilemmas may explain some forms of individual ir-
rationality. Conversely, agents can behave irrationally as individu-
als, yet their actions fit together so that the group they compose
behaves rationally (Hutchins 1995, pp. 235ff).
Individualism requires the individual to do the individual act
available that will have the best expected consequences, given
what other individuals are expected to do. Given others’ expected
acts, an individual agent has certain possible outcomes within her
causal power. The best of these may not be very good, and it may
be indeterminate what others are expected to do. But a group of
individuals acting as a collective agent can have different possible
outcomes within its causal power, given what agents outside the
group are expected to do. A collective agent may be able to bring
about an outcome better than any that the individual agent can
bring about – better for that individual, inter alia. If so, the issue
is not just what a particular unit of agency should do, given others’
Commentary/Colman: Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction





Figure 1 (Hausman). A prisoner’s dilemma game form
expected acts, but also which unit should operate. The theory of
rationality has yet to endogenize the latter question; Bacharach
calls this “an important lacuna” (1999, p. 144; but cf. Regan 1980).
The assumption of a fixed individual unit, once explicitly scru-
tinized, is hard to justify. There is no theoretical need to identify
the unit of agency with the source of evaluations of outcomes; col-
lective agency does not require collective preferences. Although
formulations of team reasoning may assume team preferences
(see target article, sect. 8.1), what is distinctive about collective
agency comes into sharper relief when it is made clear that the
source of evaluations need not match the unit of agency. As an in-
dividual, I can recognize that a wholly distinct agent can produce
results I prefer to any I could bring about, and that my own acts
would interfere. Similarly, as an individual I can recognize that a
collective agent, of which I am merely a part, can produce results
I prefer to any I could bring about by acting as an individual, and
that my doing the latter would interfere. Acting instead in a way
that partly constitutes the valuable collective action can be ratio-
nal. Not only can it best serve my goals to tie myself to the mast of
an extended agent, but rationality itself can directly so bind me –
rather than just prompt me to use rope.
Acting as part of a group, rather than as an individual, can also
be natural. Nature does not dictate the individual unit of agency.
Persons can and often do participate in different units, and so face
the question of which unit they should participate in. Moreover,
the possibility of collective agency has explanatory power. For ex-
ample, it explains why some cases (e.g., Newcomb’s Problem and
Quattrone & Tversky’s voting result) of supposedly evidential rea-
soning have intuitive appeal, while others (e.g., the smoking gene
case) have none (Hurley 1989, Ch. 4; 1991; 1994).1
If units of agency are not exogenously fixed, how are units
formed and selected? Is centralized information or control re-
quired, or can units emerge as needed from local interactions? At
what points are unit formation and selection rationally assessable?
I cannot here offer a general view of these matters, but highlight
two important issues.
First, are the relevant processes local or nonlocal? Regan’s ver-
sion of collective action requires cooperators to identify the class
of those intending to cooperate with whomever else is cooperat-
ing, to determine what collective action by that group would have
the best consequences (given noncooperators’ expected acts), and
then play their part in that collective action. This procedure is
nonlocal, in that cooperators must type-check the whole class of
potential cooperators and identify the class of cooperators before
determining which act by that group would have the best conse-
quences. This extensive procedure could be prohibitive without
central coordination. The problem diminishes if cooperators’
identities are preestablished for certain purposes, say, by their fac-
ing a common problem, so preformed groups are ready for action
(see Bacharach 1999).
A different approach would be to seek local procedures from
which potent collective units emerge. Flexible self-organization
can result from local applications of simple rules, without central
coordination. Slime mold, for example, spends most of its life as
separate single-celled units, but under the right conditions these
cells coalesce into a single larger organism; slime mold oppor-
tunistically oscillates between one unit and many units. No head-
quarters or global view coordinates this process; rather, each cell
follows simple local rules about the release and tracking of phero-
mone trails.
Howard’s (1988) Mirror Strategy for one-off PDs may allow
groups of cooperators to emerge by following a simple self-refer-
ential local rule: Cooperate with any others you encounter who act
on this very same rule. If every agent cooperates just with its
copies, there may be no need to identify the whole group; it may
emerge from decentralized encounters governed by simple rules.
Evidently, rules of cooperation that permit groups to self-organize
locally have significant pragmatic advantages.
Both Regan’s and Howard’s cooperators need to perceive the
way one another thinks, their methods of choice. Which choices
their cooperators make, depends on which other agents are coop-
erators, so cooperation must be conditioned on the methods of
choice, not the choices, of others. If method-use isn’t perfectly re-
liable, however, cooperators may need to be circumspect in as-
sessing others’ methods and allow for the possibility of lapses
(Bacharach 1999).
These observations lead to the second issue I want to highlight:
What is the relationship between the processes by which collec-
tive agents are formed and selected, and the ability to understand
other minds? Does being able to identify with others as part of a
unit of agency, require being able to identify with others mentally?
Psychologists ask: What’s the functional difference between gen-
uine mind-reading and smart behavior-reading (Whiten 1996)?
Many social problems that animals face can be solved merely in
terms of behavior-circumstance correlations and corresponding
behavioral predictions, without postulating mediating mental
states (see Call & Tomasello 1999; Heyes & Dickinson 1993; Hur-
ley 2003; Povinelli 1996). What kinds of problems also require un-
derstanding the mental states of others?
Consider the kinds of problems that demonstrate the limita-
tions of individualistic game theory. When rational individuals face
one another, mutual behavior prediction can break down in the
ways that Colman surveys; problem-solving arguably requires be-
ing able to understand and identify with others mentally. If coop-
erators need to know whether others have the mental processes of
a cooperator before they can determine what cooperators will do,
they must rely on more than unmediated associations between cir-
cumstances and behavior. Collective action would require mind-
reading, not just smart behavior-reading. Participants would have
to be mind-readers, and be able to identify, more or less reliably,
other mind-readers.
NOTE
1. It is widely recognized that Prisoners’ Dilemma can be interpreted
evidentially, but less widely recognized that Newcomb’s Problem and
some (but not all) other cases of supposed evidential reasoning can be in-
terpreted in terms of collective action.
Coordination and cooperation
Maarten C. W. Janssen
Department of Economics, Erasmus University, 3000 DR, Rotterdam, The
Netherlands. janssen@few.eur.nl www.eur.nl/few/people/janssen
Abstract: This comment makes four related points. First, explaining co-
ordination is different from explaining cooperation. Second, solving the
coordination problem is more important for the theory of games than
solving the cooperation problem. Third, a version of the Principle of Co-
ordination can be rationalized on individualistic grounds. Finally, psycho-
logical game theory should consider how players perceive their gaming sit-
uation.
Individuals are, generally, able to get higher payoffs than main-
stream game-theoretic predictions would allow them to get. In co-
ordination games, individuals are able to coordinate their actions
(see e.g., Mehta et al. 1994a; 1994b; Schelling 1960) even though
there are two or more strict Nash equilibria. In Prisoner’s Di-
lemma games, individuals cooperate quite often, even though
mainstream game theory tells that players should defect. In this
comment, I want to make four points. First, it is important to dis-
tinguish the cooperation problem from the coordination problem.
Second, from the point of view of developing a theory of games,
the failure to explain coordination is more serious than the failure
to explain cooperation. Third, the Principle of Coordination, used
to explain why players coordinate, can be rationalized on individ-
ualistic grounds. One does not need to adhere to “we thinking” or
“Stackelberg reasoning.” Finally, psychological game theory may
gain predictive power if it takes into account how players perceive
their gaming situation.
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The problem of coordination is different from the problem of
cooperation. In a cooperation problem, as the one-shot Prisoner’s
Dilemma, players have a dominant strategy, which is not to coop-
erate, and one may wonder why people deviate from their domi-
nant strategy and do cooperate. To explain cooperation, one has to
depart from the axiom of individual rationality. This is not the case
for the problem of coordination. In a coordination problem, there
are two or more Nash equilibria in pure strategies and the issue is
that individual rationality considerations are not sufficient to pre-
dict players’ behavior. To explain coordination, an approach that
supplements the traditional axioms of individual rationality may
be taken.
In a truly one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, where the payoffs are
formulated such that players care only about their individual pay-
offs, I find it hard to find reasons (read: to explain) why people co-
operate. Of course, I don’t want to deny the empirical evidence,
but the dominant strategy argument seems to me very appealing
and difficult to counteract. If people choose to cooperate, they
must be in one way or the other boundedly rational. I think the
theory of games should not just explain how people in reality be-
have when they play games. It should also have an answer to the
question why, given their own preferences, they behave in a cer-
tain way. The weakest form this requirement can take is that, given
a theoretical prediction people understand, it is in their own in-
terest not to deviate from the prediction. In other words, a theory
of games should be reflexive. The problem with a theory of games
which says that players cooperate is that “smart students” don’t see
any reason why it is beneficial to do so. If the theory makes a pre-
diction, then it should be in the interest of the players to make that
prediction come true.
In coordination problems, the concept of Nash equilibrium is
too weak, as it does not give players a reason to choose one out of
several alternatives. Gauthier (1975), Bacharach (1993), Sugden
(1995), and Janssen (2001b) make use of (a version of) the Prin-
ciple of Coordination to explain coordination. Janssen (2001a) de-
velops a relatively simple framework that rationalizes the unique-
ness version of this Principle. The basic idea is that each player
individually forms a plan, specifying for each player how to play
the game, and which conjecture to hold about their opponent’s
play. Individual plans should satisfy two axioms. Individual ratio-
nality says that a plan be such that the sets of strategies that are
motivated by the plan must be best responses to the conjectures
that are held about the other player’s play. Optimality requires
that players formulate optimal plans, where a plan is optimal if the
maximum payoff both players get if they follow this plan is larger
than the minimum payoff both players would get according to any
alternative plan satisfying the individual rationality axiom.
If there is a unique strict Pareto-efficient outcome, then there
is a unique plan satisfying Individual Rationality and Optimality
how to play the game. To see the argument, consider the follow-
ing game (Table 1).
It is clear that a plan where every player conjectures the other
to play L, and where both players actually choose L, is a plan that
satisfies Individual Rationality and, moreover, is better for both
players than any other plan. As the plan is uniquely optimal, both
players thinking individually formulate the same plan, and they
will choose to do their part of it.
Note that the above approach is different from “we thinking” as
discussed by Colman, as no common preferences are specified.
Also, no coach is introduced who can make recommendations to
the players about how to coordinate their play, as in Sugden (2000,
p. 183).
This approach, by itself, cannot explain coordination in a game
where two players have to choose one out of three (for example,
two blue and one red) objects and where they get awarded a dol-
lar if they happen to choose the same object. Traditionally, game
theory would represent this game in the following “descriptively
objective” matrix (Table 2).
Intuitively, the players should pick the red object, but the Prin-
ciple of Coordination advocated here, by itself, cannot explain this
intuition.
Psychological game theory may, in addition to the elements
mentioned by Colman, also further investigate Bacharach’s (1993)
suggestion, and investigate how people describe the game situa-
tion to themselves (instead of relying on some “objective” game
description). By using the labels of the strategies, individuals may
describe the above game as being a game between picking a blue
and a red object, where the chance of picking the same blue ob-
ject, given that both pick a blue object, is equal to a half. Given
such a description, there is (again) a unique plan satisfying Indi-
vidual Rationality and Optimality.
Which is to blame: Instrumental rationality, or
common knowledge?
Matt Jones and Jun Zhang
Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
48109-1109. mattj@umich.edu junz@umich.edu
http://umich.edu/~mattj
Abstract: Normative analysis in game-theoretic situations requires as-
sumptions regarding players’ expectations about their opponents. Al-
though the assumptions entailed by the principle of common knowledge
are often violated, available empirical evidence – including focal point se-
lection and violations of backward induction – may still be explained by in-
strumentally rational agents operating under certain mental models of
their opponents.
The most important challenge in any normative approach to hu-
man behavior is to correctly characterize the task the person is
presented with. As Colman points out, the normative analysis of
game settings provided by instrumental rationality is incomplete;
information must be included about the opponent. We argue here
that the common knowledge of rationality (CKR) axioms, which
are meant to extend normative analysis to game theory, actually
limit the rationality attributed to subjects. When players are al-
lowed to reason about their opponents, using more information
than just that provided by CKR2, we find that the major phe-
nomena cited as evidence against rational choice theory (RCT) –
focal point selection and violations of backward induction argu-
ments – can be predicted by the resulting normative theory. This
line of reasoning follows previous research in which supposed sub-
optimalities in human cognition have been shown to be adaptive
given a more fully correct normative analysis (e.g., Anderson &
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Table 1 (Janssen). A game of pure coordination




Table 2 (Janssen). A game of pure coordination
without a uniquely efficient equilibrium
Blue Blue Red
Blue 1,1 0,0 0,0
Blue 0,0 1,1 0,0
Red 0,0 0,0 1,1
Schooler 1991; Anderson et al. 1997; Flood 1954; Jones & Sieck,
in press; Oaksford & Chater 1996; Schacter 1999).
The difficulty with the CKR axioms is that they require players
to reason about their opponents entirely a priori, based only on the
assumptions of rationality and common knowledge, while ignor-
ing all other potential sources of information. A more faithful
model of rational choice would allow players to utilize all the
knowledge available to them, including general knowledge about
human behavior or specific knowledge about the opponent gained
from previous interactions (e.g., earlier moves). For example, the
fact that the conventional priority of Heads over Tails leads to the
phenomenon of focal point selection should realistically be avail-
able to each player as information for use in predicting the oppo-
nent’s choice. Thus, all that is needed is a simple intuitive under-
standing of human behavior for a subject to infer correctly (and
rationally) that the opponent is likely to choose the focal option.
Instrumental rationality then dictates that the player chooses that
option as well. Similar reasoning applies to payoff dominance in
the case of the Hi-Lo matching game.
Relaxing the restrictions provided by CKR on players’ models
of their opponents can also explain violations of the prescriptions
of backward induction arguments. If Player II’s model of Player I
admits alternatives to perfect rationality, then an initial coopera-
tive move by Player I will simply lead to an update of II’s beliefs
about I (rather than generating a logical impasse). This sort of up-
dating can be formalized using a Bayesian framework, in which
each player has probabilistic prior beliefs about the opponent
(perhaps peaked around rationality, but nonzero elsewhere), which
are determined by prior experience with the opponent or with
people in general. Even if the prior expectation were heavily bi-
ased towards strict rationality, an initial cooperative move by
Player I would force Player II’s model to favor other possibilities,
for example, that Player I always plays Tit-For-Tat. This could lead
to Player II cooperating on step 2, in turn giving Player I justifi-
cation for cooperating on step 1.
The preceding arguments have shown how failures of CKR can
be remedied by more complete normative analyses that preserve
the assumption of instrumental rationality, that is, optimality of ac-
tions as conditioned on the model of the opponent. The question
of rationality in game scenarios then shifts to the rationality of that
model itself (inductive rationality). In the case of focal point se-
lection, we have offered no specific mechanism for the inductive
inference regarding the opponent’s likely choice, as based on gen-
eral experience with human behavior. We merely point out that it
is perfectly consistent with the assumption of inductive rationality
(although it has no basis in CKR). (Ironically, the same empirical
fact that is cited as evidence against RCT – namely, focal point se-
lection – actually corroborates the rationality of people’s inductive
inferences.)
The stance taken in our discussion of backward induction,
whereby people are rational yet they entertain the possibility that
others are not, presents a subtler problem. What must be re-
membered here is that, as a positive theory, RCT only claims that
people try to act rationally (target article, sect. 3.3), and that the
idealization of perfect rationality should give qualitatively correct
predictions. Of course, in reality, people do err, and subjects are
aware of this fact. Therefore, in forming expectations about their
opponents’ actions, subjects are open to the possibility of errors of
reasoning by the opponent. Furthermore, as one progresses fur-
ther back in the chain of reasoning entailed by backward induc-
tion, the expectation of such errors compounds. Thus, the frame-
work proposed here can be viewed as idealizing rationality at the
zero level, but not at higher orders of theory-of-mind reasoning.
Our thesis, that people follow instrumental rationality but an-
chor it on their model of the opponent, is supported by Hedden
and Zhang’s (2002) recent investigation of the order of theory-of-
mind reasoning employed by subjects in three-step sequential-
move games. On each trial, subjects, who controlled the first and
third moves, were asked first to predict the response of the oppo-
nent (a confederate who controlled the second move) and their
own best choice on the first move. Initially, subjects tended to pre-
dict myopic choices by the opponent, corresponding to level 0 rea-
soning (level 1 was optimal for the opponent). Accordingly, sub-
jects’ own actions corresponded to the level 1 strategy, rather than
the level 2 strategy prescribed by CKR. However, after sufficient
experience with an opponent who played optimally, 43% of sub-
jects came to consistently predict the opponent’s action correctly,
and altered their own behavior to the level 2 strategy. Although
the remaining subjects failed to completely update their mental
model of the opponent, errors of instrumental rationality (dis-
crepancies between the action chosen and that dictated by the ex-
pectation of the opponent’s response) remained low and approxi-
mately constant throughout the experiment for both groups.
These results support the claim that violations of the predictions
of CKR can be explained through scrutiny of player’s models of
their opponents, without rejecting instrumental rationality, and
suggest that further investigations of rational choice in game situ-
ations must take into account the distinction between instrumen-
tal and inductive rationality.
Analogy in decision-making, social
interaction, and emergent rationality
Boicho Kokinov
Central and East European Center for Cognitive Science, Department of
Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, 1618
Bulgaria. bkokinov@nbu.bg
http://www.nbu.bg/cogs/personal/kokinov
Abstract: Colman’s reformulation of rational theory is challenged in two
ways. Analogy-making is suggested as a possible candidate for an underly-
ing and unifying cognitive mechanism of decision-making, one which can
explain some of the paradoxes of rationality. A broader framework is pro-
posed in which rationality is considered as an emerging property of anal-
ogy-based behavior.
Rationality has long been shown to fail as a descriptive theory of
human decision-making, both at the individual and social levels.
In addition, Colman presents strong arguments that rationality
also fails as a normative theory for “good” decision-making – “ra-
tional” thinking does not produce optimal behavior in social in-
teraction and even acts against the interests of the individual in
some cases. Fortunately, human beings often act against the pos-
tulates of rationality and achieve better results than prescribed by
the theory. Therefore, Colman concludes that “rationality” has to
be redefined by extending it with additional criteria for optimiza-
tion, such as the requirement for maximizing the “collective” pay-
off, or with additional beliefs about the expected strategies of the
coplayers. He does not clarify how and when these additional cri-
teria are triggered or where the common beliefs come from.
We are so much attached to the notion of rationality that we are
always ready to repair it, but not to abandon it. The theory of ra-
tionality is, in fact, a formalization of a naive theory of human
thinking. This naive theory makes it possible to predict human be-
havior in most everyday situations in the same way as naive physics
makes it possible to predict natural phenomena in everyday life.
However, no one takes naive physics so seriously as to claim that
it provides “the explanation” of the world. Moreover, even refined
and formalized versions of this naive theory, like Newtonian me-
chanics, are shown not to be valid; and more complicated and
counterintuitive theories at the microlevel, like quantum me-
chanics, have been invented. On the contrary, rationality theory is
taken seriously, especially in economics, as an explanation of hu-
man behavior.
Instead of extending rationality theory with additional socially
oriented rules, it may be more useful to make an attempt to build
a multilevel theory that will reveal the implicit and explicit cogni-
tive processes involved in decision-making. These underlying cog-
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nitive mechanisms produce decisions, which are sometimes “in-
dividually rational,” sometimes “collectively rational,” and some-
times “not rational at all.” Because these mechanisms have been
evolved and developed to assure human survival, they will, most
of the time, produce results that are “rational” or “optimal” from
some point of view – this is what makes rationality a good naive
theory. However, this does not mean that people explicitly follow
the rules of maximization prescribed by the theory.
Colman proposes an eclectic collection of ad-hoc strategies
(team reasoning, Stackelberg reasoning, epistemic, and nonmono-
tonic reasoning), which are all different forms of explicit deduc-
tive reasoning. Deduction can certainly play a role in decision-
making, but it is not enough to explain it. Recent studies revealed
that analogy-making is a more basic mechanism of human think-
ing, which is present from early infancy and is used ubiquitously
in everyday life (Gentner et al. 2001). Analogy-making is a process
of perceiving one situation (target) in terms of another (base),
thereby preserving the system of relations among elements and
transferring knowledge from the base to the target. Arguments
have been presented that deduction is in fact based on analogy,
and a special form of it (Halford 1993; Kokinov 1992). Markman
and Moreau (2001) have reviewed the evidence that analogy plays
an important role in perceiving and framing the decision situation,
as well as in comparison of the alternatives. Moreover, analogy
may be used both explicitly and implicitly (Kokinov & Petrov
2001; Markman & Moreau 2001). Thus, analogy may play a uni-
fying role in describing the mechanisms of decision-making.
Analogy-making may explain the paradoxes of using the focal
points described by Colman. They are easily perceivable and anal-
ogous to focal points in other games. Therefore, it is natural to ex-
pect people to use them again and again if previous experience of
using a focal point has been successful. Similar arguments may be
applied to social dilemmas and trust games. If another player has
used a certain strategy in a previous case, I may expect him or her
to behave the same way in an analogous situation, and thus have a
prediction for his or her behavior.
Analogies may be applied at various levels: Analogies to previ-
ous cases of decision-making in the same game or analogies to
games with similar structure; analogies to cases of social interac-
tion with the same individual or to cases of social interactions with
individuals who are considered analogous (i.e., are in similar rela-
tions to me, like family or team members). Thus, even a novice in
a particular game can still use his or her previous experience with
other games.
Analogy can explain the “deviations” from the prescribed “ra-
tional” behavior and the individual differences among players. If
a player has an extensive positive experience of cooperative be-
havior (i.e., many successful cases of benefiting from acting to-
gether), and if the current game is found to be analogous to one
of these cases, then he or she might be expected to act coopera-
tively (even if this is not the optimal strategy). On the contrary, if
the game reminds the player of a previous case of betrayal or
fraud, then defection strategy should be expected.
In summary, analogy may play a crucial role in a future theory
of decision-making. Instead of explaining rationality with rules for
utility maximization, which people follow or break, we may explain
human behavior by assuming that decisions are made by analogy
with previous cases (avoid strategies that were unsuccessful in
analogous situations and re-use strategies that were successful).
Thus, utility maximization is an emergent property that will
emerge in most cases, but not always. In this view, rationality is an
emergent phenomenon, and rational rules are only a rough and
approximate explanation of human behavior.
Wanted: A reconciliation of rationality with
determinism
Joachim I. Krueger
Department of Psychology, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912.
joachim_krueger@brown.edu
http://www.brown.edu/departments/psychology/faculty/krueger.html
Abstract: In social dilemmas, expectations of reciprocity can lead to fully
determined cooperation concurrent with the illusion of choice. The choice
of the dominant alternative (i.e., defection) may be construed as being free
and rational, but only at the cost of being incompatible with a behavioral
science claiming to be deterministic.
The conspicuous failure of orthodox game theory is its inability to
account for cooperative behavior in noniterated social dilemmas.
Colman outlines a psychological revision of game theory to en-
hance the predictability of hitherto anomalous behavior. He pre-
sents the Stackelberg heuristic as a form of evidential reasoning.
As Colman notes, evidential reasoning is assumed to lead respon-
dents to shun the dominating alternative in Newcomb’s problem
and in decisions to vote. In the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG),
however, Stackelberg reasoning leads to defection (Colman &
Stirk 1998). Thus, Stackelberg reasoning appears to be neither ev-
idential nor parsimonious in this domain. After all, players can se-
lect the dominating alternative in the PDG without making any
predictions of what their opponents will do. How, then, can evi-
dential reasoning lead to cooperation?
The logic of the PDG is the same as the logic of Newcomb’s
problem (Lewis 1979). Just as players may expect that their
choices will have been predicted by Newcomb’s savvy demon, they
may expect that their choices in the PDG will most likely be
matched by their opponent’s choices (unless the rate of coopera-
tion is exactly 50%). The issue is whether this statistical realization
gives cooperators (or one-boxers, in Newcomb’s case) license to
lay claim to being rational.
Orthodox game theorists insist on defection, because a player’s
cooperation cannot make an opponent’s cooperation more likely.
Evidentialists, however, claim that cooperation may be chosen
without assuming a causal effect on the opponent’s choice. Only
the assumption of conditional dependence is needed. If nothing
is known about the opponent’s choice, conditional dependence is
obvious after a player committed to a choice. By definition, most
players choose the more probable alternative, which means that
the choices of two independent players are more likely to be the
same than different (Krueger 1998). Because time is irrelevant, it
follows that it is more likely that two players will make the same,
instead of different, choices. In the extreme case, that players ex-
pect their responses to be reciprocated without fail, their dilemma
devolves into a choice between mutual cooperation and mutual
defection. As mutual cooperation offers the higher payoff, they
may choose cooperation out of self-interest alone.
Evidentialist reasoning is distasteful to the orthodox mind be-
cause it generates two divergent conditional probabilities that can-
not both be correct (i.e., p[opponent cooperation/own coopera-
tion] . p[opponent cooperation/own defection]). Choosing the
behavior that is associated with the more favorable prospect then
smacks of magical thinking. But causal assumptions enter at two
levels: at the level of the investigator and at the level of the par-
ticipant. Investigators can safely assume that players’ efforts to in-
fluence their opponents are pointless. Players, however, may think
they can exert such influence. Although this expectation is irra-
tional, it does not invalidate their cooperative choices. Note that
investigators can also subscribe to a more plausible causal argu-
ment, which holds that both players’ choices result from the same
set of latent variables. These variables, whatever they may be, pro-
duce the proportions of cooperation found in empirical studies.
Players who realize that one option is more popular than the other,
but do not know which, can discover the popular choice by ob-
serving their own. The fact that they may have an experience of
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unfettered choice, and perhaps even hope to influence their op-
ponents, is quite irrelevant (Wegner 2002).
The burgeoning literature on social dilemmas suggests that in-
dividual behavior in these situations presents a more poignant
dilemma to the investigators than to the participants. However
modest their predictive successes may be, experimental studies of
social behavior rest on a bedrock assumption of determinism. In
this spirit, experimentalists assume that individuals’ judgments
and decisions are fully determined (Bargh & Ferguson 2000). It is
ironic that research participants who are cast into the PDG or con-
fronted with Newcomb’s problem can satisfy norms of rationality
only by denying any determining effect on their own behavior that
would make them act like most others.1 They are enjoined to
choose defection without drawing any inference as to what this
might say about their opponents’ choices. Evidentialists, in con-
trast, can maintain a deterministic outlook without being per-
plexed. They need only assume that cooperators choose “as if”
they were free.
Incidentally, players working on the assumption that their own
choices will likely be reciprocated are also comfortable with com-
mon-interest games. They do well without experiencing the puz-
zlement of orthodox game theorists and even without resorting to
von Stackelberg’s best-bet heuristic. Perhaps more importantly,
evidential reasoning preserves methodological individualism in
common-interest games. Collective preferences, as entailed by
team spirit, are unnecessary. A game in which players are paid only
if their choices do not match, however, would be a true puzzle to
the evidentialist and the orthodox alike. Even team spirit, no mat-
ter how lofty its intent, cannot overcome this hurdle.
NOTE
1. In iterated PDGs, the assumption of determinism is more apparent
than in one-shot games. Players’ choices are assumed to be controlled by
the design of the game (i.e., the experimenters) and by each other’s choices
in preceding rounds (e.g., Rachlin 2002).
Let’s cooperate to understand cooperation
John Lazarus
Evolution and Behaviour Research Group, Psychology, School of Biology,
University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE2 4HH United Kingdom.
j.lazarus@ncl.ac.uk
http://www.ncl.ac.uk/biol/staff/john_lazarus.html
Abstract: The importance of understanding human cooperation urges
further integration between the relevant disciplines. I suggest ideas for
bottom-up and top-down integration. Evolutionary psychology can inves-
tigate the kinds of reasoning it was adaptive for humans to employ. Disci-
plines can learn from each other’s approaches to similar problems, and I
give an example for economics and evolutionary biology.
Understanding the factors that facilitate and constrain human co-
operation is of the greatest importance. I suggest here ways in
which disciplines with a convergent interest in cooperation might
fruitfully interact, with an emphasis on theoretical modelling.
Colman describes “nonstandard forms of reasoning” that help
to explain irrational social decisions. Psychological game theory
should employ the methods of evolutionary psychology (Tooby &
Cosmides 1992) to determine both the kinds of social problems
that early humans were selected to solve, and the kinds of reason-
ing that were adaptive to employ. Such an analysis of social prob-
lems has shown that human reasoning is well-designed for cheater
detection, for example (Cosmides & Tooby 1992). An evolution-
ary analysis of kinds of reasoning could start with team reasoning
(target article, sect. 8.1), for which two potential adaptive expla-
nations seem worth pursuing. Team reasoning might be favoured
where cooperation benefits the group, or where maximizing col-
lective payoff raises one’s reputation and thus brings future re-
wards (Milinski et al. 2002). Evolutionary game theory is the tool
for analyzing the evolutionary fate of competing modes of reason-
ing.
Knowledge of social decision-making in dyads and small, un-
structured groups is a starting point for understanding coopera-
tion at the higher levels of structured groups, firms, institutions,
communities, and states (cf. Hinde 1987). Table 1 (see overleaf )
lists disciplines sharing an interest in cooperation, indicating their
interests, methods, and levels of analysis; it is not exhaustive (e.g.,
nothing on military strategy). Its purpose is to indicate the multi-
disciplinary nature of cooperation, to encourage further interdis-
ciplinary work (following, e.g., Axelrod 1984; 1997; Frank 1988),
and to act as a reference point for the following proposals in this
direction.
Colman shows that there is much to be done before we under-
stand cooperative decision-making at the lowest level, although
understanding should be advanced by reference to the social psy-
chological foci in Table 1. To bring greater psychological reality to
decision theory in the structured groups of institutions and soci-
eties, game theory models and psychological game theory findings
should be combined with the decision-making models of eco-
nomics and related disciplines (Table 1; see also Axelrod 1997).
This bottom-up approach should be complemented by psycho-
logical game theory adopting top-down insights gained from
analyses of real-life economic behaviour. Decision-making in
these real-life contexts may reflect evolved predispositions, and
may tap motivations at work even in the economically elementary
scenarios of the psychological laboratory. For example, studies of
the way in which communities govern their own use of common
pool resources (CPRs), such as grazing pastures (Ostrom 1990),
may reveal evolved influences on cooperative decision-making,
and even evolved modes of reasoning, because the hunting and
gathering activities of early humans also have CPR properties.
Successful CPR decisions are characterized by: a clear in-group/
out-group distinction; resource provision in proportion to need
and sharing of costs in proportion to ability to pay; and graded
punishments for the greedy (Ostrom 1990). Whether these char-
acteristics apply to decision-making in other kinds of cooperative
relationship is open to evolutionary psychological and empirical
analysis. It would be valuable to know whether cooperation was
rational and evolutionarily stable in CPR scenarios.
In addition to bottom-up and top-down integration, different
disciplines can surely learn from each other’s approaches to simi-
lar problems. I close with an example. In economics, a common
pool resource is “subtractable,” because resources removed by
one person are unavailable for others. In contrast, a pure public
good (e.g., a weather forecasting system) is “nonsubtractive” in
that its use by one person leaves it undiminished for others (Os-
trom 1990, pp. 31–32). In evolutionary biology, parental invest-
ment in offspring is of two kinds, “shared” and “unshared,” re-
spectively, the identical concepts just described from economics.
Food for the young must be shared among them, whereas parental
vigilance for predators is enjoyed by all simultaneously. Modelling
in the evolutionary biology case has examined the influence of the
number of users on the optimal allocation of investment, and on
conflict between producer (parent) and user (offspring) (Lazarus
& Inglis 1986). Could economists use these results? Have econo-
mists produced similar results that evolutionary biologists should
know about?
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Table 1 (Lazarus). Approaches to cooperation
Discipline Focus Levels of Analysis Methods Sample References
Ethology Cooperation in the Dyad Group Field work; Laboratory Dugatkin 1997
animal kingdom experiments
Evolutionary biology Biological and Dyad Group Game theory; simulation Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; 
cultural evolution and analytical modelling; Boyd & Richerson 1991; 
evolutionary stability Roberts & Sherratt 1998
Artificial intelligence Artificial societies; com- Group Network Agent-based simulation Andras et al. 2003; Axelrod 
puting applications; modelling; complexity theory 1997; Schillo et al. 2000
trust
Psychology
Evolutionary psychology Evolutionary origin, Dyad Group Laboratory experiments Cosmides & Tooby 1992
adaptive biases, 
brain modularity
Commitment and Dyad Group Evolutionary theory; Frank 1988
the emotions laboratory experiments
Psychological game Rationality; biases in Dyad Group Game theory; laboratory Milinski et al. 2002; Col-




Developmental Moral development Dyad Group Laboratory experiments and Kohlberg 1984
psychology natural observations; Cross-
cultural comparison
Social psychology Egoistic or altruistic Dyad Group Laboratory experiments Batson 1987; Cialdini et al.
motivation? 1987
Empirical notions of Dyad Group Questionnaire studies; Buunk & Schaufeli 1999; 
reciprocity; equity; evolutionary psychology Charlton 1997; Wagstaff 
desert and fairness 2001
Cooperation within Group(s) Laboratory experiments; Feger 1991; Rabbie 1991
and between groups field work
Trust Group Field work, discourse Hardin 2002; Kramer & 
Tyler 1996
Anthropology Social exchange; Dyad Group Field work Kaplan & Hill 1985; Kelly 
social hunting 1995
Sociology Trust Group Discourse Hardin 2002
Economics Trust Group Field work Kramer & Tyler 1996
Common pool Common resource Game theory; field work; Ostrom 1990
resources group historical studies
Public choice Public goods Economic decision theory Margolis 1982; van den 
Doel & van Velthoven 
1993
Political philosophy Collective action Community State Game theory Taylor 1987
Distributive justice Community State Discourse Rawls 1999
Trust Community State Discourse Hardin 2002
Ethics Moral behavior Dyad Group Metaethics; Cross-cultural Arrington 1998; Yeager 
comparison 2001
Game theory need not abandon individual
maximization
John Monterossoa and George Ainslieb
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Abstract: Colman proposes that the domain of interpersonal choice re-
quires an alternative and nonindividualistic conception of rationality.
However, the anomalies he catalogues can be accounted for with less rad-
ical departures from orthodox rational choice theory. In particular, we em-
phasize the need for descriptive and prescriptive rationality to incorporate
recursive interplay between one’s own choices and one’s expectation re-
garding others’ choices.
Colman proposes that an alternative conception of rationality is
required to account for human interaction, and he provides some
suggestions in this direction. What he specifically sees the need to
give up is “methodological individualism” – the premise that “ra-
tional play in games can be deduced, in principle, from one-per-
son rationality considerations” (Binmore 1994a, quoted in target
article, sect. 4.1, para. 1). We think the anomalies he catalogues
can be accounted for without abandoning this foundational prin-
ciple of deterministic behavioral science.
First, the prevailing payoffs in experimental games are not the
same as the specified payoffs. Social interactions are rife with in-
visible contingencies that are impossible to bring under full ex-
perimental control. Human beings are fundamentally social crea-
tures, which entails the presence of powerful interpersonal
motivations, too numerous to list. Otherwise, anomalous play,
such as rejecting a low offer in a one-shot ultimatum game or co-
operating in a one-round prisoner’s dilemma game, is sensible if
we allow that the dollars offered do not exhaust the prevailing pay-
offs. Colman discusses this type of proposal (Camerer’s “behav-
ioral game theory,” Rabin’s fairness equilibrium), but he concludes
it is not enough to account for all the phenomena he presents. We
agree, and furthermore, do not think that the subjects’ many mo-
tives, beyond maximizing the specified matrix outcomes, are or-
derly enough to inspire any useful addition to game theory (such
as adding X points to particular cells); discrepancies between the
specified payoffs and the prevailing payoffs will always be noise in
the experiment, the friction that distorts the ideal physics lab.
However, permitting the free use of probability estimates of
other’s choices should be enough to let “methodological individu-
alism” both describe and prescribe rationality to the extent that
subjects are motivated by the specified matrices of the game. Of
particular importance in explaining otherwise anomalous play is
the subject’s use of her own inclinations and behavior as test cases
that inform her expectations regarding what others will do. In the
kinds of situations game theorists care about, it is neither descrip-
tively tenable nor prescriptively effective to require individuals to
finalize their assessments of what others will do prior to consider-
ing what they will do. Instead, we think that a rational individual
is simultaneously engaging in both computing expectation of what
the other player will be motivated to do and contemplating what
she herself should do, and each process informs the other. In the
absence of specific information about one’s counterpart, what bet-
ter basis is there to predict her behavior than via one’s own re-
sponse to the situation?
Colman describes such a recursive process in characterizing
one attempt to develop a game-theoretic rationale for the Pareto-
dominant H-H solution in the Hi-Lo game. In this account, Player
I assumes by default that Player II’s strategies are equally proba-
ble. She thus concludes she should choose H, because the proba-
bility-weighted sum is higher. But this, Colman adds, violates ra-
tional choice theory. “By the transparency of reason, Player I ‘s
intention to choose H would be common knowledge and would
induce Player II to choose the best reply, namely H, with certainty,
contradicting Player I’s initial assumption” [i.e., of equal probabil-
ity of moves] (sect. 5.6, para. 4). While such recursion may violate
game theory’s constraints, we think it is descriptively accurate,
prescriptively rational, and it does not entail abandoning method-
ological individualism.
The recursion between someone’s own perceived choices and
their expectations about the choices of others is easier to see in a
discoordination variant of the Hi-Lo game, in which players get to
keep their choice (in some monetary unit) if and only if they chose
differently from each other. With no a priori expectation regard-
ing what Player II will choose, Player I’s first-order inclination is
to choose the high amount, following the same logic as above. But
seeing the similarity of her counterpart’s predicament, she may
expect her to have thought the same way, giving her the second-
order inclination that she must go for the lower amount to get any-
thing. But then again, if she thinks her counterpart is a similarly
sophisticated sort, she might get the feeling that her counterpart
went through the same thought process, thus giving her the third-
order inclination that maybe she should therefore go for H. The
more similar she thinks her counterpart to be to herself, the more
dizzying the potential for iteration, and the less likely there will be
a probable solution.
The recursive prediction model has the advantage that it also
provides intertemporal bargaining within the individual person. In
situations that involve resisting temptation, individuals cannot be
certain of their own future choices. The need to choose in the pre-
sent, with an eye to the precedent this choice will set for the fu-
ture (e.g., whether or not I am sticking to my diet), places people
in a situation analogous to a repeated prisoner’s dilemma (PD)
game, as we have argued elsewhere (Ainslie 2001, pp. 90–104;
Ainslie & Monterosso 2003; Monterosso et al. 2002). Briefly, the
danger that future selves will see past violations of a resolution as
a reason to violate it, in turn, is similar to the danger that one
player’s defection will cause the other(s) to defect. But, in this bar-
gaining, a person may propose a choice to herself (“I’ll have an ice
cream”), then put herself in the shoes of her future self to evalu-
ate it retrospectively (“I’ll have gone off my diet”), then revise her
current choice in light of this evaluation (“I’ll have a muffin in-
stead”), and evaluate this (“no”), and propose again (“a bran muf-
fin”) at some length before making a single concrete choice.
Choices may turn out to divide along salient features, just as in the
Hi-Lo game, not because of their intrinsic payoff, but because
they make intertemporal cooperation more likely. Intertemporal
bargaining theory predicts the emergence of both positive and
negative features that have been ascribed to willpower. It gener-
ates an internal version of Adam Smith’s “unseen hand” without
assuming an innate faculty of self-control.
Second-order indeterminacy
Marco Perugini
Department of Psychology, University of Essex, Colchester, CO4 3SQ United
Kingdom. mperug@essex.ac.uk
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~mperug
Abstract: Psychological game theory, as defined by Colman, is meant to
offer a series of solution concepts that should reduce the indeterminacy of
orthodox game theory when applied to a series of situations. My main crit-
icism is that, actually, they introduce a second-order indeterminacy prob-
lem rather than offering a viable solution. The reason is that the proposed
solution concepts are under-specified in their definition and in their scope.
Colman looks at game theory from a psychological perspective. In
the first part of his article, he convincingly argues about the limi-
tations of orthodox game theory, especially when applied to social
interactions. The examples are well chosen and the case is well
built. This is an important contribution that might help us to fo-
cus, once and for all, on these important issues. However, Col-
man’s suggestion of psychological game theory as a way forward to
overcome the severe limitations of orthodox game theory in ex-
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plaining social interactions is not entirely convincing. The spirit
behind this attempt should be praised, yet psychological game
theory as defined and exemplified by Colman does not offer a truly
viable solution. The key problem is that the suggested solutions
are theoretically under-specified, quite limited in scope, and lead
to a second-order indeterminacy.
To illustrate my point I will focus on the concept of “team rea-
soning.” What is so special about team reasoning that cannot be
said about other ways of reasoning? For example, one might de-
fine “altruistic reasoning,” “individualistic reasoning,” “fairness
reasoning,” “reciprocity reasoning,” and so on, in the same kind of
holistic way as the definition is offered for “team reasoning.” It is
easy to find examples of games that can be solved using some of
these concepts; although they can be solved promptly also via
“team reasoning,” the intuition is that it would not necessarily be
the best solution concept. By best solution concept I mean a con-
cept that is intuitively compelling and likely to be empirically sup-
ported with actual behavioral data.
I will present two examples of games. For the first example, let’s
consider all modified coordination games for two players with
asymmetrical payoffs. Let’s consider this asymmetric coordination
game with the following payoffs and choices (Fig. 1):
As for every coordination game, a standard analysis would show
two Nash equilibria (H, H and L, L), and the issue would be how
to select one of the two. Applying a team reasoning would single
out H, H as the best equilibrium. Would this be a compelling so-
lution? I doubt it. If I were Player I, I would think twice before
choosing H. By applying “fairness reasoning” or “Reciprocity rea-
soning,” I could anticipate that Player II would like L, L much
more than H, H (or, put differently, dislike much more the in-
equality of payoffs resulting from H, H). I would therefore antic-
ipate that the other player would play L, and as a consequence I
would decide to play L. On the other hand, if I were to apply “al-
truistic reasoning” or “individualistic reasoning,” for opposite rea-
sons I should come to the conclusion that Player II will play H,
and hence so would I. The problem is threefold: First, we can list
a series of reasoning concepts besides “team reasoning”; second,
psychological game theory, as defined by Colman, would offer no
tools to select among these different reasoning concepts; and
third, the solution concept which would be the best for a player,
depends on his expectations about the other player’s type.
The second example is perhaps even more intriguing.1 The Ul-
timatum Game (UG) is a well-known paradigm that has been the
subject of several studies in experimental economics and in social
psychology. The UG is a very simple game whereby two players
bargain over a given monetary endowment. The first player pro-
poses a division of the endowment and the second player can ei-
ther accept or refuse it. If she refuses it, both players end up with
nothing. Orthodox game theory predicts that the first player will
propose a small amount for the second player (e.g., 99% for self
vs. 1% for other) and the second player will accept the proposal.
However, several experimental studies have found systematic de-
viations from these predictions (e.g., Guth 1995; Thaler 1988). It
is well established that a consistent portion of second players
would reject low offers (e.g., 25% or lower) even though this
means that both players end up with nothing. What about team
reasoning? A team-reasoning second player should never reject
any offer, because from the perspective of a second player the
strategy that maximizes the joint payoff is to accept any offer. In
fact, for every offer, the alternative would be to reject it, which is
always dominated in terms of joint payoffs, given that it implies no
payoff for both players. Therefore, a team reasoning second player
would be equally likely to accept a 1/99 or a 50/50 split. The in-
triguing conclusion is that a team-reasoning player often will be-
have exactly as dictated by orthodox game theory, even in those
situations where our intuition would suggest we do otherwise.
Equally problematic are those cases where team reasoning of-
fers different predictions from orthodox game theory. Take social
dilemmas. Of course, social dilemmas can be solved by using team
reasoning, but this is equally true for several of the nonstandard
solution concepts that I have sketched previously. I wonder how
well a team reasoning concept would fare when compared with
other nonstandard solution concepts across a comprehensive
range of social dilemmas. To sum up, I am not convinced that team
reasoning can be a good solution to much more than the specific
example of the Hi-Lo matching game with symmetrical payoffs
illustrated by Colman. But then, why should it not be named
“matching reasoning” instead?
These examples illustrate my main problem with Colman’s sug-
gestions: Concepts such as team reasoning must be defined more
precisely, which ultimately means that it will be necessary to spec-
ify the payoffs involved, how they are transformed, and under
which conditions each solution concept primarily applies. The
preceding examples have made clear that an important parameter
is the symmetry of the payoffs for the players: Everything else be-
ing equal, the more asymmetrical the payoffs, the less likely is that
team reasoning can offer a compelling solution for all players. But
this implies that the team reasoning concept should specify what
level of asymmetry is acceptable to the players, which ultimately
means to specify some function of weighting the payoffs involved.
Only in this way can the solution concepts pass more stringent the-
oretical and empirical tests. The alternative would be to have a
storage bin full of loose ad-hoc reasoning concepts that can be
used post-hoc for different situations, but without any rule that
specifies when and why they should be adopted. In other words,
ironically, the lack of a reason for choosing, which was the main
point behind many of Colman’s sharp criticisms on the indeter-
minacy of orthodox game theory, will strike back with a vengeance.
Without specifying the concepts more precisely – given that they
can explain or predict only some interactions and not others, and
that alternative nonstandard concepts can be compellingly applied
in several circumstances – we will be left without any reason why
to apply a given nonstandard psychological solution concept in the
first place.
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1. I owe this example to Tim Rakow.
Chance, utility, rationality, strategy,
equilibrium
Anatol Rapoport
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G3,
Canada. anatol.rapoport@utoronto.ca
Abstract: Almost anyone seriously interested in decision theory will name
John von Neumann’s (1928) Minimax Theorem as its foundation, whereas
Utility and Rationality are imagined to be the twin towers on which the
theory rests. Yet, experimental results and real-life observations seldom
support that expectation. Over two centuries ago, Hume (1739– 40/1978)
put his finger on the discrepancy. “Reason,” he wrote “is, and ought to be
the slave of passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to
serve and obey them.” In other words, effective means to reach specific
goals can be prescribed, but not the goals. A wide range of experimental
results and daily life behavior support this dictum.
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Figure 1 (Perugini). Example of a coordination game with asym-
metric payoffs.
In November 1945, a conference of mathematicians was held at
the Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago. A robot was dis-
played in the entrance hall, inviting the visitors to play a game of
tic-tac-toe. Needless to say, regardless of who made the first move,
every game ended either in a draw or in a win for the robot. Many
were impressed. Today, an exhibit of this sort would be unthink-
able, except, possibly in a children’s section.
The term “game,” in the context of interacting actors with usu-
ally different goals, was introduced by von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1944) in their seminal treatise Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior. It will surprise many that von Neumann did
not recognize chess as a “game” in the sense that he used the term.
“Chess is not a game,” von Neumann told Jacob Bronowski, who
worked with him during World War II (Poundstone 1992, p. 6).
He meant that there is a “correct” way to play the game – although
no one presently knows what it is – and that the game should
therefore be trivial, in much the same sense as tic-tac-toe is triv-
ial to players aware of a “correct” strategy.
It turned out that the inspiration for game theory was not chess
or any parlor game, which can be shown to have one or more “cor-
rect” ways to play it, but poker instead, where it is not possible to
guess with certainty the choice of strategy of one’s opponent(s).
According to Luce and von Winterfeldt (1994), “[M]ost people
in real situations attempt to behave in accord with the most basic
(conventional) rationality principles, although they are likely to fail
in more complex situations.” The “situations” are not mentioned,
but one can surmise that “utility” is (perhaps tacitly) represented
in them by a linear function of some “good” (money, survivors),
and that expected utilities are either given (EU) or subjectively as-
sumed (SEU).
This observation tends to imply that normative (prescriptive)
decision theory has a positive role to play along with recent em-
pirical descriptive approaches, which seek to gain understanding
of how people actually make decisions in a great variety of sit-
uations. Yet, already in the late eighteenth century, maximization
of expected utility was shown to lead to absurd results in the so-
called Petersburg Paradox. A fair coin is thrown. The gambler wins
n2n21 rubles if “heads” appears n times before the first “tails.” The
gambler’s expected gain is infinite. Daniel Bernoulli (1738/1954),
to whom the invention of the game is attributed, modified the
rule, whereby expected utility increased logarithmically rather
than linearly with n. This still made the expected gain, and thus a
“rational” maximum stake, enormous, and hence unacceptable to
any “rational” player. Indeed, as long as expected gain increases
monotonically with n, a rule can be devised to make the expected
gain enormous. No “rational” gambler can be expected to pay any-
where near it for the privilege of playing the game once.
Passing from gambling to two-or-more-person games, we en-
counter similar difficulties with prescriptive decision theory. Es-
pecially impressive are paradoxes resulting from backward induc-
tion. Consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma game played a large known
number of times. In a single play, defection by both players is a
minimax outcome, which, according to von Neumann, is the only
rational one. In a long sequence of plays, however, one might sup-
pose that repeated cooperation (CC) might emerge, as each player
forestalls the other’s “revenge” for defection. Nevertheless, the last
“rational” outcome ought to be double defection (DD), because no
retaliation can follow. Given this conclusion, the next to the last
play also ought to be (DD), and so on down to the first play.
When Flood and Dresher, discoverers of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game (Poundstone 1992), reported to von Neumann that in a long
sequence of plays of the game, the outcome was not at all a solid
string of DD’s, as predicted by the minimax theorem, the great
mathematician did not take the result of the admittedly informal ex-
periment seriously. Subsequent experiments, however, showed
that, especially in long repeated plays, substantial runs of CC are a
rule rather than an exception. Even in single plays by total strangers,
frequent CC outcomes have been observed (Rapoport 1988).
Colman cites backward induction in “Centipede,” a weirdly de-
signed multi-move game in which both players could win fabulous
sums if they tacitly agreed to cooperate after the first play. Never-
theless, backward induction would dictate stopping after the first
play, whereby both would receive zero. In contrast, backward in-
duction in R. Selten’s “Chain Store” game prescribes CC through-
out. The inventor of the game writes that, in the role of the chain
store, he would not play as prescribed and presumably would get
more money (Selten 1978). Luce and Raiffa (1957) also preferred
to violate the backward induction prescription in finitely repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma, thus avoiding the only minimax equilibrium
of this game.
It turns out that these frequent failures of rational choice the-
ory to prescribe acceptable actions in gambling or game-like situ-
ations can be traced to two often tacitly implied assumptions,
namely, rejection of so called “evidential” decision theory (Joyce
1999) and independence of decisions of individual players.
Suppose a believer in predestination (Calvinist, Presbyterian) is
asked why, if his ultimate abode is fixed, he leads a sober and
chaste life. Why doesn’t he drink, gamble, chase women, and so
on while he can? He might answer, “Since God is just, I can as-
sume that I am among the saved, because I live as I live.” He con-
siders his frugal and chaste life as “evidence” that he has been
saved and he cherishes this feeling (Joyce 1999).
Asked why he bothers to vote in a general election, seeing that
his vote can’t possibly make a difference in the result, Herr Kant
replies, “I vote, because I would like everyone to vote and because
it makes me feel that I have done my duty as a citizen.” In the
wilderness, Dr. Z has one dose of a life-saving medicine. If given
to Mr. X, it will save his life with a probability of 0.9; if given to Mr.
Y it has a probability of 0.95. Maximization of expected utility de-
mands that she give the medicine to Mr. Y. But Dr. Z tosses a fair
coin to decide. She doesn’t want to “play God.”
The concept of rationality in classical prescriptive decision the-
ory has three weak spots: individualism, decision independence,
and the minimax equilibrium dogma. “Individualism” in this con-
text means “egoism.” To avoid the pejorative connotation, Wick-
steed (1933) called it “non-tuism.” Decision independence is
dropped in evidential decision theory. “However I decide, so will
my co-players, since there is no reason to suppose that they think
not as I do.” This perspective dethrones the Nash equilibrium
from its role as a sine qua non condition of rational choice.
In spite of his generous appreciation of game-theoretic contri-
butions to decision theory, Colman effectively pronounces the end
of prescriptive theory founded on the orthodox paradigm, and dis-
cusses the promising dawn of inductive experimental-psychologi-
cal approaches.
Why not go all the way
Richard Schuster
Department of Psychology, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel.
schuster@psy.haifa.ac.il
Abstract: “Psychology Game Theory” grafts social-process explanations
onto classical game theory to explain deviations from instrumental ratio-
nality caused by the social properties of cooperation. This leads to confu-
sion between cooperation as a social or individual behavior, and between
ultimate and proximate explanations. If game theory models explain the
existence of cooperation, different models are needed for understanding
the proximate social processes that underlie cooperation in the real world.
Colman’s provocative paper reminds me of a familiar scenario in
science. A popular doctrine is under stress but refuses to die. In-
stead, it is amended again and again in a vain attempt to forge an
accommodation with a new reality. A good example is the as-
sumption that individual self-interest, which can explain the evo-
lution of cooperation, must also underlie the behavior of cooper-
ating in the real world. Colman characterizes this assumption
(from Hume) as “instrumental rationality.” The stress comes from
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the emerging reality (cf. Palameta & Brown 1999) that humans, in
a variety of interactive decision games, prefer to cooperate more
than predicted from instrumental rationality alone. Colman’s pro-
posal is to explain the cooperation bias with “Psychological game
theory,” a set of “formal principles of nonrational reasoning”
linked to the social context of cooperation in which the actions and
motives of other participants may not be completely known. This
commentary will suggest that Colman’s allegiance to the basic par-
adigm of game theory does not allow his theory to go far enough
when addressing the social reality of cooperation under free-rang-
ing conditions.
The root of the problem seems to be the familiar mistake of con-
founding ultimate versus proximate explanations. If game theo-
retical models are designed to provide an ultimate explanation for
the existence of cooperation, such models only create obscurity
and confusion when they are stretched to incorporate what hap-
pens when live subjects are used in the kinds of experiments
spawned by game theory. Setting aside the evolution of coopera-
tion and altruism at the level of groups (e.g., Sober & Wilson
1998), natural selection at the level of individuals is necessarily
selfish. But as Colman realizes (see also Chase 1980; Dennett
1995), classical game theory was never meant to be about behav-
ior. Evolution is a process that guarantees maximization of indi-
vidual fitness precisely because it is mindless and therefore “non-
rational,” leading to higher payoffs in the absence of intentional
choosing. It is this nonrational aspect of cooperation that is grist
for the mill of game theory, whether in behavioral ecology (e.g.,
Mesterton-Gibbons & Dugatkin 1992), the social sciences (e.g.,
Luce & Raiffa 1957), or economics (e.g., Arrow 1963).
When humans or animals actually choose whether or not to co-
operate, they are no longer “mindless,” in the sense that their
choices are no longer immune from the influence of proximate
psychological processes evoked by the presence and behaviors of
others (Boesch & Boesch 1989; Roberts 1997; Schuster 2001;
2002; Schuster et al. 1993). The existence of such processes invites
the question of how best to study them. By grafting psychological
game theory onto classical game theory, the result is a peculiar
kind of hybrid explanation that is part social and part individual,
part proximate and part ultimate. On the one hand, cooperation is
retained as an individual behavior, resting on “a bedrock of
methodological individualism” (cf. target article, sect. 8.1, em-
phasis Colman’s). This is obvious from the basic design of labora-
tory experiments in which social interaction is deliberately mini-
mized or totally absent. Instead, anonymous players are physically
isolated in separate cubicles and individually compensated ac-
cording to how all players have chosen between strategic options.
On the other hand, humans playing such games show a persis-
tent bias towards cooperating, despite the impoverished social
conditions. The experimental conditions leave the experimenter
with few social variables to manipulate. And the theoretician is left
with the less-than-enviable task of speculating about why decision
games with human subjects might generate too much coopera-
tion. One proposal is to suggest traits such as “group-identity” or
“social value orientation,” which can vary across subjects. Col-
man’s proposal is a set of unobservable intervening variables, such
as “focal points,” “collective preferences,” and “team reasoning.”
Still another possibility is to speculate that humans, despite the
physical isolation, are nevertheless influenced by the possibility
that outcomes also depend on others (e.g., Forsythe et al. 1994).
A player might then opt for cooperation because it is intrinsically
reinforcing (Frank 1988; Schuster 2001; 2002; Sober & Wilson
1998), or merely to avoid the embarrassment of meeting oppo-
nents who were hurt by defection. At the end of the day, all such
explanations remain plausible, but highly speculative, with little
likelihood that they could be disentangled using the nonsocial ex-
perimental conditions associated with game theory.
To better understand the social dimensions of cooperation, and
their impact on instrumental rationality, one alternative is to study
examples such as team sports, military strategies, and collabora-
tive business ventures under free-ranging conditions, where co-
operation is intrinsically social (see Dugatkin 1997 for a review of
animal examples). The social properties of cooperation can then
be separately analyzed before, during and after engaging in a bout
of cooperation (Schuster 2001; 2002). Instead of the anonymity
among partners favored by game theorists, real-life “players” are
usually familiar from group membership and/or prior encounters.
Cooperators are therefore likely to have preferred partners
(Dugatkin 1995). With interaction unrestricted, social influences
also impact on how cooperation is performed, including the abil-
ity to coordinate actions, use signals, and develop a division-of-
labor based on different and complementary roles (Boesch &
Boesch 1989; Schuster et al. 1993; Stander 1992). There is also the
possibility that the cooperators themselves are affected by work-
ing together in ways that affect the incentive to cooperate (Schus-
ter 2001; 2002). Finally, social influences can affect how outcomes
are allocated following an act of cooperation, because of factors
such as sex, age, aggression, or status, which influence priority of
access (e.g., Boesch & Boesch 1989; Noë 1990). In humans, allo-
cation can also follow from bargaining or prior arrangements. In-
strumental rationality is also violated when cooperation persists
even though individual behavior might be more profitable (e.g.,
Packer et al. 1990).
A second alternative is to incorporate free-ranging conditions
into experimental models of cooperation. One example is a sim-
ple model in which pairs of laboratory rats (Rattus norvegicus) are
rewarded with a saccharine solution for coordinating back-and-
forth shuttling within a shared chamber in which social interaction
is unrestricted (Schuster 2001; 2002). Two experiments are rele-
vant to instrumental rationality. In one, the option of competing
over outcome allocation was modeled by reinforcing cooperative
shuttles with intermittent presentations of either one or two cups
of saccharine solution. Although pairs varied in how the single out-
comes were allocated, from near “sharing” to strong dominance
by one partner, there was no relationship between outcome dis-
parity and the level of performance (Schuster et al., in prepara-
tion). The second experiment measured choice between entering
one chamber, where the rats shuttled alone, or another chamber
in which they always cooperated with the same partner. This situ-
ation is analogous to the game theory choice between cooperation
and noncooperation, with the important difference being that the
cooperation option, as in real life, was also a social option. Even
though there was no advantage from choosing either chamber, be-
cause outcomes and the proportions of reinforced shuttles were
matched, cooperation was strongly preferred (Schuster 2001;
2002; Schuster et al., in preparation).
By incorporating the social dimensions of cooperation into ex-
perimental models, it becomes possible to clarify the differences
between ultimate explanations based on game theory or proximate
explanations based on social processes. This clarification would
not be needed if predictions from the two kinds of explanations
were congruent. But congruence seems more likely when behav-
ior is not social, so that the abstract prediction of maximizing fit-
ness or expected utility can be better matched by the influence of
feedback from individual experience (e.g., Staddon 1983). The co-
operation bias shows that the advantage from using game-theory
models, eliminating the “noise” generated by uncontrollable so-
cial interactions, can no longer be defended. The same methods
are also inadequate for analyzing why the preference for cooper-
ation deviates from instrumental rationality.
So why not go all the way and explain cooperation under free-
ranging conditions by jettisoning the game-theory approach, in
both method and theory, in favor of alternative models that are
more faithful to the reality of cooperation in the real world? Then
we could begin to study what is impossible with Colman’s ap-
proach, namely, the experimental analysis of deviations from pre-
dictions based on instrumental rationality, and the likely identifi-
cation of, as yet undiscovered, sources of reinforcement that
underlie cooperation as we know it.
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Locally rational decision-making
Richard M. Shiffrin
Psychology Department, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405.
shiffrin@indiana.edu
http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/people/homepages/shiffrin.html
Abstract: Colman shows that normative theories of rational decision-mak-
ing fail to produce rational decisions in simple interactive games. I suggest
that well-formed theories are possible in local settings, keeping in mind
that a good part of each game is the generation of a rational approach ap-
propriate for that game. The key is rationality defined in terms of the game,
not individual decisions.
Colman gives an intriguing, interesting, and at times amusing ac-
count of the failures of normative theories of rational decision-
making. He suggests moving toward a “psychological” game the-
ory that would be “primarily descriptive or positive rather than
normative,” and adds “a collection of tentative and ad hoc sugges-
tions” (target article, sect. 8). I suggest that a well-formed psy-
chological theory of rational decision-making may well be possi-
ble in local contexts (of a scope and generality large enough to be
interesting). The approach is rooted in the thought that rational-
ity itself is a psychological rather than axiomatic concept, justify-
ing the need to reinvent it (or at least restrict it) for different set-
tings.
I propose that all the decision-makers in a social/interactive
game are faced with a dual task: They must decide (quite possibly
without any communication) what theory of rational decision-
making applies in that situation, and given that, whether a jointly
rational solution exists, and what it is. The first of these tasks is not
typically made explicit, but is a necessary consequence of the cur-
rent lack of a general (axiomatic) theory of rational decision-mak-
ing.
It will suffice for this commentary to consider the Centipede
game (Colman’s Fig. 5). This is a good exemplar of a social/inter-
action game without communication (except through the choices
made), and with the goal for each player to maximize individual
utility (not beat the other player). I assume that both players know
that both players are rational, and not subject to the sundry “irra-
tional” forces that lead human decision-makers to their choices. I
also assume that each player knows his or her own mapping of
monetary payoffs onto subjective utility, but does not know the
mapping for the other player, other than the shared knowledge
that a larger payoff (in monetary amount, say) corresponds to a
larger utility. Note that this assumption (in most cases) eliminates
the possibility that a rational strategy will involve a probabilistic
mixture. Assuming that player A’s mixture of choices affects player
B’s mixture of outcomes, player A generally cannot know whether
the utility to B of a given mixture exceeds that for some other fixed
or mixed payoff.
Therefore, the players at the outset of a game will both consider
the same finite set of strategies Sj, where a given strategy consists
of the ordered set of decisions kD(1A), D(2B), D(3A), D(4B), . . .
D(N)l, where D(I) is one of the choices allowed that player by the
sequence of previous choices in that strategy. A game utility Uj is
associated with each strategy: kUjA, UjBl. Each player’s goal is to
reach a strategy that will maximize his or her personal Uj, in the
knowledge that both players are rational and both have this goal.
In a Centipede game with many trials (say, 20), backward in-
duction seems to lead to the “irrational” decision to stop (defect)
on trial 1, even though both players can gain lots of money by play-
ing (cooperating) for many trials. Of course, backward induction
is flawed when used here in the usual way: Player A defects on,
say, trial 15 in the certainty that Player B will defect on trial 16.
But trial 15 could not have been reached unless B had been co-
operating on all previous choices, so certainty is not possible.
Thus, by cooperating on the first trial, the player eliminates back-
ward induction as a basis for reasoning, and allows cooperation to
emerge as a rational strategy. Yet, the forces in favor of defecting
grow over trials, until backward induction seems to regain its force
on the penultimate choice (e.g., trial 19 of 20, or 3 of 4).
Consider, therefore, a two-trial version of Colman’s Centipede
game. Both players at the outset consider the three possible strate-
gies: kstopl, kplay, stopl, kplay, playl, with associated payoffs of
k0,0l, k21,10l, k9, 9l. The players look for a rational solution, in
the hope that one exists (they share the knowledge that some
games may not have a rational solution). So each player reasons:
Which of the three strategies could be rational? Player B might
like kplay, stopl, but both players could not decide this strategy was
rational. If it were, A would stop on trial 1 (forcing a better out-
come). Therefore, both players know kplay, stopl could not be a
rational strategy. Of the two remaining strategies, both players
have little trouble seeing kplay, playl as the rational choice, given
that k9, 9l is preferred to k0,0l.
This solution is “selfish,” not predicated on maximizing joint re-
turn. It derives from the shared knowledge of playing a two-trial
social game: In a one-trial game even a rational, cooperative deci-
sion-maker would clearly defect. Rationality is defined in terms of
the entire game and total payoffs, not the payoff on a given trial.
This approach could perhaps be considered a kind of generaliza-
tion of the “Stackelberg reasoning” discussed by Colman, but is
even more closely related to “dependency equilibria” discussed by
Spohn (2001). It can be generalized and formalized (though not
in this commentary). I note only that it gives justification for co-
operative choices in simultaneous-choice games, such as the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (and sequential-play extensions of those games).
Perhaps the chief objection to this approach involves the per-
ception that accepted causal precepts are violated: What is to stop
B from defecting once trial 2 is reached? This issue is reminiscent
of that obtaining in Newcomb’s paradox (Nozick 1969), or the
“toxin” puzzle (Kavka 1983), but in those cases a defense of a
seemingly irrational later choice depends on uncertainty con-
cerning an earlier causal event (I say “seemingly” because I am
quite certain a Newcomb’s chooser should take “one” and the
“toxin” should be imbibed). The present case is more trouble-
some, because the first choice is known when the last choice is
made. I nonetheless defend cooperation with the primary argu-
ment that rationality ought to be, and in fact must be, defined in
terms of the entire game and not an individual decision within that
game.
“Was you ever bit by a dead bee?” –
Evolutionary games and dominated
strategies
Karl Sigmund
Institut für Mathematik, Universität Wien, 1090 Vienna, Austria.
karl.sigmund@univie.ac.at http://mailbox.univie.ac.at/karl.sigmund/
Abstract: On top of the puzzles mentioned by Colman comes the puzzle
of why rationality has bewitched classical game theory for so long. Not the
smallest merit of evolutionary game theory is that it views rationality as a
limiting case, at best. But some problems only become more pressing.
Aficionados of Humphrey Bogart will recognize this title’s ques-
tion as being a running gag from the film “To Have and Have Not.”
Apparently, if you step barefoot on a dead bee, you are likely to
get hurt. The assumption that human behavior is rational died a
long time ago, for reasons Colman summarizes very well, but it has
failed to be buried properly. And if you carelessly tread on it, you
will learn about its sting.
The question is, of course, why one should tread on it in the first
place. There seems no reason ever to come close. The hypothesis
that humans act rationally has been empirically refuted not only
in the context of interactive decisions, but also for individual de-
cision-making, where, in a way, it is even more striking. Indeed,
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some of the observed interactive behavior can be explained in ra-
tional terms, if the utility function is modified by a term depend-
ing on the payoff difference between the player and the coplayers
(see Fehr & Schmidt 1999). But this device, a “fix” that resembles
the modifications of epicycles in the Ptolemaic model of celestial
mechanics, cannot explain deviations from rationality in individ-
ual decision-making as evidenced, for instance, by the paradoxes
of Allais (see, e.g., Allais & Hagen 1979) or Ellsberg (1961).
The founding fathers of game theory had little knowledge of
such experiments. But it seems difficult to understand why, to our
day, after all the work by Tversky, Kahnemann (see e.g., Kahne-
mann & Tversky 1979), and many others, full rationality can still
be termed “not such a bad assumption.” Not every scientific ide-
alization deserves as much respect as that of a perfect gas! Cling-
ing to human rationality, in the face of evidence, must be a way of
protecting faith in the existence of a “unique rational solution” for
every game – a supernatural claim.
Game theory is the conceptual tool for analyzing social interac-
tions in terms of methodological individualism. That it should be
used in any normative sense smacks of dogmatism. Game theory
is a branch of mathematics, and in this sense is not more “norma-
tive” or “descriptive” than algebra. It helps to analyze the logical
consequences of certain assumptions. The assumption of fully ra-
tional agents is just one of many alternatives. Its prominent role is
caused by force of habit alone. Almost two hundred years ago,
mathematicians rejected the creed in a unique set of geometrical
axioms. Why should there be a unique set of postulates for game
theory?
The rationality axiom is obviously not needed in game-theoret-
ical analyses dealing with the chemical warfare between bacterial
mutants, the mating behavior of male lizards, or the economical
solidarity between students (see Fehr & Gächter 2000; Kerr et al.
2002; Sinervo & Lively 1996). Even the term “bounded rational-
ity” seems ill-advised in such contexts, implying to lay-persons that
rationality is the norm that bacteria, lizards, and undergraduates
fail to achieve.
In applications to real-life situations (as opposed to philosoph-
ical puzzles), game theory can do just as well without the postu-
late of rationality, and Occam’s razor demands, therefore, to get
rid of it. That it held out for so long is mostly due to historical con-
tingency.
An illustration of historical contingency at work is the fact that
John Nash, in his Ph.D. thesis, explicitly stated that his equilib-
rium notion could be motivated, not only by an appeal to rational
players, but also by what he called the “mass action” approach.
Oddly, this section was deleted in the published version from 1950
(see Weibull 1995). It seems that a reviewer had discarded it.
Nash’s mass action approach was resuscitated decades later in evo-
lutionary game theory: Thinking in terms of populations came nat-
urally to evolutionary biologists. No longer do the players have to
be rational; all they need is some propensity for adopting success-
ful strategies. This can be due to learning, to imitation, to infec-
tion, or to inheritance (see, e.g., Gintis 2000; Hofbauer & Sig-
mund 1998; Weibull 1995).
But, and here comes the sting, getting rid of the rationality ax-
iom as a foundational postulate does not get rid of all problems.
Evolutionary games lead, in many cases, back to the puzzles de-
scribed by Colman. It only places them in the context of natural
science. Whenever successful strategies spread, dominated strate-
gies will get eliminated, defection will evolve in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, and selfishness will be just as self-defeating as it
is between rational players bent on out-smarting their equally ra-
tional coplayers.
This is the dead bee’s revenge. Far from explaining it away, evo-
lutionary game theory emphasizes the urgency of the paradox.
There are societies out there – not only in philosophical mind
games – that display cooperation, although it is a dominated strat-
egy. Opting for the evolutionary approach is beneficial, neverthe-
less, because it opens up so many testable solutions to the puzzles.
Consider, for example, the Ultimatum game. Here an experi-
menter offers ten dollars to a pair of test persons, provided they
keep to the following rules: A toss of the coin decides who of the
two is the “Proposer” and must decide which part of the ten dol-
lars to offer to the coplayer. If the “Responder” accepts the offer,
this is how the money is split between the two players. If the “Re-
sponder” rejects the offer, the experimenter pockets the money.
In each case, the game is over, and all go their separate ways – no
haggling, and no further rounds.
In real experiments, small offers get rejected by most Respon-
ders, and most Proposers offer a substantial share. This blatantly
contradicts the usual rationality assumptions, whereby Proposers
ought to offer the minimal amount and Responders ought to ac-
cept it. Numerical simulations of evolving populations of players
yield the same prediction. But, whereas the rationality axiom just
leads to an impasse, the evolutionary approach suggests ways out.
If one assumes, for example, (a) that players usually interact only
within their neighborhood (rather than with a randomly chosen
member of a large, well-mixed crowd); or (b) that there is always
some small percentage of players who would never offer, as Pro-
posers, less than they would accept as Responders; or (c) that play-
ers occasionally offer less if they learn, somehow, that their
coplayer is likely to swallow it; then offers coming close to reality
will evolve (see Nowak et al. 2000; Page & Nowak 2002; Page et
al. 2002). None of these three hypotheses need be right; but all al-
low for testable predictions. Game theory is not only a tool for
philosophical debates, but – rid of the straitjacket of rationality –
it is an instrument for every social science.
Irrationality, suboptimality, and the
evolutionary context
Mark Steer and Innes Cuthill
School of Biological Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol, BS8 1UG, United
Kingdom. mark.steer@bristol.ac.uk i.cuthill@bristol.ac.uk
Abstract: We propose that a direct analogy can be made between optimal
behaviour in animals and rational behaviour in humans, and that lessons
learned by the study of the former can be applied to the latter. Further-
more, we suggest that, to understand human decisions, rationality must be
considered within an evolutionary framework.
We believe that Colman raises valuable and interesting points
about the nature of rational choice in humans. Nonetheless, we
would like to make the important point that behaviour considered
to be irrational within the confines of an experimental situation
may nonetheless be rational within a wider context. We believe
there are illuminating parallels between the study of the adaptive
value of behaviour (in terms of individual optimality or evolution-
ary stability) and that of rationality in decision-making. Just as a
rational decision is one that maximizes some measure of utility, so
to a behavioural ecologist, an optimal decision is one that maxi-
mizes Darwinian fitness given certain constraints. Thus, we be-
lieve that the appropriate research program to understand the ra-
tionality (or otherwise) of decision-making in humans should be
analogous to that needed to understand the adaptive value of be-
haviour in the face of evolution by natural selection. These issues
are of broad concern, not just confined to game-theoretic situa-
tions.
Imagine, for example, an investigation into the foraging behav-
iour of a bird in an aviary. It has a choice between foraging in two
locations. At location A, situated deep in a bush, the bird experi-
ences a low rate of food intake; at the more open location B, the
rate of intake is much higher. Contrary to the predictions of a sim-
ple model of energetic intake maximization, the bird prefers to
feed at A. Why?
Although the experimenters appreciate that the bird is in no
danger of predation, it doesn’t necessarily follow that the bird
does. Foraging in the open may be deemed too risky, even though
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the rate of gain is higher. It is only when we start to take these con-
siderations into account, and include them in the model, that the
bird’s behaviour begins to make sense (see Houston & McNamara
1989; 1999; McNamara 1996 for further discussion). Of course,
we must test our new assumptions independently before accept-
ing our revised hypothesis.
So is the bird making optimal, or suboptimal, foraging deci-
sions? This depends on what information we can expect the bird
to have about its current situation. If it can perceive that it is in no
danger of predation, then to carry on exhibiting antipredator be-
haviour may indeed be considered suboptimal. However, if the
bird is incapable of perceiving the decreased threat, either
through a lack of the cues it would use in nature or an inflexible
decision rule (that nonetheless works well under natural condi-
tions), then the behaviour may be optimal within the context for
which the rule evolved. The information that the bird bases its de-
cisions upon depends not only on its perception of the current en-
vironment, but also on its own developmental and evolutionary
history. Indeed, to an evolutionary game theorist, it is appropriate
to ask why a decision rule that may be susceptible to develop-
mental experience (e.g., learning) has evolved as opposed to a rel-
atively inflexible, innate, rule.
We suggest that a direct comparison can be made between our
investigation of the apparent suboptimality of the bird foraging
under cover and how one should investigate the apparent irra-
tionality of, for example, an altruistic person in a one-shot game.
Although the behaviour of the person in question might seem to
be irrational within the confines of the experimental set-up, we
have to consider not only whether the person perceives (or even
can perceive) the game in the way the experimenters have con-
ceived it, but also whether it makes evolutionary sense for that
person to do so.
We would go further than simply drawing analogies between
the study of optimality in animal decision-making and of rational-
ity in human behaviour. We believe that a full understanding of
human decision-making, even if the rules are the result of con-
scious reasoning rather than inflexible preprogrammed strategies,
requires an evolutionary perspective. As behavioural ecologists,
our belief is that natural selection should have equipped humans,
just as other animals, with rules that maximize fitness in the ap-
propriate environment. Therefore, from our point of view, the
most rational decision for a human to make should be that which
maximizes fitness. If indeed human decisions are constrained in
some way by evolutionary influences, then considering our evolu-
tionary past could be instrumental in understanding why seem-
ingly irrational decisions are made in certain circumstances.
Not only might human behaviour be less flexible than we imag-
ine, the subject may perceive that the game is being played with a
wider range of people than the experimenter has planned: the ex-
perimenters, other players, and observers. For example, individ-
uals behave differently if they are informed that they are playing
another person, than if they are told they are playing against a
computer (Baker & Rachlin 2002).
So we return to our main point. Whether our bird is behaving
optimally or not depends to some degree on whether it is reason-
able to expect that bird to know that predation risk is zero. Simi-
larly, whether a person’s choices in a game can be considered
(ir)rational depends on whether we expect that person to have un-
derstood the precise experimental paradigm and then acted ac-
cordingly. The importance of looking at the wider context when
considering responses to games is paramount to understanding
how people might react. When individuals make seemingly irra-
tional choices in a predictable fashion, there are three possibilities
among which we need to distinguish: First, subjects don’t possess
the capabilities to fully assess the conditions of the situation, pre-
cipitating fully rational behaviour as far as the subject is con-
cerned. Or, subjects might fully understand the conditions of the
game, however, because of a developmental or evolutionary hang-
up, they perform the (evolutionarily) right behaviour in the wrong
context. The behaviour is thus locally irrational, but rational within
a wider framework. Or, third, all the conditions of the game are
well understood by a subject, and the decisions truly are irrational
(and thus maladaptive?).
Bridging psychology and game theory yields
interdependence theory
Paul A. M. Van Lange and Marcello Gallucci
Department of Social Psychology, Free University, 1081 BT Amsterdam, The
Netherlands. pam.van.lange@psy.vu.nl m.gallucci@psy.vu.nl
Abstract: This commentary focuses on the parts of psychological game
theory dealing with preference, as illustrated by team reasoning, and sup-
ports the conclusion that these theoretical notions do not contribute above
and beyond existing theory in understanding social interaction. In partic-
ular, psychology and games are already bridged by a comprehensive, for-
mal, and inherently psychological theory, interdependence theory (Kelley
& Thibaut 1978; Kelley et al. 2003), which has been demonstrated to ac-
count for a wide variety of social interaction phenomena.
Understanding social interaction phenomena is obviously a key is-
sue in the social and behavioral sciences. It is, therefore, surpris-
ing that several important theories, such as rational choice theory,
game theory, and complementary forms of decision theory, tend
to focus on the individual level of behavior, as if there is no mu-
tual dependence between individuals. In other words, these the-
ories tend to neglect the conceptual importance of interdepen-
dence in understanding social interaction – the realization that
important psychological processes, including deviations of ratio-
nality and self-interest, are ultimately rooted in the dimensions of
interdependence underlying interaction situations.
In the target article, Colman proposes psychological game the-
ory as an alternative to “orthodox theory” in accounting for devia-
tions of rationality and self-interest, thereby extending orthodox
theory in at least two important respects. First, it addresses inter-
personal psychology by emphasizing the role of beliefs and ex-
pectations relevant to a situation and the actions and beliefs of the
interaction partner. Second, it addresses a collective level of analy-
sis, emphasizing, for example, the importance of collective pref-
erences in settings of interdependence.
Although we are in agreement with both extensions, we do not
think that these extensions make a very novel contribution to ex-
isting social psychological theory. Moreover, we share the critical
view expressed by Colman that psychological game theory “amounts
to nothing more than a collection of tentative and ad hoc sug-
gestions for solving the heterogeneous problems that have been
highlighted in earlier sections” (sect. 8). Notwithstanding their
heuristic value, the suggestions would have been considerably less
tentative and less ad hoc, if Colman had discussed psychological
game theory in relation to existing social psychological theories. In
particular, we argue that the parts of psychological game theory
dealing with preference, illustrated mainly with team reasoning,
are already well-understood in terms of interdependence theory
(Kelley & Thibaut 1978; Kelley et al. 2003; Rusbult & Van Lange
2003), which in many ways can be conceptualized as an inherently
psychological, yet formal, theory of social interaction. As we will
see, after a brief discussion of interdependence theory, it is not
clear whether the part of psychological game theory dealing with
preference – a part that is very essential to game theory – con-
tributes above and beyond interdependence theory in under-
standing social interaction.
Interdependence theory. Interdependence theory may be char-
acterized by at least three qualities. First, using games and related
conceptual tools, interdependence theory provides a taxonomy of
interaction situations, which can be analyzed in terms of several
dimensions, such as degree and mutuality of dependence, basis
for dependence, corresponding versus conflicting interest, tem-
poral structure, and information availability (Kelley et al. 2003;
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Rusbult & Van Lange 2003). This taxonomy allows one to charac-
terize interaction situations. For example, a social dilemma would
be characterized as one involving relatively high levels of interde-
pendence, based on unilateral actions of the partner, and also
characterized by a fairly strong conflict of interest; and social
dilemmas may differ in terms of temporal structure (e.g., single-
trial vs. iterated) and information availability (e.g., complete or in-
complete information regarding one another’s preferences).
Second, interdependence theory assumes that the outcomes in
any interaction situation (“the given preferences”) may be psy-
chologically transformed into a subjective situation representing
effective preferences, which are assumed to guide behavior and
ultimately social interaction. Examples of transformation rules are
interaction goals such as enhancement of both one’s own and
other’s outcomes (MaxJoint), equality in outcomes (MinDiff),
other’s outcomes (MaxOther), or relative advantage over other’s
outcomes (MaxRel). Although transformations may be a product
of careful reasoning and thought, they may also occur in a fairly
automatic manner, involving very little thought or deliberation. As
such, transformations deviate not only from self-interest, but also
from rationality, in that individuals are not assumed to obey crite-
ria of strict rationality. More importantly, transformations are as-
sumed to accompany cognitive and affective processes in guiding
behavior and shaping interaction (see Kelley et al. 2003; Rusbult
& Van Lange 2003).
Finally, interdependence theory focuses on both individual and
collective levels of analyses, in that it explicitly seeks to understand
social interaction, which is conceptualized as a product of two in-
dividuals (with their basic preferences and transformational ten-
dencies) and the interaction situation. Social interactions are also
assumed to shape relatively stable embodiments of transforma-
tions, at the intrapersonal level (i.e., dispositions such as social
value orientation), at the relationship level (i.e., partner-specific
orientations, such as commitment), and at the cultural level (i.e.,
broad rules for conduct, such as social norms; see Rusbult & Van
Lange 2003; Van Lange et al. 1997).
Interdependence theory and psychological game theory. As
noted earlier, the parts of psychological game theory dealing with
preference seem to be well-captured by interdependence theory.
Needless to say, the notion of transformation explicates deviations
of rationality and self-interest, and it is a theory that focuses on
both individual and collective levels of analysis. Moreover, al-
though transformations are individual-level rules, they do have
strong implications for the collective level of analysis. For exam-
ple, transformations may be interrelated with group-based vari-
ables, such as group identification (“we-thinking”), group attach-
ment, or feelings of group responsibility. A case in point is the
demonstration that individuals with prosocial orientation define
rationality at the collective level, not at the individual level, thus
judging cooperation as more intelligent than noncooperation in
social dilemmas (cf. goal-prescribes-rationality principle, Van
Lange 2000). Also, interdependence theory emphasizes the con-
ceptual importance of beliefs, expectations, and interpersonal
trust. Following the seminal work of Kelley and Stahelski (1970),
the transformations that people actually adopt are assumed to be
strongly conditioned by trust, beliefs, and expectations regarding
the transformations pursued by particular interaction partners.
Utility of a transformational analysis. We should also briefly
comment on Colman’s suggestion that a transformational analysis
is not especially helpful in understanding the Hi-Lo Matching
game. Let us analyze this particular interaction situation for five
transformations. First, a transformational analysis indicates that
the orientations toward enhancing one’s own outcomes (individu-
alism), joint outcomes (cooperation), and a partner’s outcomes (al-
truism) prescribe matching, and more strongly so for Heads than
for Tails. Second, mere enhancement of relative advantage (com-
petition) and equality in outcomes (egalitarianism) are irrelevant
in this particular situation, because all four cells present equal out-
comes for self and other. Given that cooperation and individual-
ism are prevalent orientations, and given that often cooperation is
accompanied by egalitarianism (see Van Lange 1999), the trans-
formational analysis indicates that most people will be oriented to-
ward matching Heads (followed by matching Tails). Pure forms of
competition or egalitarianism lead to indifference, which in fact
may hinder effective coordination between two individuals.
Thus, a transformation analysis may very well account for the
fact that people tend to be fairly good at coordinating in the Hi-
Lo Matching game and related situations. At the same time, the
transformational analysis suggests that one reason people may not
be able to coordinate is that at least one individual is merely in-
terested in outperforming the interaction partner (or, less likely,
merely interested in obtaining equality in outcomes). More gen-
erally, a comprehensive transformation analysis (which includes
not only cooperation, as discussed by Colman) helps us under-
stand this specific situation, even though we agree with Colman’s
implicit assumption that a transformational analysis is typically
more strongly relevant to motivational dilemmas, involving more
pronounced conflicts among cooperation, equality, individualism,
and competition.
Conclusion. Over the past 25 years, interdependence theory
has inspired several programs of research in areas as diverse as re-
lationships, norms and roles, interpersonal dispositions, social
dilemmas, group decision-making, and negotiation. It is a com-
prehensive, logical, and psychological theory of social interaction,
thereby, to some degree, using the language (and logic) of game
theory. Our discussion indicates that the parts of psychological
game theory dealing with preference (and illustrated by team rea-
soning) do not extend interdependence theory in terms of theo-
retical potential, logic (including parsimony), or psychological
breadth. Perhaps the contribution of Colman’s article is more
strongly rooted in conceptualizing specific lines of reasoning, such
as Stackelberg reasoning, and reasoning focusing on common be-
liefs and nonmonotonic reasoning, which tend to deviate from
self-interest or rationality. We are most confident about one broad
message that Colman’s article shares with interdependence the-
ory – that is, the conviction that “bridging” social psychology with
game theory is essential to the further development of the science
of social interaction. After all, one needs games (“the situational
structure”) and the psychology of two individuals (“the processes,”
i.e., transformations, along with cognition and affect) to under-
stand social interaction.
Toward a cognitive game theory
Ivaylo Vlaeva and Nick Chaterb
aDepartment of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1
3UD, United Kingdom; bInstitute for Applied Cognitive Science, Department
of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, United Kingdom.
ivaylo.vlaev@psy.ox.ac.uk nick.chater@warwick.ac.uk
Abstract: We argue that solving the heterogeneous problems arising from
the standard game theory requires looking both at reasoning heuristics, as
in Colman’s analysis, and at how people represent games and the quanti-
ties that define them.
Colman’s elegant and persuasive article describes psychological
game theory by introducing formal principles of reasoning, and fo-
cuses on several nonstandard reasoning processes (team reason-
ing, Stackelberg reasoning, and epistemic and nonmonotonic rea-
soning). The goal is to explain psychological phenomena in
game-playing that orthodox game theory, and its conventional ex-
tensions, cannot explain. We argue that, in addition, a model is
needed of how the economic agent perceives and mentally repre-
sents the game initially, before any (strategic) reasoning begins.
For instance, the perceived utility of various outcomes might
change depending on the previous games seen.
As an illustration of such a possible model, here we offer some
initial results from a research program that aims to ground ac-
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counts of rationality in general, and decision theory in particular,
on the underlying cognitive mechanisms that produce the seem-
ingly paradoxical behavior. Colman’s sections 2 and 4 discuss the
basic underlying assumptions of expected utility theory and game
theory. Existing models of rational choice and interactive game-
theoretic decision making typically assume that only the attributes
of the game need be considered when reaching a decision; that is,
these theories assume that the utility of a risky prospect or strat-
egy is determined by the utility of the outcomes of the game, and
transforms the probabilities of each outcome. Decisions are as-
sumed to be based on these utilities.
Our results demonstrate, however, that the attributes of the
previously seen prospects and games influence the decisions in
the current prospect and game, which suggests that prospects and
games are not considered independently of the previously played
ones (Stewart et al., in press; Vlaev & Chater, submitted). In par-
ticular, Stewart et al. (in press) have revealed the phenomena of
“prospect relativity”: that the perceived value of a risky prospect
(e.g., “p chance of x”) is relative to other prospects with which it
is presented. This is counter to utility theory, according to which
the perceived value of each prospect should be dependent only on
its own attributes. Stewart et al. suggest that this phenomenon
arises in the representation of the magnitudes that define the
prospects, and suggest that the phenomenon has a common ori-
gin with related effects in the perception of sensory magnitudes
(Garner 1954; Laming 1997; Lockhead 1995).
We have found similar effects, providing a new type of anomaly
for orthodox game theory. People play repeated one-shot Pris-
oner’s Dilemma games (Vlaev & Chater, submitted). The degree
to which people cooperate in these games is well-predicted by a
function of the pay-offs in the game, the cooperation index as pro-
posed in Rapoport & Chammah (1965). Participants were asked
on each round of the game to predict the likelihood that their
coplayer will cooperate, and then to make a decision as to whether
to cooperate or defect. The results demonstrated that the average
cooperation rate and the mean predicted cooperation of the co-
player in each game strongly depend on the cooperativeness of the
preceding games, and specifically on how far the current game was
from the end-points of the range of values of the cooperation in-
dex in each session. Thus, in games with identical cooperation in-
dices, people cooperated more and expected more cooperation 
in the game with higher rank position relative to the other coop-
eration index values in the sequence. These findings present an-
other challenge to the standard rational choice theory and game
theory, as descriptive theories of decision-making under uncer-
tainty, and also to other theories where games are independently
considered.
Our proposed account for these results, and also for other prob-
lems related to the independence assumption, is that people have
poor notions of absolute cooperativeness, risk, and utility, and in-
stead make their judgments and decisions in relative terms, as is
described in some existing psychophysical and cognitive theories
of perception and judgment of information about magnitudes (in-
tensities of stimulus attributes). Thus, this account departs funda-
mentally from previous work in this field, by modeling the highly
flexible and contextually variable way in which people represent
magnitudes, like sums of money, probabilities, time intervals, co-
operativeness, and so forth, rather than by assuming that these can
be represented on absolute internal psychological scales (i.e., even
if these scales exist, they stretch or contract depending on the
other stimuli in the environment). We conjecture that the results
from the two studies presented here suggest that people use con-
text as a sole determinant of the utility of a strategy, which is a form
of a more ecologically adaptive rationality, and therefore any de-
scriptive account of game-theoretic behavior, especially in se-
quential social dilemmas, should incorporate a model of agents’
lower-level cognitive perceptual processes.
This discussion does not answer the paradoxes posed in the tar-
get article, but here we would like to make the stronger claim that
there are many more phenomena that the standard approach can-
not explain (and there will be more to be discovered), and that in
order to develop a decent account of human decision behavior in
games, a much more radical approach is needed. Our results im-
ply that Colman’s version of psychological game theory, as based
only on nonstandard forms of reasoning, needs to be supple-
mented by a more general “cognitive game theory,” which grounds
decision-making in the underlying cognitive mechanisms that pro-
duce the decision behavior. Such a cognitive approach could also
include collective rationality criteria (which, as Colman states, are
lacking in the standard decision theory), because, for example, cat-
egorization of the coplayer as being very similar to me could
strongly affect my common belief in each other’s rationality, or at
least in the similarity of the reasoning processes that we would em-
ploy. Also, the perception of the players and the game as being
similar to a previous interactive situation, in which the coplayers
acted in a certain way (e.g., chose a certain focal point), would en-
force the belief that, in the current situation, the coplayers would
act in a similar way.
From rationality to coordination
Paul Weirich
Philosophy Department, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211.
weirichp@missouri.edu
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Abstract: Game theory’s paradoxes stimulate the study of rationality.
Sometimes they motivate the revising of standard principles of rationality.
Other times they call for revising applications of those principles or intro-
ducing supplementary principles of rationality. I maintain that rationality
adjusts its demands to circumstances, and in ideal games of coordination
it yields a payoff-dominant equilibrium.
Game theory raises many puzzles about rationality, which is why
it is so fascinating to philosophers. Responding to the puzzles is a
good way of learning about rationality. Colman insightfully re-
views many of game theory’s paradoxes and uses them to argue
that, in games, people follow nonstandard principles of reasoning.
He does not, however, claim that those nonstandard principles
have normative force. Do principles of rationality need revision in
light of the paradoxes of game theory? Rationality is a rich topic,
and familiar principles are not likely to capture all its nuances.
Nonetheless, standard principles of rationality are very versatile.
In this commentary, I make a few general points about rationality
and then show that extended applications of the standard princi-
ples resolve some paradoxes.
A standard principle of rationality is to maximize utility. The lit-
erature advances several interpretations of this principle. Nearly
all acknowledge that impediments may provide good excuses for
failing to meet it; the principle governs ideal cases. Game theory
presents decision problems that are non-ideal in various ways.
Perhaps in games some failures to maximize utility are excused.
Rationality may lower standards in difficult cases.
In Equilibrium and Rationality (Weirich 1998), I generalize the
principle of utility maximization to accommodate non-ideal cases
in which no option maximizes utility. I assume that standards of
rationality adjust to an agent’s circumstances, so that in every de-
cision problem some option is rational. The generalization of the
decision principle leads to a generalization of Nash equilibrium
that makes equilibrium exist more widely. A principle Colman
calls “rational determinacy” supports the generalizations. The ver-
sion I endorse asserts that rationality is attainable, but not that ra-
tionality is attainable in one way only. It allows for multiple solu-
tions to a game. Associated with the principle of rational
determinacy is the view that achieving an equilibrium is just one
requirement of rationality, and meeting it is not sufficient for full
rationality. Principles of rationality govern equilibrium selection
also. I ascribe to the principle of equilibrium selection called pay-
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off dominance. What principles of individual rationality support
it?
Colman applies principles of team reasoning and Stackelberg
reasoning to coordination games such as the Hi-Lo Matching
game, where communication is impossible, and, as a result, nei-
ther agent can influence the other’s strategy. These principles are
replacements for utility maximization. Team reasoning replaces
individual goals with team goals. Stackelberg reasoning replaces
maximization of good results with maximization of good news.
Even if these novel principles of reasoning have descriptive value,
neither is promising as an account of rationality. Team reasoning
conflicts with individualism, and Stackelberg reasoning conflicts
with consequentialism.
Stackelberg reasoning uses evidence that a choice furnishes to
help evaluate the choice. Its approach to equilibrium selection re-
sembles the grounding of equilibrium in a strategy’s self-ratifica-
tion (see Harper 1991; 1999; Jeffrey 1983; McClennen 1992; Shin
1991; Weirich 1988; 1994). However, it does not discriminate be-
tween a strategy’s causal and evidential consequences. As causal
decision theory points out, rational decision-making attends to
causal consequences exclusively (see Gibbard 1992; Joyce 1999,
Ch. 5; and Weirich 2001, sect. 4.2).
Principles of rationality regulate the circumstances of decision
problems and not just the choices made in the decision problems.
Their influence on those circumstances affects the solutions to the
decision problems. Principles of rationality govern belief, for ex-
ample, and through belief ’s control of action, influence rational
choices. In particular, precedence shapes rational beliefs in ways
that sustain conventions of coordination. Similarly, principles of
rationality regulate an agent’s circumstances in Colman’s ideal ver-
sion of Hi-Lo so that utility maximization leads to the superior
form of coordination.
In Hi-Lo, the players’ evidence about each other influences
their beliefs about the strategies they will adopt. As Colman de-
scribes the players, each chooses H only if the other does, and nei-
ther gets the ball rolling. However, a rational agent who foresees
the possibility of playing Hi-Lo prepares for the game. He incul-
cates a disposition to choose H and lets others know about his dis-
position. Although he cannot influence his counterpart’s strategy
during the game, prior to the game he sets the stage for an opti-
mal outcome. When he enters the game, he has already influenced
his counterpart’s beliefs about his choice. Knowing about the dis-
position he has acquired, his counterpart believes he will choose
H and so maximizes utility by choosing H also.
Acquiring the disposition to choose H is rational. It leads to the
superior form of coordination. Choosing H is rational also. It max-
imizes utility given the belief that one’s counterpart will choose H.
Both agents in Hi-Lo may rationally acquire the disposition and
make the choice. Neither one’s rational steps undercut the reasons
for the other’s.
When communication is possible, the goal of optimization re-
quires an agent in Hi-Lo to plump for H and advertise his choice.
Plumping for H is rational because it elicits H from his counter-
part. Acquiring a disposition to pick H is rational for the same rea-
son when communication is not possible. Having a disposition to
pick H elicits H from one’s counterpart. It does not matter that the
disposition has bad consequences if one’s counterpart were to
choose L. That possibility is not realized. The disposition is ratio-
nal because of its good consequences, even if it entails a disposi-
tion to make an irrational choice in a counterfactual situation.
When one has an opportunity to prepare for Hi-Lo, it is ratio-
nal to put oneself into a decision situation such that a strategy of
maximum utility has a utility at least as great as a strategy of max-
imum utility in any other decision situation into which one might
put oneself. Rational decision preparation yields a decision prob-
lem in which rationality prospers.
A rational agent providently handles events prior to a game. She
prepares for the game in ways that improve its likely outcome.
Cultivating dispositions to choose certain ways is sensible prepa-
ration for coordination problems. Enriching an account of ratio-
nality to cover such preparation helps explain successful coordi-
nation without drastic revision of the principles for reasoning in
games.
Author’s Response
Beyond rationality: Rigor without mortis in
game theory
Andrew M. Colman
School of Psychology, University of Leicester, Leicester LE1 7RH, United
Kingdom. amc@le.ac.uk www.le.ac.uk/home/amc
Abstract: Psychological game theory encompasses formal theo-
ries designed to remedy game-theoretic indeterminacy and to
predict strategic interaction more accurately. Its theoretical plu-
rality entails second-order indeterminacy, but this seems un-
avoidable. Orthodox game theory cannot solve payoff-dominance
problems, and remedies based on interval-valued beliefs or pay-
off transformations are inadequate. Evolutionary game theory ap-
plies only to repeated interactions, and behavioral ecology is pow-
erless to explain cooperation between genetically unrelated
strangers in isolated interactions. Punishment of defectors eluci-
dates cooperation in social dilemmas but leaves punishing behav-
ior unexplained. Team reasoning solves problems of coordination
and cooperation, but aggregation of individual preferences is prob-
lematic.
R1. Introductory remarks
I am grateful to commentators for their thoughtful and of-
ten challenging contributions to this debate. The commen-
taries come from eight different countries and an unusually
wide range of disciplines, including psychology, economics,
philosophy, biology, psychiatry, anthropology, and mathe-
matics. The interdisciplinary character of game theory and
experimental games is illustrated in Lazarus’s tabulation of
more than a dozen disciplines studying cooperation. The
richness and fertility of game theory and experimental
games owe much to the diversity of disciplines that have
contributed to their development from their earliest days.
The primary goal of the target article is to argue that the
standard interpretation of instrumental rationality as ex-
pected utility maximization generates problems and anom-
alies when applied to interactive decisions and fails to ex-
plain certain empirical evidence. A secondary goal is to
outline some examples of psychological game theory, de-
signed to solve these problems. Camerer suggests that
psychological and behavioral game theory are virtually syn-
onymous, and I agree that there is no pressing need to dis-
tinguish them. The examples of psychological game theory
discussed in the target article use formal methods to model
reasoning processes in order to explain powerful intuitions
and empirical observations that orthodox theory fails to ex-
plain. The general aim is to broaden the scope and increase
the explanatory power of game theory, retaining its rigor
without being bound by its specific assumptions and con-
straints.
Rationality demands different standards in different do-
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mains. For example, criteria for evaluating formal argu-
ments and empirical evidence are different from standards
of rational decision making (Manktelow & Over 1993; No-
zick 1993). For rational decision making, expected utility
maximization is an appealing principle but, even when it is
combined with consistency requirements, it does not ap-
pear to provide complete and intuitively convincing pre-
scriptions for rational conduct in all situations of strategic
interdependence. This means that we must either accept
that rationality is radically and permanently limited and rid-
dled with holes, or try to plug the holes by discovering and
testing novel principles.
In everyday life, and in experimental laboratories, when
orthodox game theory offers no prescriptions for choice,
people do not become transfixed like Buridan’s ass. There
are even circumstances in which people reliably solve prob-
lems of coordination and cooperation that are insoluble
with the tools of orthodox game theory. From this we may
infer that strategic interaction is governed by psychological
game-theoretic principles that we can, in principle, dis-
cover and understand. These principles need to be made
explicit and shown to meet minimal standards of coher-
ence, both internally and in relation to other plausible stan-
dards of rational behavior. Wherever possible, we should
test them experimentally.
In the paragraphs that follow, I focus chiefly on the most
challenging and critical issues raised by commentators. I
scrutinize the logic behind several attempts to show that the
problems discussed in the target article are spurious or that
they can be solved within the orthodox theoretical frame-
work, and I accept criticisms that appear to be valid. The
commentaries also contain many supportive and elabora-
tive observations that speak for themselves and indicate
broad agreement with many of the ideas expressed in the
target article.
R2. Interval-valued rational beliefs
I am grateful to Hausman for introducing the important is-
sue of rational beliefs into the debate. He argues that games
can be satisfactorily understood without any new interpre-
tation of rationality, and that the anomalies and problems
that arise in interactive decisions can be eliminated by re-
quiring players not only to choose rational strategies but
also to hold rational beliefs. The only requirement is that
subjective probabilities “must conform to the calculus of
probabilities.”
Rational beliefs play an important role in Bayesian deci-
sion theory. Kreps and Wilson (1982b) incorporated them
into a refinement of Nash equilibrium that they called per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium, defining game-theoretic equi-
librium for the first time in terms of strategies and beliefs.
In perfect Bayesian equilibrium, strategies are best replies
to one another, as in standard Nash equilibrium, and beliefs
are sequentially rational in the sense of specifying actions
that are optimal for the players, given those beliefs. Kreps
and Wilson defined these notions precisely using the con-
ceptual apparatus of Bayesian decision theory, including
belief updating according to Bayes’ rule. These ideas pre-
pared the ground for theories of rationalizability (Bern-
heim 1984; Pearce 1984), discussed briefly in section 6.5 of
the target article, and the psychological games of Geanako-
plos et al. (1989), to which I shall return in section R7 be-
low.
Hausman invokes rational beliefs in a plausible – though
I believe ultimately unsuccessful – attempt to solve the pay-
off-dominance problem illustrated in the Hi-Lo Matching
game (Fig. 2 in the target article). He acknowledges that a
player cannot justify choosing H by assigning particular
probabilities to the co-player’s actions, because this leads to
a contradiction (as explained in sect. 5.6 of the target arti-
cle).1 He therefore offers the following suggestion: “If one
does not require that the players have point priors, then
Player I can believe that the probability that Player II will
play H is not less than one-half, and also believe that Player
II believes the same of Player I. Player I can then reason
that Player II will definitely play H, update his or her sub-
jective probability accordingly, and play H.”
This involves the use of interval-valued (or set-valued)
probabilities, tending to undermine Hausman’s claim that
it “does not need a new theory of rationality.” Interval-val-
ued probabilities have been axiomatized and studied (Ky-
burg 1987; Levi 1986; Snow 1994; Walley 1991), but they
are problematic, partly because stochastic independence,
on which the whole edifice of probability theory is built,
cannot be satisfactorily defined for them, and partly be-
cause technical problems arise when Bayesian updating is
applied to interval-valued priors. Leaving these problems
aside, the proposed solution cleverly eliminates the contra-
diction that arises when a player starts by specifying a point
probability, such as one-half, that the co-player will choose
H, and ends up deducing that the probability is in fact unity.
Because “not less than one-half” includes both one-half and
unity, the initial belief is not contradicted but merely re-
fined from a vague belief to a certainty.
This is not strictly Bayesian updating, because it is driv-
en by deduction rather than empirical data, but it is unnec-
essary to pursue that problem. More importantly, what rea-
son does a player have for believing that the probability is
not less than one-half that the co-player will choose H? The
HH equilibrium is highly salient by virtue of being payoff-
dominant, but Gilbert (1989b) showed that this does not
imply that we should expect our co-players to choose H, be-
cause mere salience does not provide rational agents with a
reason for action (see sect. 5.5 of the target article). As far
as I know, this important conclusion has never been chal-
lenged.
The proposed solution begins to look less persuasive
when we realize that there are other interval-valued beliefs
that do the trick equally well. If each player believes that
the probability is not less than three-quarters that the co-
player will play H, then once again these beliefs can be re-
fined, without contradiction, into certainties. This suggests
that not less than one-half is an arbitrary choice from an in-
finite set of interval-valued priors.
In fact, Hausman need not have handicapped himself
with his controversial and decidedly nonstandard interval-
valued probabilities. He could merely have required each
player to believe from the start, with certainty, that the co-
player will choose H. That, too, would have escaped the
contradiction, but it would also have exposed a question-
begging feature of the solution.
This leads me to the most serious objection, namely, that
the proposed solution does not actually deliver the intu-
itively obvious payoff-dominant solution. It gives no obvi-
ous reason why we should not require each player to believe
that the probability is not less than one-half that the co-
player will choose L. If these beliefs are refined into cer-
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tainties, then the players choose the Pareto-inefficient LL
equilibrium. In other words, a belief that the co-player will
choose L becomes self-confirming provided only that both
players adopt it, in exactly the same way that a belief that
the co-player will choose H does, although these two beliefs
are mutually exclusive. This is a variation of a well-known
problem in rational expectations theory (Elster 1989,
pp. 13–15).
The point of section 5.6 of the target article is to argue
that orthodox game theory fails to justify or explain the in-
tuitively obvious payoff-dominant HH solution. Haus-
man’s suggestion falls short of being a complete solution
because of technical problems with interval-valued beliefs,
and because it seems, on examination, to have other short-
comings. Nevertheless, it is the most resourceful and chal-
lenging attempt among all the commentaries to solve a
problem discussed in the target article without recourse to
psychological game theory.
R2.1. Are social dilemmas paradoxical?
I feel impelled to comment on the following assertion by
Hausman about the single-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game
(PDG) shown in Figure 4 of the target article: “Although
rationality is indeed collectively self-defeating in a PDG,
there is no paradox or problem with the theory of rational-
ity” (emphasis in original). It was Parfit (1979) who first de-
scribed rationality as self-defeating in the PDG. It is true
that he claimed it to be collectively and not individually self-
defeating, but he did not mean to imply that it embodied
no paradox or problem of rationality. If both players choose
strategically dominant and hence rational D strategies, then
the collective payoff to the pair (the sum of their individual
payoffs) is less than if they both choose cooperative C
strategies. If the dilemma amounted to nothing more than
that, then I would agree that “there is no paradox or prob-
lem.”
But the PDG places a player in a far deeper and more
frustrating quandary. Each player receives a better individ-
ual payoff from choosing D than from choosing C, whatever
the co-player chooses, yet if both players choose D, then
each receives a worse individual payoff than if both choose
C. That is what makes the PDG paradoxical and causes ra-
tionality to be self-defeating. I discuss this in section 6.5 of
the target article and point out in sections 6.9 and 6.11 that
the same paradox haunts players in multi-player social
dilemmas.
I am not even sure that it is right to describe rationality
in the PDG as collectively but not individually self-defeat-
ing. As Krueger reminds us, the logician Lewis claimed
that the PDG and Newcomb’s problem2 are logically equiv-
alent. Lewis (1979) was quite emphatic:
Considered as puzzles about rationality, or disagreements be-
tween two conceptions thereof, they are one and the same
problem. Prisoner’s Dilemma is Newcomb’s problem – or
rather, two Newcomb’s problems side by side, one per prisoner.
(p. 235, emphasis in original)
This turned out to be controversial (Campbell & Sowden
1985, Part IV), and Krueger’s own comments show rather
effectively that the correspondence is far from clear, but
everyone agrees that the two problems are at least closely
related. Nevertheless, in Newcomb’s problem there is only
one decision maker, and choosing the dominant (two-box)
strategy must therefore be individually self-defeating in
that case.
What is a paradox? The word comes from the Greek
paradoxos, meaning beyond (para) belief (doxa). Quine
(1962) defined it as an apparently valid argument yielding
either a contradiction or a prima facie absurdity. He pro-
posed a threefold classification into veridical paradoxes,
whose conclusions are true; falsidical paradoxes, whose
conclusions are false; and antinomies, whose conclusions
are mutually contradictory. The PDG is obviously a veridi-
cal paradox, because what we can deduce about it is true
but prima facie absurd. A classic example of a veridical
paradox is Hempel’s paradox,3 and the PDG seems para-
doxical in the same sense. Newcomb’s problem, which is
logically equivalent or at least closely related to the PDG,
is indubitably paradoxical.
R3. Payoff-transformational approaches
Van Lange & Gallucci are clearly underwhelmed by the
solutions outlined in the target article. They “do not think
that these extensions make a very novel contribution to ex-
isting social psychological theory.” Social psychology is no-
toriously faddish, but surely what is important is how well
the extensions solve the problems in hand, not how novel
they are. They should be judged against competing theo-
ries, and Van Lange & Gallucci helpfully spell out their pre-
ferred solution to one of the key problems. They tackle the
payoff-dominance problem, arguing that interdependence
theory, with its payoff transformations, provides a complete
solution. If they are right, then this simple solution has been
overlooked by generations of game theorists, and by the
other commentators on the target article; but I believe that
they misunderstand the problem.
Van Lange & Gallucci’s discussion focuses on the Hi-
Lo Matching game shown in Figure 2 of the target article.
They assert that maximization of individual payoffs (indi-
vidualism), joint payoffs (cooperation), and co-player’s pay-
offs (altruism) all lead to successful coordination on the
payoff-dominant HH equilibrium (I have substituted the
usual term “payoffs” where they write “outcomes,” because
an outcome is merely a profile of strategies). They then
claim: “Given that cooperation and individualism are preva-
lent orientations, . . . the transformational analysis indicates
that most people will be oriented toward matching H (fol-
lowed by matching L)” (here I have corrected a slip in the
labeling of strategies, replacing Heads and Tails with H and
L). They believe that this “may very well account for the fact
that people tend to be fairly good at coordinating in the Hi-
Lo Matching game.”
The individualism transformation is no transformation at
all: it is simply maximization of individual payoffs. With the
specified payoffs, the players have no reason to choose H
(see sect. 5.6 of the target article). The cooperation trans-
formation fails for the same reason, merely producing the
bloated Hi-Lo Matching game shown in Figure 6. Although
I do not discuss the altruism transformation in the target ar-
ticle, it fares no better. A simple proof is given in an end-
note.4
Van Lange & Gallucci labor to show that the players
prefer the HH outcome in the Hi-Lo Matching game un-
der certain payoff transformations. But we do not need pay-
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off transformations to tell us that – it is obvious by inspec-
tion of Figure 2. The problem is that, in spite of their obvi-
ous preference for HH, the players have no reason to choose
the strategy H. “Wishes can never fill a sack,” according to
an Italian proverb, and that is why Harsanyi and Selten
(1988) had to introduce the payoff-dominance principle as
an axiom in their equilibrium selection theory. We need to
explain how human players solve such games with ease. The
fact that “people will be oriented toward matching H” does
not magically entail that this “may very well account for the
fact that people tend to be fairly good at coordinating in the
Hi-Lo Matching game.”
Other commentators remark that individual preferences
do not automatically guarantee coordination on payoff-
dominant outcomes. For example, Hurley comments: “In
Hi-Lo, individuals have the same goals, yet individual ra-
tionality fails to guarantee them the best available out-
come.” As Haller puts it: “principles other than individual
rationality have to be invoked for equilibrium selection.”
Barclay & Daly share the opinion of Van Lange &
Gallucci that “tinkering with utility functions” is all that is
needed to solve the game, but they do not attempt to show
how this can be done, so there can be no reasoned reply.
Payoff transformations are potentially useful for psycholog-
ical game theory, notably in Rabin’s (1993) “fairness equi-
libria,” discussed by Carpenter & Matthews, Camerer,
and Haller (in passing), but they cannot solve the payoff-
dominance problem, although it would be pleasant indeed
if such a simple solution were at hand.
Team reasoning and Stackelberg reasoning, the two sug-
gestions in the target article, both solve the problem but re-
quire nonstandard auxiliary assumptions. Alvard reminds
us that cultural mechanisms solve cooperative problems so
transparently that many do not recognize them as solutions
at all. This brings to mind Heider’s (1958) comment: “The
veil of obviousness that makes so many insights of intuitive
psychology invisible to our scientific eye has to be pierced”
(p. 322).
R4. Is rationality dead?
Writing from the standpoint of evolutionary game theory
(see sect. R5 below), Sigmund puts forward the radically
dismissive view that rationality is dead: “The assumption
that human behavior is rational died a long time ago. . . .
The hypothesis that humans act rationally has been empir-
ically refuted. . . . Even the term ‘bounded rationality’
seems ill-advised.” Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), in true
evolutionary spirit, explained the development of their view
of rationality in their superb monograph on evolutionary
games:
The fictitious species of rational players reached a slippery
slope when the so-called “trembling hand” doctrine became
common practice among game theorists . . . and once the word
of “bounded rationality” went the round, the mystique of ratio-
nality collapsed. (p. xiv)
This invites the following question. Does Sigmund ex-
pect his readers to be persuaded that rationality is dead? If
he rejects rationality in all its forms, then he can hardly
claim that his own opinions are rationally based, and there
is consequently no obvious reason why we should be per-
suaded by them. By his own account, his comments must
have arisen from a mindless evolutionary process unrelated
to truth. This view cannot be taken seriously, and it is de-
batable – though I shall resist the temptation to debate it –
whether it is even possible for Sigmund to believe it.
It seems clear to me that people are instrumentally ra-
tional in the broad sense explained in section 2 of the tar-
get article. Rapoport agrees, and so do other commenta-
tors, explicitly and implicitly. All that this means is that
human behavior is generally purposive or goal-directed. To
deny this would be to deny that entrepreneurs try to gen-
erate profits; that election candidates try to maximize votes;
that professional tennis players try to win matches; and that
Al-Qaeda terrorists try to further their ideological goals. To
deny human instrumental rationality is to deny that such ac-
tivities are purposive.
The assumption of instrumental rationality has a privi-
leged status because of its neutrality toward the ends that
people seek. Whether people are motivated by a desire for
money, status, spiritual fulfillment, altruistic or competitive
objectives, devotion to family, vocation, or country, they are
rational to the extent that they choose appropriate actions
to promote their desires. Barclay & Daly appear to over-
look this when they argue in favor of rejecting rationality
even as a default assumption. They suggest that people may
be driven by motives such as “concern for the welfare of
others,” and that this leads to decisions that are “not in ac-
cordance with predictions of RCT [rational choice theory].”
But in RCT and game theory such motives are assumed to
be fully reflected in the players’ utility functions. Rational-
ity is interpreted as behavior that optimally fulfils an agent’s
desires, whatever these may be.
We have to treat other people as broadly rational, for if
they were not, then their reactions would be haphazard and
unpredictable. We assume by default that others are ratio-
nal. The following Gedankenexperiment illustrates this
nicely (cf. Elster 1989, p. 28). Imagine a person who
claimed to prefer A to B but then deliberately chose B when
A was also available. We would not, in the absence of spe-
cial circumstances, infer that the choice was irrational. We
would normally infer that the person did not really prefer
A, or perhaps that the choice of B was a slip or an error. This
shows rather effectively that rationality is our default as-
sumption about other people’s behavior.
There are certainly circumstances in which people be-
have irrationally. Introspection, anecdotal evidence, and
empirical research all contribute clear examples. I find the
following introspective example, originally formulated by
Sen (1985) and mentioned in Rapoport’s commentary, es-
pecially persuasive. A family doctor in a remote village has
two patients, S and T, both critically ill with the same dis-
ease. A certain drug gives excellent results against the dis-
ease, but only one dose is available. The probability of suc-
cess is 90 per cent for Patient S and 95 per cent for Patient
T. To maximize expected utility (EU), the doctor should ad-
minister it to T. But there are many doctors who would pre-
fer to toss a coin, to give S and T equal chances of receiving
the drug, although this mixed strategy yields a lower EU. It
is difficult not to empathize with a doctor who is reluctant
to “play God” in this situation, although tossing a coin obvi-
ously violates the axioms of instrumental rationality.
Anecdotal examples abound. Behavior that ignores fu-
ture consequences, such as the actions of a person de-
scending into drug addiction, are obviously irrational. Em-
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pirical research has focused on anomalies such as the Allais
and Ellsberg paradoxes (see, e.g., Dawes 1988, Ch. 8). Each
of these involves a pair of intuitively compelling choices that
can be shown to be jointly incompatible with the axioms of
expected utility theory. In addition, a great deal of empiri-
cal research has been devoted to heuristics and biases that
deviate from rationality (Bell et al. 1988; Kahneman et al.
1982; Kahneman & Tversky 2000). When violations are
pointed out to decision makers, they tend to adjust their be-
havior into line with rational principles, suggesting that
people’s choices are sometimes in conflict with their own
normative intuitions (Tversky 1996). But what attracts at-
tention to all these phenomena is precisely that they are de-
viations from rational behavior.
People evidently take no pride in their occasional or fre-
quent lapses from rationality (Føllesdal 1982; Tversky
1996). Anecdotal and experimental evidence of irrational-
ity does not alter the fact that people are generally rational.
The fact that birds and bats and jumbo jets fly does not 
refute Newton’s universal law of gravitation. By the same
token, the fact that human decision makers deviate from ra-
tionality in certain situations does not refute the funda-
mental assumption of instrumental rationality.
Less often discussed than bounded rationality and irra-
tionality is the fact that people are sometimes even more ra-
tional than orthodox game theory allows. In section 5 of the
target article, I show that players frequently succeed in co-
ordinating, to their mutual advantage, where game theory
fails. In section 6, I show that players frequently cooperate
in social dilemmas, thereby earning higher payoffs than
conventionally rational players. In section 7, I show that
players frequently ignore the logic of backward induction in
sequential games, thereby outscoring players who follow
game theory. These examples suggest that human players
are, on occasion, super-rational inasmuch as they are even
more successful at maximizing their expected utilities than
orthodox game theory allows.
R5. Evolutionary games
I discuss evolutionary game theory briefly in section 1.3 of
the target article, but several commentators (Alvard, Bar-
clay & Daly, Butler, Casebeer & Parco, Sigmund, and
Steer & Cuthill) take me to task for assigning too little im-
portance to evolutionary and adaptive mechanisms. Evolu-
tionary approaches are certainly fashionable, and I believe
that they have much to offer. I have contributed modestly
to the literature on evolutionary games myself. However,
because the target article was devoted to examining ratio-
nality in strategic interaction, evolutionary games are only
obliquely relevant.
Sigmund traces the origin of the evolutionary approach
to a passage in John Nash’s Ph.D. thesis. The passage is
missing from the article that emerged from the thesis (Nash
1951), but the thesis has now been published in facsimile
(Nash 2002), and my reading of the key passage suggests
that Nash interpreted his computational approach as a
method of approximating rational solutions by simulation,
analogous to the Newton-Raphson iterative method for
solving equations. He imagined a game repeated many
times by players who “accumulate empirical information on
the relative advantage of the various pure strategies at their
disposal” (Nash 2002, p. 78) and choose best replies to the
co-players’ strategies. He showed how this adaptive learn-
ing mechanism causes the strategies to converge toward an
equilibrium point.
Contemporary evolutionary game models, whether they
involve adaptive learning processes (à la Nash) or replica-
tor dynamics, are designed to explore the behavior of goal-
directed automata. Either the automata adjust their strate-
gies in response to the payoffs they receive in simulated
interactions, or their relative frequencies in the population
change in response to payoffs. In either case they are pro-
grammed to maximize payoffs, and in that limited sense
they are instrumentally rational, even though their behav-
ior is generated without conscious thought or deliberate
choice, as Barclay & Daly and Steer & Cuthill correctly
point out. One of the pioneers of genetic algorithms has
gone so far as to claim that evolutionary models can be used
“to explore the extent to which we can capture human ra-
tionality, both its limitations and its inductive capacities, in
computationally defined adaptive agents” (Holland 1996,
p. 281).
Gintis makes the important point that evolutionary game
theory cannot solve all the problems of orthodox game the-
ory, because it is relevant only to large populations and re-
peated interactions. It cannot solve the problems that arise
in isolated interactions.
Indeed, evolutionary or adaptive mechanisms are a far
cry from rational choice. Human decision makers can and
do anticipate the future consequences of their actions,
whereas genetic and other evolutionary algorithms are
backward-looking, their actions being determined exclu-
sively by past payoffs (plus a little randomness in stochastic
models). They function by unthinking evolution, learning,
and adaptation. This is not intended as a criticism – back-
ward-looking nostalgia may not be as limiting as it appears
to be. It is worth recalling that the behaviorist school of psy-
chology also explained human and animal behavior by a
backward-looking and unthinking adaptive mechanism,
namely, reinforcement. Behaviorism had a dominant influ-
ence on psychology throughout the 1940s and 1950s and re-
mains influential even today.
R5.1. Learning effects
Casebeer & Parco claim that an experiment on three-
player Centipede games by Parco et al. (2002) directly con-
tradicts both psychological and traditional game theory.
Parco et al. found that play converged toward equilibrium
over 60 repetitions of the game, especially when very large
monetary incentives were assigned to the payoffs. These in-
teresting learning and incentive effects contradict neither
traditional game theory nor the nonstandard approaches
that I tentatively discuss in section 8.4 of the target article,
namely, epistemic and non-monotonic reasoning. They sug-
gest to me that players gradually learn to understand back-
ward induction, through the course of repetitions of the
rather complex game, especially when much is at stake.
Convergence toward equilibrium is characteristic of iter-
ated games in general.
I agree with Kokinov that strategic decisions are often
made by analogy with previous experiences and, in partic-
ular, that there are circumstances in which people tend to
repeat strategies that were successful in the past and to
avoid strategies that were unsuccessful. This is most likely
to occur in repeated games of incomplete information, in
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which players do not have enough information to select
strategies by reasoning about the game. The most common
form of incomplete information is uncertainty about the co-
players’ payoff functions. The mechanism that Kokinov
proposes is an analogical version of a strategy for repeated
games variously called win-stay, lose-change (Kelley et al.
1962); simpleton (Rapoport & Chammah 1965, pp. 73–74);
or Pavlov (Kraines & Kraines 1995), and it is remarkably ef-
fective in some circumstances.
R6. Behavioral ecology
Turning now to behavioral ecology, I agree with Alvard,
Butler, and Lazarus that human beings and their cogni-
tive apparatus are products of natural selection, and that
evolution may help to explain some of the problems dis-
cussed in the target article, although it may be over-ambi-
tious to suggest, as Alvard does, that “many of the ad hoc
principles of psychological game theory introduced at the
end of the target article might be deductively generated
from the principles of evolutionary theory.”
Steer & Cuthill advocate a radically evolutionary inter-
pretation. They believe that our most rational decisions are
those that maximize Darwinian fitness – that is, our lifetime
reproductive success, or the number of offspring that we
produce. That is how rationality is implicitly defined in evo-
lutionary game theory (see sect. R5 above), and in that con-
text the interpretation works well enough. But maximizing
offspring cannot be taken as the ultimate underlying motive
of all human behavior, because it simply does not fit the
facts. Most purposive actions are driven by motives far re-
moved from reproduction, and there are common forms of
purposive behavior, such as contraception and elective ster-
ilization, that clearly diminish Darwinian fitness.
Butler identifies the most prominent biological theories
that help to explain cooperation in social dilemmas (see
sect. 7 of the target article). (1) Kin selection (Hamilton
1964) involves cooperation with close relatives, sacrificing
individual payoffs in order to maximize the total number of
one’s genes that are passed on. (2) Reciprocal altruism
(Trivers 1971) may occur when selfish motives exist for co-
operating in long-term relationships. (3) Indirect reciproc-
ity (Alexander 1987) operates in established groups when
an individual can benefit in the long run by establishing a
reputation for cooperativeness.
These three theories certainly help to explain why coop-
eration occurs in certain circumstances – Hancock & De-
Bruine discuss some interesting and relevant evidence
from research into facial resemblance in games – but it
seems clear that they cannot provide a complete answer.
None of them can explain why cooperation occurs among
genetically unrelated strangers in isolated interactions lack-
ing opportunities for reputation-building. Yet we know that
it does, in many cases.
A further suggestion of Butler’s escapes this criticism.
He quotes from Price et al. (2002): “punitive sentiments in
collective action contexts have evolved to reverse the fitness
advantages that accrue to free riders over producers.” It 
is not unusual for people who take advantage of the coop-
eration or generosity of others to find themselves socially
ostracized or worse. There is now powerful experimental
evidence that this tends to promote and maintain coopera-
tion. Fehr and Gächter (2002) studied altruistic punish-
ment of defectors, costly to those who administer it, in pub-
lic goods dilemmas. They found that cooperation flourishes
when punishment is possible and tends to break down when
it is not.
Gintis also mentions punishment as a possible explana-
tory mechanism, and Barclay & Daly agree with the sug-
gestion of Price et al. (2002) that a propensity to punish de-
fectors may have evolved. Can punishment of defectors
explain cooperation in social dilemmas?
Punishment is invariably costly to those who administer
it, and hence, is altruistic, because it takes time and energy
and invites retaliation. Therefore, natural selection should
tend to eliminate it. If the theory is to work, then we must
assume that failure to punish defectors is treated as free-
riding and hence as a form of second-degree defection that
is itself subject to sanctions from other group members. But
that raises the question of sanctions against third-degree
defectors, who neglect to punish second-degree defectors,
and so on, leading to an infinite regress that collapses un-
der its own weight. Juvenal’s Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
(Who is to guard the guards themselves?) was never more
pertinent. Altruistic punishment seems to be a fact of life,
but it does not explain cooperation. It replaces the problem
of explaining cooperation with that of explaining punish-
ment of defectors.
Lazarus makes several useful suggestions for interdisci-
plinary research on strategic interaction. I am less sure
about the relevance of functional brain imaging, discussed
by Berns and more briefly by Butler. This research is in-
triguing, and useful discoveries are being made, but it is
hard to believe that brain imaging “will help resolve the ap-
parent paradoxes.” By way of analogy, consider the current
debate in the field of artificial intelligence about the “strong
AI” proposition that a computer capable of passing the Tur-
ing test – by responding to inputs in a manner indistin-
guishable from a human being – would necessarily have a
mind and be capable of thought. No one believes that
studying the electronic circuitry of computers will help to
resolve this problem, and for analogous reasons I doubt that
functional brain imaging can help resolve the conceptual
problems associated with strategic interaction.
R6.1. Does unselfishness explain cooperation in social
dilemmas?
I agree with Fantino & Stolarz-Fantino that people are
taught from an early age to be unselfish and cooperative,
that such behavior tends to be rewarded throughout life,
and that unselfish and cooperative behavior is often recip-
rocated. However, it is important to point out that, in or-
thodox game theory, unselfish motives cannot explain co-
operation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG) and
other social dilemmas. At best, unselfish motives might ex-
plain cooperation in experimental games in which the pay-
offs presented to the players correspond to social dilemmas
but the players’ utility functions include cooperative or al-
truistic motives that transform them into other games in
which cooperation is an unconditionally best strategy. In
any experimental game in which this occurs, the players are
not playing a social dilemma: extraneous sources of utility
have transformed the game into something else.
Rescher (1975) mounted the most strenuous and sus-
tained attempt to solve the paradox of the PDG along these
lines, by appealing to unselfish motives and values. He
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claimed that “the PDG presents a problem for the conven-
tional view of rationality only when we have been dra-
gooned into assuming the stance of the theory of games it-
self” (p. 34). Disdainfully placing “dilemma” in quotation
marks, Rescher argued that
the parties were entrapped in the “dilemma” because they did
not internalize the welfare of their fellows sufficiently. If they
do this, and do so in sufficient degree, they can escape the
dilemmatic situation. (p. 48)
This argument collapses as soon as it is pointed out that the
players’ utilities represented in the payoff matrix are not
based on a disregard of each other’s interests. On the con-
trary, they are assumed to reflect the players’ preferences,
taking fully into account their motives, values, tastes, con-
sciences, and moral principles, including any concerns they
may have for the welfare of others. Hancock & DeBru-
ine’s comment that “non-economic factors influence be-
havior” is obviously right, provided that economic factors
are sufficiently narrowly defined. Further, the evidence
that they cite for the effects of personal attractiveness on
behavior in the Ultimatum game (see also sect. R7 below)
is interesting and instructive, but it is important to remem-
ber that utility theory and game theory are entirely neutral
with regard to the sources and nature of players’ utilities.
Rescher (1975) treated the numbers in the payoff matrix
as “‘raw,’ first-order utilities” and then transformed them
into “‘cooked,’ other-considering, second-order ones” (p. 46)
in order to demonstrate how to neutralize the dilemma of
the PDG, overlooking the fact that the payoff matrix actu-
ally dishes up pre-cooked utilities in the first place. Fur-
thermore, there is no guarantee that cooking raw utilities
would invariably neutralize the dilemma. In some games,
the payoffs may represent a social dilemma only after un-
selfish motives and values are factored in. As Camerer
points out, in experimental games, the best we can do is 
to measure monetary payoffs, but the underlying theory
applies to von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, and these
are certainly assumed to include non-monetary compo-
nents.
Edgeworth’s (1881) famous dictum that “the first princi-
ple of economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-
interest” (p. 16) is trivially – in fact, tautologically – true in
modern utility theory. Rational agents try to maximize their
expected utilities whenever they are free to choose, and this
must be so because their utility functions are defined by
their choices. An agent’s utility function may nevertheless
include concern for the welfare of others, and I believe that,
for most non-psychopaths, it does. That, at least, is the stan-
dard theory. Whether players’ preferences can invariably be
represented by static utilities is a moot point – see my com-
ments on team reasoning in section 8.1 of the target article
and my outline of the psychological games of Geanakoplos
et al. (1989) in section R7 immediately below.
R7. Psychological games and sequential
rationality
Carpenter & Matthews are right to point out that the ear-
lier psychological games of Geanakoplos et al. (1989), and
theories descended from their work, offer persuasive an-
swers to some of the problems that I discuss. One of the ref-
erees of the target article drew my attention to this earlier
work, and I was able to insert a brief mention of it in the 
final version. I agree that it is highly relevant, and that Gea-
nakoplos et al. were the first to use the term psychological
games, though apparently not psychological game theory.
In the theory of Geanakoplos et al. (1989), players’ pref-
erences depend not only on the outcomes of a game but also
on their beliefs – the arguments of players’ utility functions
include both outcomes and expectations. The theory mod-
els intuitively plausible emotional aspects of strategic inter-
actions, such as surprise, pride, anger, and revenge. Gea-
nakoplos et al. argue persuasively that these factors cannot
in general be adequately represented in conventional util-
ity functions. This subverts the orthodox game-theoretic
view, defended by Barclay & Daly, that relevant psycho-
logical factors can always be represented in the payoff func-
tions.
To illustrate the basic idea, a simple psychological game
can be constructed from the Ultimatum game, which was
mentioned by several commentators. In the Ultimatum
game, a monetary prize of $100 (for example) is divided be-
tween Player I and Player II as follows. Player I makes a sin-
gle take-it-or-leave-it proposal for a division of the prize,
Player II either accepts or rejects it, and neither player re-
ceives anything if the proposal is rejected. From a game-
theoretic point of view, Player I should offer Player II one
penny, and Player II should accept it, because a penny is
better than nothing. Numerous experiments have shown
that human players deviate sharply from game theory:
Player I usually offers much more than one penny – often
a 50–50 split – and Player II usually rejects any offer
smaller than about one-quarter of the prize value.
Suppose Player I proposes the following split: $99 for
Player I and $1 for Player II. A Player II who is resigned to
Player I taking the lion’s share of the prize may follow or-
thodox game theory and accept the offer, preferring $1 to
nothing. But a Player I who expects a 50–50 offer may be
sufficiently proud or angry to reject the proposal, leaving
both players with nothing – emotions aroused by the in-
equity of the proposal may outweigh the $1. Intuitively, this
outcome is a second credible equilibrium, and in the the-
ory of Geanakoplos et al. (1989), it emerges as a psycholog-
ical Nash equilibrium. The particular payoffs, and hence
the equilibrium that is likely to be chosen, depend on Player
II’s expectations.
Carpenter & Matthews do a superb job of tracing the
development of these intriguing ideas through the work of
Rabin (1993) and others. These are among the most excit-
ing recent developments in game theory, at least from a
psychological viewpoint. They help to explain several puz-
zling phenomena, including cooperation in social dilem-
mas.
This leads Carpenter & Matthews to pose the follow-
ing reasonable question: “What observed behavior will the
‘new psychological game theory’ explain that an old(er) . . .
one cannot?” To this I reply that the theories discussed in
the target article already explain focusing in pure coordina-
tion games and selection of payoff-dominant equilibria.
They may ultimately help to explain cooperation in back-
ward-induction games such as the Centipede game. The
older theories have not, as far as I know, explained these
phenomena. Many other strategic phenomena that also re-
main unexplained by the older theories may yield to new
approaches in the future.5
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R8. Unit of rational agency
I am grateful to Hurley for drawing attention to the rele-
vance of Regan’s (1980) book on utilitarianism and cooper-
ation. Although Regan did not use the terminology of ra-
tional choice theory, he tackled problems closely linked to
those addressed in sections 5 and 6 of the target article. In
Chapters 2 and 7, he explained with painstaking thorough-
ness why individualistic payoff maximization, or what he
calls act utilitarianism, cannot solve the payoff-dominance
problem, and in later chapters he put forward and defended
a theory of cooperative utilitarianism that clearly antici-
pated team reasoning.
Some commentators are skeptical about the claim in sec-
tion 8.1 of the target article that team reasoning is inher-
ently non-individualistic. In particular, Barclay & Daly
“looked in vain for evidence or argument” to support this
contention. They claim that team reasoning involves noth-
ing more than “incorporating nonstandard preferences into
the decision makers’ utility functions.” I thought I had
shown in section 8.1 of the target article why this is not so,
but for those who remain unconvinced, Regan’s (1980)
book should eradicate any lingering smidgen of doubt.
A standard assumption of decision theory and game the-
ory is that the unit of rational agency is the individual. Hur-
ley rejects this assumption and argues that the dogma of in-
dividualism is ultimately responsible for the problems of
coordination and cooperation that I discuss. This may be so,
but I need to point out a non-trivial problem associated with
collective agency and related ideas, including (I regret)
team reasoning.
Hurley points out that collective agency does not neces-
sarily require collective preferences or collective utility: “As
an individual I can recognize that a wholly distinct agent can
produce results I prefer to any I could bring about, and that
my own acts would interfere [with this process].” But a col-
lective agent representing or implementing the prefer-
ences of several individuals needs a method of aggregating
their preferences into a unique choice of action or strategy.
The problem is that even if each individual has rational
preferences in the sense defined in section 2.1 of the target
article, a collective agent acting on their behalf cannot, in
general, choose rationally or make a reasonable decision.
Hurley understands that individual rationality can co-exist
with collective irrationality but does not follow the implica-
tions of this to its awkward conclusion.
Rationality tends to break down at the collective level be-
cause of Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow 1963). This
theorem establishes that there can be no rational collective
agency implementing the preferences of a group. Even if
the members of a group have rational individual prefer-
ences, there can in general be no non-dictatorial procedure
for aggregating these preferences to reach a decision with-
out violating minimal conditions of fairness and workable-
ness. Arrow proved that if a procedure meets three mild
and uncontroversial conditions, then it must be dictatorial.
A simple account is given in Colman (1995a, Ch. 10).
Arrow’s original proof relies on the profile of individual
preferences leading to Condorcet’s paradox of voting. The
simplest example is a group of three individuals judging
three options labeled x, y, and z. Suppose that one individ-
ual prefers x . y . z (strictly prefers x to y and y to z); a
second prefers y . z . x; and a third prefers z . x . y.
Then the group prefers x to y by a majority (because the
first and third voters prefer x to y), prefers y to z by a ma-
jority (because the first and second voters prefer y to z), and
prefers z to x by a majority (because the second and third
voters prefer z to x). These collective preferences violate
the axiom of transitivity mentioned in section 2.1 of the tar-
get article and are therefore irrational.
This means that if the unit of agency is the group, or even
an individual agent acting on behalf of the group, in the
manner of a trade union negotiator, then there is in general
no satisfactory procedure whereby the agent can choose ra-
tionally from the set of available options. This poses an in-
tractable problem for the notion of rational collective
agency whenever there are more than two individuals and
more than two options. Binary decisions escape this partic-
ular problem; Arrow’s theorem kicks in only when there are
three or more individuals and options.
In practice, of course, families, firms, organizations, and
other groups do sometimes act collectively, but such actions
cannot in general be instrumentally rational. Many organi-
zations are managed dictatorially. Arrow’s theorem shows
that those that are not are liable to encounter situations in
which they are doomed to act inconsistently or to find
themselves unable to act at all.
Hurley cites the slime mold as a biological example of
collective agency. There are other life forms that challenge
our usual conception of individuality. Earthworms can be
subdivided into two or more independently acting individ-
uals. Sea urchins do not have fully centralized nervous sys-
tems and cannot therefore act as individuals. Sponges have
no nervous systems at all and hence no individuality in the
sense that ordinary unicellular and multicellular organisms
are individuals.
In human beings, Hurley argues that the unit of agency
may sometimes be below the level of the individual. Mon-
terosso & Ainslie discuss how this might arise in in-
tertemporal choices, in which a person functions as two or
more agents with different preferences, as when a short-
term preference for eating an ice-cream conflicts with a
longer-term preference for slimming. I tend to agree that
there is nothing sacrosanct about the individual as the unit
of agency, but such subhuman agents (if they will forgive
me for calling them that) raise similar problems of consis-
tency and rationality to those outlined above.
People have non-rational ways of coping with problems
of self-control, including resolute choice (Machina 1991;
McClennen 1985, 1990) and various pre-commitment strat-
egies. A frequently quoted pre-commitment strategy from
Greek mythology is that of Ulysses, who had himself bound
to the mast of his ship in order to prevent himself from
yielding to the temptations of the Sirens when the time
came to sail near their island. Surprisingly, other animals
are also apparently capable of commitment and resolute
choice.6
R8.1. Is the payoff-dominance principle individually
rational?
Weirich provides a thoughtful and subtle analysis of the
payoff-dominance principle discussed in section 5.6 of the
target article. According to this principle, if one equilibrium
point payoff-dominates all others in a game, in the sense of
yielding every player a strictly higher payoff than any other
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equilibrium point, then rational players will play their parts
in it.
I argue in the target article that the payoff-dominance
principle cannot be derived from standard assumptions of
individual rationality alone. I discuss team reasoning and
Stackelberg reasoning as possible ways forward. Weirich
rejects these approaches on the grounds that “team rea-
soning conflicts with individualism, and Stackelberg rea-
soning conflicts with consequentialism.” He outlines how
the payoff-dominance principle might be based on as-
sumptions of individual rationality, suitably extended.
The payoff-dominance principle was originally intro-
duced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), hence it is worth
pointing out that they agree with me that the principle can-
not be based on individual rationality. This does not prove
me right, but it will make me feel better if I turn out to be
wrong. After discussing their subsidiary risk-dominance
principle, which is based in individual rationality, they write:
In contrast, payoff dominance is based on collective rationality:
it is based on the assumption that in the absence of special rea-
sons to the contrary, rational players will choose an equilibrium
point yielding all of them higher payoffs, rather than one yield-
ing them lower payoffs. That is to say, it is based on the as-
sumption that rational individuals will cooperate in pursuing
their common interests if the conditions permit them to do so.
(Harsanyi & Selten 1988, p. 356, emphasis in original)
The point is that, other things being equal, a player who
simply maximizes individual payoffs has no reason to pre-
fer a payoff-dominant equilibrium point. Thus, there seems
to be a hidden inconsistency between Weirich’s rejection
of team reasoning on the ground that it conflicts with indi-
vidualism, and his reliance on the payoff-dominance prin-
ciple.
The extensions to individual rationality that Weirich
puts forward to ground payoff dominance involve pre-play
communication, or what is often called cheap talk. For ex-
ample, he suggests that a rational player preparing to play
the Hi-Lo Matching game (shown in Fig. 2 of the target ar-
ticle) “inculcates a disposition to choose H and lets others
know about his disposition.”
The nature and function of the pre-play communication
is not specified sufficiently formally to be analyzed rigor-
ously, but this turns out be immaterial, because even if it
does indeed lead players to choose the payoff-dominant
equilibrium point, I believe that the solution can be shown
to be illusory. In particular, pre-play communication cannot
secure the foundations of the payoff-dominance principle.
A counterexample is Aumann’s version of the Stag Hunt
game, shown in Figure R1.
Note that this game is really a Hi-Lo Matching game with
extra bits and pieces in the cells off the main (top-left to bot-
tom-right) diagonal. As in the Hi-Lo Matching game, there
are two pure-strategy equilibrium points at CC and DD,
and the first payoff-dominates the second by a small mar-
gin. But for both players C is a much riskier choice than D,
because it entails the possibility of a zero payoff, whereas
the worst possible payoff from a D choice is 7. In other
words, the maximin strategy is D and the DD equilibrium
is risk-dominant, but both players strictly prefer CC.
According to Harsanyi and Selten (1988, pp. 358–59),
pre-play communication is useless in this game, because it
is in the individual interests of each player to encourage the
co-player to choose C, by pretending to have a “disposition”
to choose C and letting the co-player know this (to use
Weirich’s terminology), but then to play safe by choosing
D. It was this Stag Hunt game that persuaded Harsanyi and
Selten reluctantly to insert the payoff-dominance principle
into their theory as an axiom.
For these reasons, I believe that Weirich’s suggestion,
though apparently innocuous and sensible, is unsatisfac-
tory. Although it gives the desired result in the simple Hi-
Lo Matching game, it cannot provide a general solution to
the payoff-dominance problem.
Janssen agrees with Weirich that the “principle of co-
ordination,” as he calls it, can be “rationalized on individu-
alistic grounds.” But he bases his rationalization on a “prin-
ciple of optimality” that obviously requires collective
reasoning – it is really just Harsanyi and Selten’s payoff-
dominance principle in disguise – apparently undermining
his claim that he does not need “we thinking” to rationalize
payoff dominance. I have shown in the preceding para-
graphs why I believe that individualistic reasoning cannot
supply a firm foundation for the payoff-dominance princi-
ple. Janssen’s analysis of his version of the Hi-Lo Matching
game (his Table 1) seems to rely on self-confirming expec-
tations. My comments toward the end of section R2 above
apply equally here.
On the other hand, I agree entirely with Janssen that the
problem of coordination (discussed in sect. 5 of the target
article) is quite separate from the problem of cooperation
in social dilemmas (discussed in sect. 6). These problems
should not be confused. Furthermore, I welcome his use-
ful suggestion that psychological game theory should take
account of framing effects. Too little attention has been
paid to framing effects in the literature on game theory and
experimental games, though Bacharach (1993) is a striking
exception, as Janssen points out, and so is Geanakoplos et
al. (1989) (see sect. R7 above). The commentaries of Jones
& Zhang, discussed in section R10 below, and Vlaev &
Chater, discussed in section R11, are also relevant to this
suggestion.
R8.2. Does insufficient reason explain payoff
dominance?
Gintis rejects the solutions that I propose for the payoff-
dominance problem in isolated interactions, namely, team
reasoning and Stackelberg reasoning. He rejects team rea-
soning on the ground that the principle of insufficient rea-
son provides a satisfactory solution. However, in section 5.6
of the target article, I argue that any attempt to solve the
problem on the basis of the principle of insufficient reason
is logically flawed, and Gintis makes no attempt to reply to
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Figure R1. Stag Hunt game
that argument. I do not believe that a solution based on the
principle of insufficient reason can be defended.
In addition, Gintis finds Stackelberg reasoning “implau-
sible” because it allegedly fails to work in the Battle of the
Sexes game: “Stackelberg reasoning in this game would
lead the players never to coordinate, but always to choose
their preferred strategies.” This would be a valid objection
– in fact, a devastating one – if true. But the Battle of the
Sexes is not a Stackelberg-soluble game, because its Stack-
elberg strategies are out of equilibrium; therefore, the the-
ory makes no prediction whatsoever about the choices of
the players. Section 8.2 of the target article explains all this
and includes the sentence: “Stackelberg reasoning man-
dates the choice of Stackelberg strategies only in games that
are Stackelberg soluble.” Gintis is perfectly entitled to con-
sider Stackelberg reasoning as implausible, of course, but
not for the reason that he gives.
Team reasoning and Stackelberg reasoning may not be
appealing as first philosophy, but they do at least plug an ex-
planatory hole. There may be better solutions to the payoff-
dominance problem, but until someone formulates them,
we are stuck with the theories that we have.
R9. Indeterminacy of psychological game theory
Perugini makes the valid point that psychological game
theory, consisting as it does of a plurality of ad hoc theoret-
ical approaches to particular classes of games, generates a
kind of second-order indeterminacy. Various nonstandard
forms of psychological game-theoretic reasoning may pro-
duce determinate local solutions, but they do not add up to
a comprehensive theory because they “offer no tools to se-
lect among these different reasoning concepts” in specific
cases. Perugini illustrates this problem vividly by pointing
out that team reasoning is no better than orthodox game
theory at explaining human behavior in the Ultimatum
game.
Along similar lines, Kokinov points out that different
forms of reasoning involve different optimization criteria
and common beliefs, and that there is nothing to specify
“how and when these additional criteria are triggered and
where the common beliefs come from.” Haller comments
that “novel solution concepts may be compelling in some
contexts and unconvincing under different but similar cir-
cumstances,” as when Stackelberg reasoning yields unsatis-
factory solutions if applied to certain classes of Stackelberg-
solvable games that he identifies.
This is all true. There does not exist a psychological game
theory that is both comprehensive and free of the draw-
backs of orthodox game theory. In the absence of such a
theory, we need particular remedies for particular prob-
lems. This is not so very different from the current state of
theoretical development in any branch of psychology –
there is no comprehensive grand theory, just a collection of
more modest theories that explain certain classes of behav-
ior but are apt to generate absurd or empirically incorrect
predictions when applied in the wrong contexts. I do not
feel any need to apologize for the heterogeneity of psycho-
logical game theory, though of course a comprehensive and
rigorous grand theory would be much better.
From the standpoint of cognitive psychology, Shiffrin
grasps the nettle of theoretical plurality with both hands.
He suggests that rationality should be interpreted not as an
axiomatic system of general applicability, but as a psycho-
logical concept defined in relation to particular games. Ac-
cording to this view, a decision maker must first decide what
theory of rational decision making applies to the current
game, then whether a jointly rational solution exists, and, if
so, what it is. Shiffrin illustrates this by applying Spohn’s
(2001) theory of dependency equilibria to the Centipede
game. Although the general approach seems quite radical,
it looks promising.
I tend to agree with Shiffrin that there must be some-
thing wrong with the backward induction argument as it is
usually applied to the Centipede game (summarized in sect.
7.4 of the target article). The argument is persuasive, and
that may be because it is valid, but it is possible for an ar-
gument to be valid – necessarily true if its premises are true
– but unsound if one or more of its premises is false. The
premises of the backward induction argument are the com-
mon knowledge and rationality (CKR) assumptions set out
in section 4 of the target article, and they are certainly in-
adequate if Shiffrin is right in thinking that rationality must
be defined in terms of how the entire game is played, rather
than how each decision is made. This seems closely related
to the notion of resolute choice (see the end of sect. R8
above).
R10. Depth of strategic reasoning
According to Jones & Zhang, although the CKR axioms
are designed to make normative decision theory applicable
to games (see sect. 3 of the target article), they are far too
limiting. These commentators argue that rational choice
theory can be salvaged if players are assumed to be instru-
mentally rational and to anchor their rationality not on a pri-
ori assumptions of their co-players’ rationality, but on the-
ory-of-mind models of their co-players “based on general
experience with human behavior.”
This is an interesting and plausible approach, but it has
one worrying anomaly. It assumes that players are instru-
mentally rational but that they do not necessarily model
their co-players as instrumentally rational. It seems unrea-
sonable for rational players not to credit their co-players
with rationality equal to their own. Apart from everything
else, the asymmetry implies that players’ models of one an-
other could never be common knowledge in a game. This
may not be a knock-down argument, but it does seem po-
tentially problematic.
In support of their approach, Jones & Zhang discuss a
fascinating pair of experiments by Hedden and Zhang
(2002) on depth of strategic reasoning. The CKR assump-
tions imply indefinitely iterated recursive reasoning (“I
think that you think that I think . . .”), but Hedden and
Zhang found that players tend to operate at shallow levels
only. Some zero-order reasoning was observed, with play-
ers choosing strategies myopically, without considering
their co-players’ viewpoints; but most players began with
first-order reasoning, defined as behavior that maximizes
payoffs against co-players who use zero-order reasoning.
When pitted against first-order co-players, some of the ex-
perimental players began to use second-order reasoning,
but even after 30 repetitions of the game, fewer than 40
percent had progressed beyond first-order reasoning.
Hedden and Zhang’s (2002) experiments were shrewdly
designed and well executed, although I have drawn atten-
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tion elsewhere to some significant methodological prob-
lems with them (Colman 2003). The findings broadly cor-
roborate those of earlier experiments on depth of reason-
ing in so-called beauty contest games and other games that
are solvable by iterated deletion of strongly dominant
strategies (notably Stahl & Wilson 1995). Findings from
disparate experimental games converge on the conclusion
that human players generally manage only first-order or at
most second-order depth of strategic reasoning.
It is worth commenting that research into cognitive pro-
cessing of recursively embedded sentences has also shown
that people can handle only one or two levels of recursion
(Christiansen & Chater 1999; Miller & Isard 1964). The fol-
lowing four-level embedded sentence is virtually incom-
prehensible: The article that the commentary that the stu-
dent that the professor that the university hired taught read
criticized was written by me. One level of embedding
causes no problems: The article that the commentary criti-
cized was written by me. Two levels of embedding can be
handled with effort and concentration: The article that the
commentary that the student read criticized was written by
me. Three or more levels are impossible to process and look
ungrammatical. There are evidently severe limitations to
human cognitive capacities for multi-level recursive think-
ing in language as in games.
I agree with Jones & Zhang that facts like these need to
be taken into account in any descriptively accurate game
theory. But they seem to show that human players are
themselves imperfectly rational, not merely that they
model their co-players as irrational. In any event, a theory
according to which players are instrumentally rational but
do not credit their co-players with the same sophistication
as themselves seems internally unsatisfactory.
In the Centipede game, singled out for discussion by
these commentators, their assumptions do indeed appear
to allow Player II to respond to a cooperative opening move
by Player I. This may enable Player II to model Player I as
a tit-for-tat player and therefore to respond cooperatively.
However, it seems that the backward induction argument
may nevertheless be retained, in which case, unless I am
mistaken, Player I may be left with a reason to cooperate
and a reason to defect – a contradiction. The Centipede
game is a notoriously hard nut to crack.
R11. Prospect relativity in games
When people first think about repeated games, they often
fall into the trap of assuming that any theoretical conclu-
sions about a one-shot game can be applied to each repeti-
tion of it by the same players. The supergame that results
when a stage game is repeated a number of times is, in fact,
a new game with its own equilibrium points, and conclu-
sions about the stage game cannot be applied straightfor-
wardly to the supergame. Psychologically, however, players
frequently think about each repetition as a separate game.
A grandiose question arising from this is whether we
should model all the games in a player’s life as a single su-
pergame. We would probably want to call it the Game of
Life, had John Conway not already taken the name for his
cellular automata. It seems highly unlikely that different
games have absolutely no bearing on one another but
equally unlikely that people analyze them all together. This
is an empirical question, and Vlaev & Chater take a step
in the direction of answering it. They cite evidence that
prospects in risky individual decisions cannot be considered
independently of previous risky decisions, and that such
prospect relativity also occurs in games. They are probably
right in suggesting that psychological game theory needs to
be supplemented by a cognitive game theory.
The findings on game relativity that Vlaev & Chater cite
relate to the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, though the
findings may turn out to apply across different games. They
found that cooperation and expectations of cooperation in
each stage game were strongly dependent on cooperative-
ness in preceding games. Their explanation for these find-
ings is that players have poor notions of absolute coopera-
tiveness, risk, and utility, and that they therefore make
relative judgments. This suggestion fits in with evidence
from cognitive psychology, and (if I understand the findings
correctly) prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979;
Tversky & Kahneman 1992). It is also closely related to the
evidence cited by Fantino & Stolarz-Fantino of a pro-
nounced effect of past history on decision making. This
work provides another answer to Janssen’s plea for more
research into “how people describe the game situation to
themselves.”
R12. Research methodology
I think that Schuster’s analogy between psychological
game theory and scientific doctrines that are “amended
again and again in a vain attempt to forge an accommoda-
tion with a new reality” is a little unfair. He may have in
mind Ptolemaic epicycles, postulated to explain the ob-
served deviations of the orbits of some celestial bodies from
perfect circles before Copernicus introduced a heliocentric
astronomy in the sixteenth century, and mentioned by Sig-
mund. Sigmund referred to epicycles in connection with a
relatively innocent amendment designed to bring game
theory more closely in line with intuition and empirical ob-
servations.
The purpose of any theory is to explain, and there are
three ways in which it can prove inadequate: through being
indeterminate, misleading, or unfalsifiable. A theory is in-
determinate if it fails to generate clear predictions; it is mis-
leading if it generates predictions that are refuted by em-
pirical observations; and it is unfalsifiable if there are no
empirical observations that could refute it and therefore no
possibility of testing it. Some aspects of game theory are
certainly misleading inasmuch as they generate predictions
that are refuted by empirical observations, especially in so-
cial dilemmas, backward induction games, and Ultimatum
games; but its most serious and obvious failing is its sys-
tematic indeterminacy. Ptolemaic epicycles and similar the-
oretical amendments are objectionable because they ren-
der theories unfalsifiable. Neither orthodox game theory
nor psychological game theory can be accused of that.
Science advances by replacing old theories with new ones
that make better predictions. Newton’s theory explained
the motions of the planets, moons, and comets in the solar
system without epicycles, and it survived empirical tests
that could have falsified it. For centuries it appeared to
yield no misleading predictions, until, in 1859, astronomers
discovered that the planet Mercury drifts from the pre-
dicted orbit by what turned out to be 43 seconds of arc, or
roughly one hundredth of a degree, per century. Further-
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more, it failed to predict bending of light and black holes.
In 1916, Einstein put forward a general theory of relativity
that removed these inadequacies and also withstood em-
pirical tests that could have falsified it. It now appears that
Einstein’s theory does not predict cosmic radiation satisfac-
torily, and no doubt it too will be replaced by something
better in due course. That is how science advances in ideal
cases.
I believe that Schuster’s characterization of experimen-
tal games is misleading. He asserts that “the basic design of
laboratory experiments” involves a total absence of social
interaction between participants: “anonymous players are
physically isolated in separate cubicles.” This may be a fair
description of many experiments, but it is far from being
universal. Communication is integral to experiments based
on Ultimatum games and bargaining games in general, and
it often plays an important part in experiments on coalition-
formation in cooperative games. Even in research into be-
havior in dyadic and multi-player social dilemmas, numer-
ous experiments, dating back to 1960, have focused on the
effects of verbal and nonverbal communication between
players (see Colman 1995a).
The bleak picture that Schuster paints of experimental
games, with players isolated in solitary confinement and a
total “absence of real-life social interaction,” contains a
grain of truth, but it is an exaggeration. One of his suggested
alternatives, “to study examples [of real cooperation] . . . un-
der free-ranging conditions, where cooperation is intrinsi-
cally social,” is fraught with problems. Ethological investi-
gations are certainly useful, especially in research with
animals, but the lack of experimental manipulation of inde-
pendent variables and problems of controlling extraneous
variables limit the conclusions that can be drawn from
them. His other suggestion, “to incorporate free-ranging
conditions into experimental models of cooperation that
allow social and non-social variables to be manipulated,”
seems more promising, and he cites some interesting ani-
mal research along those lines.
R13. Concluding remarks
I approached the commentaries with an open mind, and
many of the criticisms seemed cogent and damaging when
I first read them. After thinking about them carefully, I
came to the conclusion that some are indeed valid, and I ac-
knowledge them in this response. In particular, I accept
that the theoretical plurality of psychological game theory
generates an unwelcome second-order indeterminacy, and
that there are earlier theoretical contributions that provide
solutions to some – though not all – of the problems dis-
cussed in the target article. However, the various attempts
to show that these problems are not really problematic if
viewed in the correct light, or to show how they can be
solved without recourse to psychological game theory or
nonstandard assumptions, turn out on careful examination
to be based on misunderstandings or misleading argu-
ments. When an argument is expressed informally, it some-
times appears far more compelling than it really is.
After studying and replying to the commentaries, my in-
terpretations of the fundamental issues raised in the target
article remain substantially unchanged, although I have
learned a great deal. On the central questions, my opinions
have actually been reinforced by being exposed to criti-
cisms that appeared convincing at first but less persuasive
on closer inspection.
I am more confident than before that the standard inter-
pretation of instrumental rationality as expected utility
maximization does not and cannot explain important fea-
tures of interactive decision making. This central thesis has
been endorsed by several of the commentators and sub-
jected to critical examination from many different angles by
others, and I believe that it has survived intact and has even
been fortified. If the central thesis is correct, then psycho-
logical game theory, in some form or another, is needed to
provide a more complete and accurate understanding of
strategic interaction. This is an exciting challenge.
Replying to the commentaries has sharpened and clari-
fied many of the issues and helped me to view them from
fresh angles. Seriously interested readers will also gain a
broader perspective and clearer insight into the fundamen-
tal problems and solutions by reading the target article
along with the commentaries and my response, rather than
by reading the target article alone.
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NOTES
1. Monterosso & Ainslie claim that this justification for
choosing H is “descriptively accurate” and “prescriptively ratio-
nal,” but they do not explain how this can be so, given that it leads
to a contradiction.
2. In front of you is a transparent box containing $1,000 and an
opaque box containing either $1 million or nothing. You have the
choice of taking either the opaque box only, or both boxes. You
have been told, and believe, that a predictor of human behavior,
such as a sophisticated computer programmed with psychological
information, has already put $1 million in the opaque box if and
only if it has predicted that you will take only that box, and not the
transparent box as well, and you know that the predictor is correct
in most cases (95 percent of cases, say, although the exact figure is
not critical). Both strategies can apparently be justified by simple
and apparently irrefutable arguments. The expected utility of tak-
ing only the opaque box is greater than that of taking both boxes,
but the strategy of taking both boxes is strongly dominant in the
sense that it yields a better payoff irrespective of what is already
in the boxes. For a thorough examination of this problem, see
Campbell and Sowden (1985).
3. A researcher wishes to test the hypothesis that all ravens are
black. According to the logic of empirical induction, every black
raven that is observed is a confirming instance that renders the hy-
pothesis more probable. However, the propositions “All ravens are
black” and “All non-black objects are not ravens” are logically
equivalent, having the same truth value and differing merely in
wording. It follows that, on a rainy day, instead of examining
ravens, the researcher could stay indoors and examine non-black
objects, such as a green book, a blue curtain, a white lampshade,
and so on, checking that they are not ravens, because each of these
is also a confirming instance of the hypothesis. Most logicians
agree that this conclusion is true, and that its prima facie absur-
dity arises from a psychological illusion rooted in misguided intu-
ition. (On the other hand, perhaps it is a refutation of induction.)
4. In Van Lange’s (1999) model, all social value orientations are
interpreted as maximizations of simple linear functions of the vari-
ables W1 (own payoff), W2 (co-player’s payoff), and W3 (“equal-
ity in outcomes”). Although W3 is not formally defined, from Van
Lange’s examples it is obviously equal to – uW1 – W2u. Altruism is
simply maximization of W2, and because in the Hi-Lo Matching
game W1 5 W2, this is equivalent to maximizing W1. It is not hard
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to see that no linear combination of these three variables can solve
the payoff-dominance problem. Note first that, because W3 5
– uW1 – W2u, any linear function of W1, W2, and W3 can be ex-
pressed as aW1 1 bW2, where a and b are suitably chosen real
numbers. Furthermore, because W1 5 W2 in the Hi-Lo Match-
ing game, maximizing aW1 1 bW2 amounts to maximizing W1 for
any values of a and b, and this is simply individualistic payoff max-
imization, which leaves neither player with any reason for choos-
ing H, as shown in section 5.6 of the target article.
5. Among those that spring readily to mind are behavior in
market entry games (Camerer & Lovallo 1999); coordination
through the confidence heuristic (Thomas & McFadyen 1995);
timing effects in games with asymmetric equilibria (Cooper et al.
1993); and depth-of-reasoning effects in normal-form games (Col-
man 2003; Hedden & Zhang 2002).
6. In the first experimental demonstration of commitment and
self-control in animals, Rachlin and Green (1972) presented five
hungry pigeons with a repeated choice between an immediate
small reward (two seconds eating grain) and a delayed larger re-
ward (four seconds delay followed by four seconds eating grain).
All of the pigeons chose the immediate small reward on virtually
every trial. The same pigeons were then presented with a repeated
choice between (a) 16 seconds delay followed by the choice de-
scribed above between an immediate small reward and a delayed
larger reward; and (b) 20 seconds delay followed by the larger re-
ward with no choice. Four of the five pigeons chose (b) on most
trials – three of them on more than 80 percent of trials. This looks
to me very much like resolute choice (Machina 1991; McClennen
1985; 1990). A similar phenomenon has more recently been ob-
served in honeybees (Cheng et al. 2002). For a review of research
into self-control, see Rachlin (2000).
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